Schulte v. Fitch

• Decision Date: 27 February 1925
• Docket Number: No. 24578.,24578.
• Citation: 202 N.W. 719,162 Minn. 184
• Parties: SCHULTE et al. v. FITCH et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

202 N.W. 719

162 Minn. 184

SCHULTE et al. v. FITCH et al.

No. 24578.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 27, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; John B. Sanborn, Judge.

Consolidated suits by William F. Schulte and others against C. P. Fitch and others. From an order denying application for temporary injunction, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Manahan, Sullivan & Hoogesteger, of St. Paul, for appellants.

C. L. Hilton, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

TAYLOR, C.

Chapter 269, Laws of 1923, provides, in section 1:

"The boards of county commissioners of the several counties of this state are hereby authorized upon petition of a majority of the persons owning cattle in the county * * * to appropriate * * * a sum of money not exceeding twenty-five cents per head of cattle for each tuberculin test that may be administered, until the percentage of tuberculous cattle within the county is reduced to meet the requirements of a `modified accredited area' as defined and approved by the United States Department of Agriculture and the State Live Stock Sanitary Board of Minnesota, for the purpose of aiding in the testing of cattle in the county for tuberculosis and of carrying out sanitary and quarantine regulations."

Other sections of the act provide that the state live stock sanitary board shall enter into an agreement with any county board, making such appropriation, to test all cattle in the county for tuberculosis, provided funds are available for the payment of indemnities as provided by law, and provided also that qualified veterinarians are available to make the tests; that for the purpose of receiving federal aid the federal bureau of animal industry may be a party to such agreement; that the owners of cattle within such county shall submit them for tests and physical examinations and shall cause all infected animals to be slaughtered; and that the state live stock sanitary board shall make and enforce all necessary quarantine rules and regulations within the area covered by the agreement.

In May, 1923, the board of county commissioners of Meeker county, under and pursuant to this statute, entered into an agreement with the state live stock sanitary board and the federal bureau of animal industry by which the state board, with the assistance of the federal bureau, was to test all cattle in the county for tuberculosis, to cause all infected cattle to be slaughtered, and to put into effect and enforce the rules and regulations necessary to establish the county as a "modified accredited tuberculosis-free area," as defined by the federal Department of Agriculture.

The live stock sanitary board proceeded to make the tests as provided in the regulations. The first test disclosed 553 infected herds. The board proceeded to carry out the provisions for eradicating the disease, and a later test showed that the number of infected herds had been reduced from 553 to 60. To accomplish the purpose more effectively the board adopted additional quarantine regulations. Edward Branson and five other cattle owners, engaged in the dairy business in the county, then brought an action to enjoin the county commissioners, the live stock sanitary board, and the board of health from carrying out or enforcing the provisions of the agreement on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional, and that the agreement entered into and the regulations adopted by the board are unauthorized and void. William F. Schulte and seven other taxpayers of the county brought a similar action on the same grounds. By consent the two actions were consolidated. The plaintiffs applied for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from carrying out the provisions of the agreement or enforcing the quarantine regulations during the pendency of the action. The application was denied and the plaintiffs appealed.

The two assignments of error challenge the constitutionality of chapter 269, Laws of 1923; and the authority of the state live stock sanitary board to institute criminal prosecutions against cattle owners who refuse to permit their cattle to be tested.

In support of their contention that the statute infringes the provisions of the Constitution, plaintiffs assert that it imposes taxation for a private purpose; that it makes the state a party to a work of internal improvement; that it provides for a tax not uniform on the same class of subjects; that it denies equal protection of the laws, and that it is special or class legislation.

That tuberculosis is a dangerous contagious or infectious disease which attacks both human beings and domestic animals; that it is prevalent throughout the state among both human beings and domestic animals; and that it is communicated to human beings, especially to children, by milk and other food products from infected animals, stands undisputed. The object of the statute is to promote and preserve the public health by providing a means for the control and suppression of this disease among cattle. That it is for a public purpose is beyond question.

