Town of Plainville v. Travelers Indem. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 August 1979
• Citation: 178 Conn. 664,425 A.2d 131
• Parties: TOWN OF PLAINVILLE v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 131

425 A.2d 131

178 Conn. 664

TOWN OF PLAINVILLE v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 15, 1979.

Decided Aug. 21, 1979.

Richard M. Corr, Corporation Counsel, Plainville, for the plaintiff.

Robert C. Danaher, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was James T. Flaherty, Hartford, for the defendant.

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and PETERS, JJ.

COTTER, Chief Justice.

The parties have stipulated as to the following relevant facts: On July 1, 1975, Raymond Bourgoing, a paid, regular, uninformed member of the Plainville police department, suffered a heart seizure in a doctor's office in Plainville. He was taken by ambulance to New Britain General Hospital and was subsequently released. Bourgoing died on July 7, 1975, due to an acute myocardial infarction. Bourgoing had previously passed a physical examination which failed to indicate evidence of heart disease or hypertension. He was survived by his widow, Marie A. Bourgoing.

On December 5, 1975, the plaintiff town was notified of Mrs. Bourgoing's intention to file a claim for benefits under General Statutes §§ 7-433a and 7-433c. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a notice with the workmen's compensation commission of its intention to contest liability to pay compensation on the ground that it denied that "the injury complained of arose out of and during the course of the claimant's employment." At an informal hearing on February 23, 1976, however, the plaintiff town conceded that the claim for benefits was valid under § 7-433c. Consequently, on February 25, the commissioner's finding and award was issued granting benefits to the claimant in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 7-433c.

Thereupon, counsel for the plaintiff notified the defendant, Travelers Indemnity Company, that the town considered the Bourgoing claim to be within the purview of the "Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy" issued to the plaintiff town by the defendant and in effect at all times relevant to that claim. On March 15, 1976, the defendant denied the plaintiff's claim under the policy on the ground that the policy did not provide coverage for claims made under General Statutes § 7-433c, and the present litigation ensued.

Following the trial court's decision overruling the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint alleging a breach of the policy provisions, the court, at the request and with the consent of all the parties, reserved the following question for the consideration and advice of this court: "Does the 'Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy' number DK UB 446B846-3 75 issued by Travelers Indemnity Company to the Town of Plainville provide coverage for the benefits to which Marie A. Bourgoing is entitled under Section 7-433c, Connecticut General Statutes, by virtue of the death of her husband, Officer Raymond Bourgoing of the Town of Plainville Police Department?"

The pertinent provisions of the policy between the plaintiff and the defendant obligate the insurer "(t)o pay promptly when due all compensation and other benefits required of the insured by the workmen's compensation law," and define the term "workmen's compensation law" as "the workmen's compensation law and any occupational disease law" of the state of Connecticut "but does not include those provisions of any such law which provide nonoccupational disability benefits." General Statutes § 7-433c, the provision under which Marie Bourgoing was granted compensation for the death of her husband, mandates, upon the satisfaction of certain preconditions, that municipalities pay compensation for the death or disability of municipal policemen and firemen who suffer "either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease." Consequently, the determinative issue as framed in this case can be simply stated: Was the compensation awarded to Marie Bourgoing under § 7-433c an award of occupational disability benefits required to be paid by the plaintiff under a workmen's compensation law or occupational disease law of this state?

I

Connecticut statutes concerning compensation for policemen and firemen who die or are disabled as a result of hypertension or heart disease have had a rather tumultuous history. In 1951, the General Assembly enacted a statute providing that any impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in the total or partial disability of a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service shall be presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty. Sup.1951 § 175b. The rebuttable presumption afforded to firemen was, in 1953, made applicable to regular members of paid, municipal police department; Sup.1953 § 308c; and, in 1955, was applied to situations where death, as well as disability, results. Sup.1955 § 407d.

This provision, which was repealed and reenacted in 1961 as General Statutes § 7-433a; Public Acts 1961, No. 330, §§ 1, 2; was amended by the legislature in 1967 making it explicit that the statute applies whether the condition occurs while the policeman or fireman is on duty or off duty at the time. Public Acts 1967, No. 770, § 1. Apparently still dissatisfied with the restrictive implementation of those provisions, the General Assembly, in 1969, again amended the statute by making the state retirement system applicable to this section and by substituting a conclusive presumption that the hypertension or heart disease arose out of and in the course of the employee's employment in lieu of the simple presumption. Public Acts 1969, No. 380, § 1.

In Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 285 A.2d 318, however, this court held (p. 143) that the conclusive presumption prescribed by General Statutes § 7-433a in the adjudication of workmen's compensation cases was in contravention of the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions since it operated to completely bar an employer from attempting to prove the negative fact that in a contested case a heart ailment was not causally connected with the employment. In obvious response to the suggestion in Ducharme that the objective of this legislation might be constitutionally attained by "legislation requiring municipalities to provide special compensation or a bonus for policemen and firemen or supplemental or special risk insurance in the case of such occupations"; id., 144, 285 A.2d 322; the General Assembly thereafter enacted § 7-433c in its present form. Upon a subsequent constitutional challenge, the validity of § 7-433c was sustained in 1975 in Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 357 A.2d 922, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S.Ct. 14, 46 L.Ed.2d 26. In Grover, we concluded that this statute, which "simply (provides) special compensation, or even an outright bonus, to qualifying policemen and firemen," serves a proper public purpose and does not create a class preference which contravenes § 1 of article first of the Connecticut constitution. Id., 88-89, 357 A.2d 922, 924; see Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corporation, 167 Conn. 111, 118, 355 A.2d 72.

Mindful of the above historical background, we now address the central issue involved in the present appeal that is, the proper characterization of the benefits paid pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 7-433c.

II

"The purpose of the workmen's compensation law has always been to provide compensation for an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment regardless of fault ...." Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886; Bassett v. Stratford Lumber Co., 105 Conn. 297, 298-99, 135 A. 574; see 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 1. Although in some states work-related, compensable "injuries" were strictly limited to "accidental bodily injuries" under workmen's compensation provisions; see 1B Larson, op. cit. §§ 41.00-41.31; Miller v. American Steel & Wire Co., 90 Conn. 349, 97 A. 345; all states now provide at least some coverage for "occupation diseases." 1B Larson, op. cit. § 41.10; see De la Pena v. Jackson Stone Co., 103 Conn. 93, 96-98, 130 A. 89; Dupre v. Atlantic Refining Co., 98 Conn. 646, 651-52, 120 A. 288; see General Statutes § 31-275 (Rev. to 1979). Under Connecticut's workmen's compensation provisions; General Statutes c. 568; a compensable injury includes an "occupational disease" which is defined to include "any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the employee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such." General Statutes § 31-275; see Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 133 Conn. 78, 48 A.2d 369; Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 118 Conn. 29, 37, 170 A. 146.

As discussed in part I, supra, the predecessor provisions of General Statutes § 7-433c did not, in themselves, require the payment of benefits to eligible firemen and policemen. Rather, those enactments simply provided these specific municipal employees with an advantage in proceeding under the workmen's compensation law of this state where benefits were sought for death or disability due to heart ailments.

By contrast, General Statutes § 7-433c (Rev. to 1979) is not a legislative attempt to place such policemen and firemen in a superior position in proceedings under chapter 568. "Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 568 ... to the contrary," General Statutes § 7-433c specifically requires the payment of compensation to firemen and policemen who have successfully passed a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease and who subsequently die or are disabled as a result of such conditions. It casts no burden of proof upon the claimant to show that such disease resulted from the employee's occupation or that it occurred in the line and scope of his employment. The mere fact that a fireman or...