Schwartz v. Town of Hamden

Decision Date25 February 1975
Citation357 A.2d 488,168 Conn. 8
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesIrene SCHWARTZ et al. v. TOWN OF HAMDEN et al. Melinda DANIELS et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF HAMDEN (two cases).

James H. Shulman, Hartford, and Douglas R. Daniels, New Haven, with whom was David Kotkin, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs) in each case.

John H. Anderson, Asst. Town Atty., for appellees (defendants) in each case.

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

These three appeals were taken from the decision of the defendant planning and zoning commission approving and adopting street lines for a new highway system referred to as the east-west connector in the town of Hamden. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed all three appeals. From the judgments rendered thereon and after the granting of certification, the plaintiffs filed a joint appeal to this court, assigning error in the conclusions reached by the trial court.

I

On March 24, 1970, the planning section of the defendant commission, pursuant to § 8-29 of the General Statutes, held a public hearing to consider recommendations for the establishment of street lines for the east-west connector. Those street lines were subsequently approved and adopted. The plaintiffs in the first appeal, Schwartz et al., are a group of individuals who collectively own a shopping center known as Hamden Plaza located approximately three-fourths of a mile from the proposed east-west connector. They alleged that they were 'affected' by the establishment of the proposed layout, grade and street lines and therefore had standing to appeal the decision under § 8-30 of the General Statutes. The trial court found that none of the Hamden Plaza plaintiffs owned or had an interest in land within the taking lines of the east-west connector, and concluded that they were not 'affected' or 'interested' parties under § 8-30. Their appeal was therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Appeals to the courts from the actions of planning and zoning commissions exist only under statutory authority and unless a statute provides for such appeals courts are without jurisdiction to entertain them. See, e.g., Tazza v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 164 Conn. 187, 190, 319 A.2d 393; East Side Civic Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 558, 560, 290 A.2d 348; Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1, 10, 266 A.2d 396; Long v. Zoning Commission, 133 Conn. 248, 252, 50 A.2d 172. In these cases, § 8-30 limits the right of appeal to those persons 'affected' by the commission's action taken under § 8-29 and any 'interested' party may join in that appeal.

In 1949, a person appealing from any action of a planning commission was required to show that he was 'aggrieved' by such action. General Statutes § 861 (Rev.1949). That section was repealed with the enactment of Public Acts 1951, No. 321, later §§ 389d, 390d, and 391d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement. Those sections were the predecessors of §§ 8-28, 8-29 and 8-30 respectively and established the present standing requirements for appeals to the courts from the actions of planning commissions. The 'aggrievement' requirement was retained in § 389d (General Statutes § 8-28) for all such appeals except those taken from the action of a planning commission approving and adopting surveys, maps or plans of town highways under § 390d (General Statutes § 8-29). In the latter case, § 391d (General Statutes § 8-30) gave standing to appeal to any person 'affected' by such action.

The Hamden Plaza plaintiffs argue that the legislature intended a lesser demonstration of detrimental influence when it substituted the word 'affected' for the word 'aggrieved.' That argument fails when §§ 8-29 and 8-30 are read together. See Little v. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 455, 262 A.2d 174. Section 8-29 authorizes planning commissions to prepare and file surveys, maps and plans of proposed town highways. The commission is then required to 'give notice to each record owner and to each mortgagee of record of land included in such survey, map or plan, by mail and by advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation in such municipality, of such filing and of the place . . . where, and the time . . . when, such commission shall hear any person claiming to be affected thereby. Such commission, after such hearing, may approve and adopt such map or plan, and may make assessments of benefits accruing to and damages sustained by any person owning land included in such survey, map or plan, and shall give notice of such benefits and damages to mortgagees of record of such land. . . . Such commission may change any survey, map or plan so made and filed by it . . .. Notice by mail of such change shall be given by such commission to each record owner and to all persons having a recorded mortgage interest in land affected thereby . . . (emphasis added).' General Statutes § 8-29. A close reading of § 8-29 leaves little doubt that the legislature intended the word 'affected' to describe a narrow class of persons. That word is used twice, each time to denote record owners and mortgagees of record of land included in the survey, map or plan of a proposed town highway. Section 8-30, in establishing the right to appeal, does not expand that narrow class of persons described in § 8-29 as 'affected': 'Any person affected may appeal from the action of such commission taken under section 8-29 within thirty days after notice to him of the adoption of a survey, map or plan or the assessment of benefits of damages and any interested party may join in such appeal (emphasis added). . . .' General Statutes § 8-30. 'Affected' persons are limited to those who are to be given notice of the commission's action taken under § 8-29, i.e., record owners of land and mortgagees of record of land included in the survey, map or plan of the proposed highway.

