Schuler v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 2018
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134
• Citation: 112 N.E.3d 180
• Parties: Kevin Andrew SCHULER, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

112 N.E.3d 180

Kevin Andrew SCHULER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Supreme Court Case No. 31S00-1703-LW-134

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: September 13, 2018

FILED December 4, 2018

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Brent Westerfeld, Andrew J. Borland, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew A. Kobe, Jesse R. Drum, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Joshua Otto Schalk, Harrison County Prosecuting Attorney, Corydon, Indiana

David, Justice

Defendant Kevin Andrew Schuler pled guilty to the murder of Asenath Arnold and to felony murder for the death of Gary Henderson at the hands of his accomplice Austin Scott. Schuler was sentenced to life without parole for the murder charge and received a consecutive sixty-five-year sentence for the felony murder. Schuler raises four issues in this appeal, arguing a violation of his Miranda rights, insufficient evidence to support his sentence, that his sentence was inappropriate, and failure of the trial court to meet certain requirements in its sentencing statement. We affirm the trial court on each of Schuler's first three claims but remand this matter for a new sentencing statement.

Facts and Procedural History

Asenath Arnold was found dead in her Harrison County farm home on the morning of August 3, 2013. Arnold, a mostly-bedridden fifty-seven-year-old woman, had been brutally beaten in her bedroom; her head was significantly disfigured, and blood was splattered on the walls and pooled underneath her bed. Gary Henderson, who slept in an upstairs bedroom in the same home, was also found dead with multiple stab wounds.

Later that day in adjacent Floyd County, New Albany police officers responded to a call about gun shots fired in a residential neighborhood. Police located Austin Scott and Defendant Kevin Schuler shortly thereafter and placed them under arrest. After Miranda warnings were given to both individuals, Scott offered that he "killed a man last night" and that Schuler killed someone as well. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 238, Tr. Vol. 5 at 104, 107). Police confirmed that Harrison County was working a double homicide and took Schuler to the Floyd County Sherriff's Department for further questioning.

At the police station, interrogators learned that Schuler and Scott were driving a four-wheeler early that morning and stopped at Arnold and Henderson's farmhouse to siphon gas from a tractor. Schuler knew the home because he had done work on the property a few years earlier. Schuler admitted to police that he followed Scott into the home where Scott pulled out a knife, went upstairs, and killed Henderson. The two took several items from the house including rifles and prescription medication but returned when Schuler realized he left his backpack at the scene. Schuler and Scott re-entered the home to see if they could find any more pills. At some point, Schuler found a singletree—a wooden bar normally used to hold horses together—on the property and carried it into the house.

Once Schuler and Scott were back in the house, Arnold called out to the intruders and started to emerge from her bedroom on the first floor. Schuler punched Arnold and she stumbled back to her bed. Schuler then took the singletree and struck Arnold on top of her head. Arnold prayed and pleaded with Schuler for her life. According to Scott, Schuler swung the singletree with two hands "like a sledgehammer," striking Arnold at least twice and as many as four times. (St. Ex. 30-4 at 47:53-52:00). In addition to Schuler hitting Arnold with the singletree, Scott also stabbed her in the face. Although he couldn't be completely sure whether he or Scott killed Arnold, Schuler told police, "I'm almost positive I killed her." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 250). An autopsy determined Arnold died of multiple blunt force injuries and sharp force wounds to the head. Schuler and Scott took Arnold's rings and medication before leaving the home.

Schuler was charged with three counts of murder, Class A felony robbery, Class A felony burglary, and Class D felony theft.

The State subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, alleging that Schuler intentionally killed Arnold while committing the crime of robbery. Schuler ultimately pled guilty to Count 1, murder, and Count 2, felony murder, and in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss its request for the death penalty and instead requested a sentence of life imprisonment without parole under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9. The parties agreed that the trial court alone would conduct the sentencing hearing to determine whether life without parole or a term of years would be imposed. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court verbally gave its reasons for the ultimate sentence, including a discussion of potential aggravating and mitigating factors. Schuler was sentenced to life without parole on Count 1 and sixty-five (65) years on Count 2 to be served consecutively.

