Schuver v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Inc.)

• Decision Date: 17 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-2081,94-2081
• Citation: 546 N.W.2d 610
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,683 Raymond SCHUVER and Steven Schuver, Appellants, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY (INC.), Appellee, and Sanborn Cooperative Grain Company, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 610

546 N.W.2d 610

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,683

Raymond SCHUVER and Steven Schuver, Appellants, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY (INC.), Appellee, and Sanborn Cooperative Grain Company, Defendant.

No. 94-2081.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 17, 1996.

Michael R. Bovee, of Montgomery, Barry & Bovee, Spencer, for appellants.

Donald J. Hemphill of the Hemphill Law Office, Spencer, and Raymond Michael Ripple, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

Father and son farmers appeal from an adverse summary judgment ruling on all claims against the manufacturer of a herbicide based on successive reductions in corn yields. The farmers contend the reductions in corn yields resulted from the residual carryover effect of applying the herbicide to soybeans planted in rotation with the corn.

The district court concluded that federal law preempted some of the claims and concluded the remaining claims lacked merit. We affirm the ruling because we conclude federal law preempted all of the claims.

I. Background Facts.

O'Brien County farmer Raymond Schuver applied the herbicide Preview to his soybean crop in three successive years: 1988, 1989, and 1990. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. manufactured Preview. Sanborn Cooperative Grain Company sold the herbicide to Raymond. Raymond did not read Du Pont's application directions before applying Preview. He used Preview under normal growing conditions.

Raymond rotated his cropland yearly between soybeans and corn. In 1989 he began to notice problems with his corn crop. He had planted the corn on land sown to soybeans the previous year.

This problem persisted into the 1990 growing season. At this time Raymond discussed the problem with Sanborn's agronomist. The agronomist told Raymond that Raymond's neighbor had experienced similar damage to his corn crop. The agronomist attributed this damage to the residual carryover effects of applying Preview to soybeans planted on the same ground in the prior year. "Residual carryover effect" means the length of time an application of a pesticide might harm subsequently planted crops.

Raymond retired from farming in 1991. He rented his land to his son Steven on a cash basis. Steven farmed Raymond's land in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. Steven did not use Preview on any of his crops. Nevertheless, Steven suffered damage to his corn crops because of the residual carryover effect from Raymond's use of Preview.

II. Background Proceedings.

The Schuvers filed a four-count petition against Du Pont and Sanborn. Count I alleged the defendants were negligent in the manufacture and sale of Preview to Raymond. Count II alleged a strict liability claim against the defendants because Preview was defective and unreasonably dangerous.

Count III alleged the defendants impliedly warranted Preview to be merchantable and fit for its intended purpose. Count IV alleged Sanborn expressly warranted to Raymond that Preview was the proper herbicide for the Schuvers to use on their farms.

Following the defendants' separate answers, the district court granted Du Pont's summary judgment motion--over the Schuvers' resistance--on all three counts against it. The case against Sanborn proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded damages against Sanborn and in favor of Raymond for crop damages and reduction in the fair market value of his land. The jury awarded crop damages to Steven. Sanborn is not involved in this appeal.

The case is before us on the Schuvers' appeal from the district court's summary judgment ruling against the Schuvers and in favor of Du Pont.

III. Scope of Review.

Our review of the grant or denial of summary judgment is at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we look at the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Id. The moving party carries the burden to show the absence of a material fact issue, and the resisting party is afforded every inference reasonably deducible from the evidence. Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 1995). We must determine on appeal whether (1) a genuine issue of material fact exists, and (2) the law was correctly applied. Id.

IV. Federal Preemption.

The federal preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. A state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter that is federally preempted. Clubine v. American Cyanamid Co., 534 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Iowa 1995).

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) is a comprehensive federal statute regulating pesticide use, sales, and labeling. Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 559 (9th Cir.1995). The FIFRA places enforcement authority in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2480, 115 L.Ed.2d 532, 540 (1991).

In addition,

all pesticides sold in the United States must be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 'The objectives and purposes of FIFRA include the strengthening of federal standards, increasing EPA authority for their enforcement, and providing a comprehensive and uniform regulation of the labeling, sale, and use of pesticides.' FIFRA establishes a complex process of EPA review that culminates in the approval of a label under which a product may be marketed. Manufacturers must submit draft label language addressing a number of different topics, including ingredients, directions for use, and adverse effects of the products, and a final label must be submitted to the EPA prior to registration.

Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 71 (8th Cir.1995) (citations omitted).

Before the EPA will allow a pesticide to be registered with it, the EPA administrator must determine whether:

(A) its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it;

(B) its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with the requirements of [FIFRA];

(C) it will perform its intended function without unreasonably adverse effects on the environment; and

(D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(A)-(D) (1994). Federal law additionally mandates that pesticide labels include (1) warnings and precautionary statements, and (2) directions for use. 40 C.F.R. §§ 156.10(h), (i) (1995).

practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.

The FIFRA contains an express preemption clause regarding labeling requirements:

(b) Uniformity

Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.

7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). It is undisputed that Preview is a pesticide registered with the EPA.

Following the holdings of a number of federal circuits, we recently held that "state actions based on the adequacy of warnings or instructions on the labels of EPA-registered pesticides are preempted" under the Preemption Clause. Clubine, 534 N.W.2d at 387.

In Clubine, several farmers sued two herbicide manufacturers for crop damage. They alleged claims for strict liability, implied warranty of merchantability, express warranty, and negligent failure to test, label, and provide adequate instructions and warnings regarding use of their herbicides. With the exception of negligent testing, we held that the FIFRA preempted all of these claims:

We conclude the trial court correctly ruled that it could not reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims. Under the statutory definition those claims are label-based, and, because they depend on requirements in addition to--or different from--those imposed under FIFRA, are preempted. Each of the claims (that the herbicides were defective and unreasonably dangerous, that they breached an implied warranty of merchantability, and that they breached an express warranty) is derived from the assertion of factual matters FIFRA expressly places within the exclusive dominion of the EPA. The trial court was correct in so holding.

Id. at 387.

We also held that the trial court was correct in dismissing the negligent testing claim for failure of proof. The plaintiffs produced no evidence of negligent testing on the part of the defendants. Id. at 387-88.

We decided Clubine after the parties here had completed their briefing. So the parties did not discuss Clubine in their briefs. The parties, however, did discuss Clubine in oral arguments. Counsel for the Schuvers conceded that the Schuvers' implied warranty claims are preempted under our holding in Clubine. But counsel refused to concede that the Schuvers' negligence and strict liability claims are preempted. Counsel argued that (1) contrary to our holding in Clubine, the negligence claims here are not label-based, and (2) as to the strict liability claims, our holding in Clubine is dictum. Not surprisingly, counsel for Du Pont argued that our holding in Clubine supports preemption of all of the Schuvers' claims.

Given this posture of the case, we limit our preemption discussion to the Schuvers' negligence and strict liability claims.

A. Negligence claims. Consistent with the brief, the Schuvers' counsel argued the negligence claims against Du Pont are not based solely on the inadequacy of the Preview label. Counsel argued that Du Pont was negligent in four respects:

1. in marketing Preview in ...