The intent of the legislature is to be ascertained from the language used in the statute if that language is plain and unambiguous. Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 375, 279 A.2d 561; Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36. The language in §§ 8-29 and 8-30 is susceptible to only one interpretation of the word 'affected.' Since the Hamden Plaza plaintiffs were not owners of land or mortgagees of record of land within the survey, map or plan of the east-west connector, the trial court correctly concluded that they were not 'affected' persons. See, generally, Manners v. Waterbury, 86 Conn. 573, 86 A. 14; Clark v. Saybrook, 21 Conn. 313.

The Hamden Plaza plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred in concluding that they were not 'interested parties' as that phrase is used in § 8-30. We need not reach that claim. Only 'affected' persons may appeal under § 8-30, while 'interested parties' may join in such an appeal. The Hamden Plaza plaintiffs did not join in the appeal of an 'affected' person, but chose instead to take an independent appeal. Their appeal was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

II

The plaintiffs in the second and third appeals, Melinda Daniels et al., are owners of land within the survey of the east-west connector. They therefore had standing to appeal as 'affected' persons under § 8-30. Two of those plaintiffs, Clyde and Ethel Campbell, were not given notice by mail of the commission's March 24, 1970 hearing as required by § 8-29. The provision requiring notice by public advertisement, however, was complied with and the Campbells did appear at the hearing through counsel. The plaintiffs contend that the commission's approval and adoption of the east-west connector was illegal in that it failed to give the Campbells the required notice by mail. The trial court concluded that the appearance of counsel for the Campbells at the hearing constituted a waiver by them of that notice requirement. The plaintiffs have assigned error in that conclusion.

The plaintiffs argue that failure to give the required notice constitutes a jurisdictional defect, results in a lack of due process, and renders a subsequent action of the commission or board null and void. Jarvis Acres, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 163 Conn. 41, 44, 301 A.2d 244, and cases cited therein. 'The fundamental reason for the requirement of notice is to advise all affected parties of their opportunity to be heard and to be apprised of the relief sought.' Slagle v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 690, 693, 137 A.2d 542, 544; Winslow v. Zoning Board, 143 Conn. 381, 389, 122 A.2d 789.

It must be emphasized, however, that the line of cases cited above deal with the problem of constructively notifying, by means of legal advertisements, as much of the population as possible of contemplated zoning actions. See General Statutes §§ 8-3, 8-3c and 8-7; Jarvis Acres, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, supra, 163 Conn. 47, 301 A.2d 244; Edward Balf Co. v. East Granby, 152 Conn. 319, 325, 207 A.2d 58. In those cases, subsequent action by the zoning commission or board has been held invalid if the constructive notice given to the public was inadequate. See, e.g., Aurora v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 623, 625, 220 A.2d 277; Lunt v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 532, 536, 191 A.2d 553. This was true even when the complaining party appeared at the public hearing since the legislative intent to notify the public constructively would otherwise be frustrated. Slagle v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra.

With regard to the notice by mail provision at issue here, the legislative intent was to give actual notice to owners and mortgagees of record of land within the survey, map or plan of the proposed town highway. That intent was not frustrated in this case since the Campbells did appear through counsel at the hearing without objection to the lack of personal notice. There is no claim made that the Campbells did not have adequate time in order to prepare intelligently for the hearing....

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    ...through their attendance at and participation in the October 10, 2014 association meeting, relying primarily on Schwartz v. Hamden , 168 Conn. 8, 357 A.2d 488 (1975). In its memorandum of decision, the court agreed with the defendants, citing Schwartz . That precedent, however, is readily d......
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