The present appeal ensued, which we accepted under mandatory review pursuant to Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(A)(1)(a). Additional facts will be presented below as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Schuler raises four issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: (1) whether Schuler's Miranda rights were violated during a custodial interrogation; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Schuler intentionally killed Asenath Arnold; (3) whether Schuler's sentence was inappropriate; and (4) whether the trial court's sentencing statement complied with Harrison v. State and reflects appropriate sentencing considerations. We will analyze each issue in turn.

I. Schuler's Miranda rights were not violated.

Schuler first argues that his Miranda rights were violated when police failed to stop all questioning after he requested his attorney during a police interrogation. Schuler was interrogated on two separate occasions by Harrison County Detective Nick Smith: first after Schuler was stopped and arrested in New Albany and second when Schuler was taken to the Floyd County Police Department about an hour later. During the second interrogation, the following interaction took place:

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DET. SMITH: All right. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to consult with an attorney and have that attorney present during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you before any questioning at — at no cost. If you choose to answer any questions we'd ask you now, you still have the right to stop answering questions at any time, that never changes. Do you understand that?

MR. SCHULER: Have my attorney now?

DET. SMITH: It's up to you. If you ask me for an attorney, I can't ask you no more questions.

MR. SCHULER: This isn't recorded or nothing.

DET. SMITH: Everything we do is recorded, buddy. I've got to tell your story and I've got to tell the truth. I don't want to hide nothing. If you want an attorney, tell me now, and then I will not ask you any questions.

MR. SCHULER: I — I want my attorney, but I'll answer, you can ask me questions however.

DET. SMITH: You got to be specific, buddy. I mean, if you're telling me you want an attorney, I cannot talk to you any more.

MR. SCHULER: You — you can go ahead and talk to me, that's fine.

DET. SMITH: Are you — I can't really even ask you. Are you saying you want to talk to an attorney before you talk to me?

MR. SCHULER: No, you can go ahead.

DET. SMITH: Are you positive?

MR. SCHULER: Yes.

DET. SMITH: Okay. So you want to talk to me?

MR. SCHULER: Yes, sir.

DET. SMITH: Okay. Did you mean a minute ago that you wanted an attorney first?

MR. SCHULER: Oh, no, I have an attorney. I don't know if I'm supposed to talk to him first or you. It doesn't matter, I'll go ahead and talk to you.

DET. SMITH: Only if you want to, buddy.

MR. SCHULER: Yeah.

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(Tr. Vol. 2 at 156-57). In the course of the interrogation that followed this exchange, Schuler gave details about the two murders and admitted that he at least played a role in the death of Asenath Arnold—eventually stating, "I'm almost positive I killed her." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 244, 250).

Before entering his guilty plea, Schuler moved to suppress these statements, arguing that he unambiguously and unequivocally requested an attorney. Thus, the interview should have stopped, and any statements made after this invocation of his right to counsel should have been suppressed. The trial court, however, denied Schuler's motion and proceeded to accept his guilty plea.

Schuler asks our Court to find that his Fifth Amendment right to an attorney was violated and that his motion to suppress should have been granted. When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, we review this denial in a manner similar to other sufficiency issues. Hartman v. State , 988 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. 2013). We do not reweigh evidence and there "must be substantial evidence of probative value in the record to support the trial court's decision." Id. Within this sufficiency review, we review all issues of law de novo . Id.

To the extent Schuler claims his request for an attorney was unambiguous and unequivocal, we disagree. When a person is questioned by law enforcement officers after being taken into custody, that person must first "be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once the accused requests counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Carr v. State , 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ind. 2010) (citing Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ). This request, however, must be "unambiguous and unequivocal." Carr , 934 N.E.2d at 1102 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S....