Schwartz v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 12 January 1965
• Citation: 416 Pa. 503,206 A.2d 789
• Parties: Jerome J. SCHWARTZ, Trustee, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation. Leo B. SHAPERO, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 789

206 A.2d 789

416 Pa. 503

Jerome J. SCHWARTZ, Trustee, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH,

Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of

Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation.

Leo B. SHAPERO, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH,

Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of

Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 12, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1965.

Harold Gondelman, Pittsburgh, for appellants.

David W. Craig, City Sol., Mead J. Mulvihill, Jr., Asst. City Sol., for City of Pittsburgh.

Theodore L. Hazlett, Jr., Pittsburgh, for Urban Redevelopment Authority.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, and ROBERTS, JJ.

O'BRIEN, Justice.

The instant appeals are before us on appeal from the final decrees entered below in these companion actions in equity. The litigation has been here before, Schwartz v. Urban Redev. Auth., 411 Pa. 530, 192 A.2d 371 (1963), but in an entirely different posture. When we first reviewed this litigation, the Chancellor had entered judgments of compulsory non-suit, at the close of plaintiffs' case, and we heard appeals from the refusal of the court en banc to take off the non- suits entered. On that occasion, this closely divided court held that the non-suits were improperly entered and remanded the cases for new trial.

The new trials ordered by us have taken place, and the Chancellor has made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a decree nisi, denying the relief prayed for in appellants' complaints. Exceptions were filed to the Chancellor's adjudication and argued before a court en banc, which affirmed the Chancellor's findings and conclusions and adopted his decree nisi as the final decree; ¹ these appeals followed.

From the foregoing brief history of this litigation, it must be readily apparent that the standard of review which governs our deliberations in the instant appeal differs markedly from that which led to the result achieved in the former appeal. When this matter first appeared here, we were dealing with judgments of compulsory nonsuit and held, merely, that the plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to create a prima facie case, thereby precluding non-suits. In so holding, we were bound by the rule that a non-suit should be entered only in a clear case, and, on appeal from the refusal to take off a compulsory non-suit, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable testimony and every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom and all conflicts therein must be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Miller v. McMinn's Industries, 410 Pa. 234, 188 A.2d 738 (1963); Weed v. Kerr, Pa., 205 A.2d 858 (1965).

The key question for decision at the first trial, as well as now, is whether the Board of the Authority abused its discretion in rejecting appellant Schwartz' proposal to purchase a parcel in the Lower Hill Redevelopment Area for the erection of a motor hotel. In light of the standard of review applicable to the first appeal, we found that relief was possible and indicated that plaintiffs were entitled to an adjudication, after a new trial. In short, we held that the Chancellor could reasonably infer the abuse of discretion requisite for the relief requested and, hence, the non-suits were improperly granted.

All of the evidence, including the defense, has now been heard by the Chacellor, who has made findings of fact based on that evidence. He has found that the Authority's rejection of the Schwartz proposal was based on proper criteria for the orderly development of the project and, therefore, no abuse of discretion existed. The Urban Redevelopment Law, Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, 35 P.S. 1701 et seq., sets forth the powers of the Authority. Section 9(k) of the Act, 35 P.S. § 1709(k), gives the Authority the power '[t]o sell, lease or otherwise transer * * * any real property in a redevelopment area: Provided, That with respect to a redevelopment area the Authority finds that the sale, lease or other transfer of any part will not be prejudicial to the sale or lease of other parts of the redevelopment area, nor be in any other way prejudicial to the realization of the redevelopment proposal * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

From the evidence, the Chancellor could and did find that the Authority, in the proper exercise of its discretion, considered the Schwartz proposal to be inimical to the overall redevelopment plan. The General Assembly declared the policy of the Commonwealth in the following language of the Act: 'Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to promote the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants thereof by the creation of bodies corporate and politic to be known as Redevelopment Authorities, which shall exist and operate for the public purposes of the elimination of blighted areas through economically and socially sound redevelopment of such areas, as provided by this act, in conformity with the comprehensive general plans of their respective municipalities for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial or other purposes and otherwise encouraging the provision of healthful homes, a decent living environment and adequate places...