Schutza v. Cuddeback

• Decision Date: 10 April 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 16–cv–02746–BAS–KSC
• Citation: 262 F.Supp.3d 1025
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Scott SCHUTZA, Plaintiff, v. William B. CUDDEBACK; Lou G. Cuddeback; Interstate Group LLC, Defendants.

262 F.Supp.3d 1025

Scott SCHUTZA, Plaintiff,

v.William B. CUDDEBACK; Lou G. Cuddeback; Interstate Group LLC, Defendants.

Case No. 16–cv–02746–BAS–KSC

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed April 10, 2017

Russell C. Handy, Potter Handy LLP, Phyl Grace, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

William A. Adams, Norton, Moore, and Adams, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS STATE LAW CLAIM [ECF No. 5]

Hon. Cynthia Bashant, United States District Judge

On November 07, 2016, Plaintiff Scott Schutza commenced this civil action against Defendants William Cuddeback, Lou Cuddeback, and Interstate Group, LLC ("Defendants") alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ("ADA"), and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act §§ 51–53 ("Unruh Act"). Defendants now move to dismiss the state law claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff has not opposed.¹

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) ; CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim.² (ECF No. 5.)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Scott Schutza is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendants own the real property known as "TrailersPlus" located at or about 12024 Woodside Avenue, Lakeside, California. (Id. ¶¶ 2–5.)

In February 2016, Plaintiff went to TrailersPlus in search of a trailer. (Id. ¶ 10.) However, as a result of his physical disabilities, Plaintiff alleges he was unable to access or use the property because of various access barriers, including barriers in the parking lot, at the entrance door, in the establishment itself, and in the restroom area. (Id. ¶¶ 22–27.) Plaintiff contends that he personally encountered said problems, and consequently, was denied full and equal access of the property. (Id. ¶ 28.)

On November 7, 2016, Plaintiff sued Defendants for violations of the ADA and the Unruh Act. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages under the Unruh Act and injunctive relief under the ADA. (Compl. 9:18–25.)

On December 1, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Defendants primarily contend that: (1) Plaintiff’s state law claim raises novel and complex issues of state law due to California’s recent adoption of pleading requirements for disability discrimination lawsuits; (2) the state law claim substantially predominates over the federal law claim because Plaintiff is seeking statutory damages only available under California law; and (3) Plaintiff is engaging in forum shopping. (EFC No. 5.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute provides:

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental jurisdiction is mandatory unless prohibited by § 1367(b), or unless one of the exceptions in § 1367(c) applies. Under § 1367(c), a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Underlying the § 1367(c) inquiry are considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, and comity. "[I]f these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims[.]" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Under § 1367(c), "a district court can decline jurisdiction under any one of [the statute’s] four provisions." San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of L.A. , 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998). When a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim pursuant to one of the first three provisions of the statute—that is, §§ 1367(c)(1)–(3) —the court need not state its reasons for dismissal. Id. However, when the court declines supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the statute’s "exceptional circumstances" provision—that is, § 1367(c)(4) —the court must "articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional," and consider whether values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity provide compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Exec. Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court , 24 F.3d 1545, 1552 (9th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The ADA

The ADA prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A sales or rental establishment is a "public accommodation" for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E).

To prevail on a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she has a disability; (2) the defendant operates, leases, or owns a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied appropriate accommodations by the defendant because of his or her disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. , 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). "[A] plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation of the ADA." Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido , 370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the ADA, "damages are not recoverable ... only injunctive relief is available." Wander v. Kaus , 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) ).

B. The Unruh Act

The Unruh Act provides in part that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal, and no matter what their ... disability ... are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act also provides that a violation of the federal ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

As a general matter, a claim under the Unruh Act requires a plaintiff to allege an intentional act or omission on behalf of defendant. See Org. for the Advancement of Minorities v. Brick Oven Rest. , 406 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, "[a] violation of the Unruh Act may be maintained independent of an ADA claim where a plaintiff pleads ‘intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the [Unruh] Act.’ " Schutza v. McDonald's Corp. , 133 F.Supp.3d 1241, 1247 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted). However, a showing of intentional discrimination is not required where a plaintiff brings an Unruh Act claim on the grounds that a defendant has violated the ADA. See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. , 46 Cal.4th 661, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 685, 208 P.3d 623, 628–29 (2009) ; see also Lentini , 370 F.3d at 847 ("[N]o showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA violation.").

Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for recovery of monetary damages. A plaintiff may recover actual damages for each and every offense "up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000)[.]" Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). "The litigant need not prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000." Molski , 481 F.3d at 731 (citing Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty , 216 F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2000) ).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim Substantially Predominates

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claim substantially predominates over his ADA claim under § 1367(c)(2). The Court agrees for two main reasons.

First, when considering the number of violations alleged by Plaintiff, the total amount of damages available to him under the Unruh Act—a minimum of $4,000 for each offense—indicates that Plaintiff’s predominant focus is recovering monetary damages under state law. At a minimum, Plaintiff alleges the following nine individual violations: (1) the raised threshold at the entrance door is greater than the permitted threshold for the type of door; (2) the entrance is inaccessible to Plaintiff; (3) parking is inaccessible to Plaintiff; (4) there are no parking spaces designed and reserved for persons with disabilities; (5) there is no lowered portion of transaction counters for persons in wheelchairs; (6) the restroom doorway clear passage is inaccessible to Plaintiff; (7) the restroom does not have grab bars for use by persons with disabilities; (8) the sink lacks knee clearance for wheelchair use; and (9) the restroom mirror is mounted higher than the maximum permitted. (Compl. ¶¶ 13–27.) These nine allegations, if proven, would entitle Plaintiff to a minimum monetary award of $36,000. In contrast, under the ADA, Plaintiff would only be entitled to injunctive relief. Thus, under the circumstances presented, the Court finds that the monetary damages sought by Plaintiff under the Unruh Act substantially predominate over federal injunctive relief. See Brick Oven Rest. , 406 F.Supp.2d at 1131 (finding that statutory damages available under the Unruh Act substantially predominated over injunctive relief available under the ADA where the plaintiff alleged distinct violations that, if proven, would entitle him to an award of $56,000); see also Molski v. Hitching Post I Rest.,...