"That the preservation of the public health is one of the duties devolving upon the state, as a sovereign power, cannot be successfully controverted. In fact, among all of the objects sought to be secured by governmental laws, none is more important than the preservation of the public health; and an imperative obligation rests upon the state, through its proper instrumentalities or agencies, to take all necessary steps to promote this object. This duty finds ample support in the police power which is inherent in the state and which the latter cannot surrender. It is as much for the interest of the state that the public health should be preserved as that life should be made secure." 12 R. C. L. 126.

"It is a well-recognized principle that the protection of the public health is one of the first duties of government. Therefore, whatever rationally tends to promote and preserve the public health is an appropriate subject of legislation." 29 C. J. 242.

As the statute is clearly a measure for the protection of the public against disease, it is not within the constitutional inhibition against taxation for private purposes, nor within the inhibition against the state engaging in works of internal improvement. That dairy products certified as coming from a "modified accredited area," as defined in the federal regulations, bring higher prices in the markets than such products from other areas, a fact shown by the record, does not establish that the act is for a private purpose, as claimed by plaintiffs, but that the public recognizes that such areas are comparatively free from infection, and that food products therefrom may be consumed with little or no danger of contracting the disease.

Plaintiffs apparently base their contention that the act provides for a tax not uniform on the same class of subjects on the fact that the amount to be appropriated by a county for the purpose of making the tests is to be determined by the total number of cattle in the county instead of by the number infected. They urge that a county having a large number of cattle with only a few infected is required to raise a greater sum than a county having a smaller number but with a larger number infected. We see little force in this contention, for all cattle in the county must be tested and the number infected is not known at the time the appropriation is made.

The contention that the act is special or class legislation and therefore violates the equality rules raises the important question in the case.

Laws for controlling and suppressing disease, and for promoting the public health are always given a broad and liberal construction that they may accomplish the purpose intended in enacting them. Schmidt v. County of Stearns, 34 Minn. 112, 24 N. W. 358; State ex rel. v. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 353, 90 N. W. 783, 58 L. R. A. 78, 91 Am. St. Rep. 351; Town of Iosco v. Board of County Commissioners, 93 Minn. 134, 100 N. W. 734; 29 C. J. 243.

The state may make municipalities, counties or other territorial subdivisions its agencies in performing its governmental functions. To accomplish its purpose, it may employ any agency it pleases. State v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N. W. 269, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1127; Associated Schools v. School Dist. No. 83, 122 Minn. 254, 142 N. W. 325, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 200; State ex rel. v. George, 123 Minn. 59, 142 N. W. 945; Berman v. State Agriculture Society, 93 Minn. 125, 100 N. W. 732; State v. E. Boehm, 92 Minn. 374, 100 N. W. 95; Kramer v. County of Renville, 144 Minn. 195, 175 N. W. 101; State Board of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N. E. 1019, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 52.

By this statute the state made the counties as well as the live stock sanitary board a part of the governmental machinery for protecting and preserving the public health. The powers to be exercised and the duties to be performed by a county under it are to be exercised and performed merely as a governmental agency. Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 63 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 783; Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89, 50 L. R. A. 64, 80 Am. St. Rep. 195; Henderson County Board of Health v. Ward, 107 Ky. 477, 54 S. W. 725; Forbes v. Escambia County Board of Health, 28 Fla. 26, 9 So. 862, 13 L. R. A. 549.

The power to enact laws is vested in the Legislature and is without limit except as restricted by the Constitution. A statute enacted by the Legislature is presumed to be valid, and can be declared invalid only when the court can point out some constitutional provision which it transgresses. Plaintiffs contend that this statute violates the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the Constitution which declare that:

"The Legislature shall pass no local or special law regulating the affairs of * * * any county, city, village, township, ward or school district."

And that:

"All such laws shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state."

In support of this...