Scoggin v. Scoggin
Decision Date | 18 October 2016 |
Docket Number | No. COA16–311,COA16–311 |
Citation | 791 S.E.2d 524 |
Parties | Christopher Scoggin, Plaintiff, v. Felicitas B. Scoggin (now Hayes), Defendant. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
The Armstrong Law Firm, P.A., Smithfield, by Eason Armstrong Keeney and L. Lamar Armstrong, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
The Lea/Schultz Law Firm, P.C., Wilmington, by James W. Lea, III, for defendant-appellant.
Felicitas Hayes, formerly Felicitas Scoggin, (defendant), appeals from an order that awarded Christopher Scoggin (plaintiff) primary custody of the parties' four children. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by entering a child custody order that conflicted with oral statements that the court made during the custody hearing, and that the trial court erred by finding that it was in the best interest of the children for plaintiff to have their primary physical custody. We conclude that the trial court had the authority to enter an order that was different from the court's oral statements during the hearing, and that the trial court did not err by awarding primary physical custody of the children to plaintiff.
The parties were married on 12 May 2003, separated on 6 March 2013, divorced on 17 September 2013, and are the parents of four children, born in 2002, 2003, 2009, and 2010. At the time of their divorce, plaintiff and defendant were living in California and were both serving in the United States Marine Corps. On 10 May 2013, the parties executed a settlement agreement providing that plaintiff and defendant would share joint legal and physical custody of the children, with the children alternating residence with each parent every other week. In June 2013, plaintiff received military orders to report to Jacksonville, North Carolina, and on 21 June 2013, the parties modified their agreement in order to allow plaintiff to take the children with him to North Carolina. During the following year, the children spent periods of time with plaintiff, defendant, and with plaintiff's parents.
On 22 May 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for modification of child custody. Plaintiff alleged that there had been a substantial change of circumstances in that plaintiff and defendant had moved to North Carolina and Indiana, respectively, and therefore could no longer adhere to the existing custody arrangement pursuant to the terms of which the children spent alternate weeks with each parent. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant had failed to comply with the parties' agreement regarding child custody, and sought primary physical custody of the children. On 10 July 2014, defendant filed a response and countermotion for primary physical custody of the children, in which defendant alleged that plaintiff had failed to abide by the requirements of the parties' custody agreement.
On 10 June 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties' motions for custody of the children. The trial court heard conflicting testimony from each party regarding the other party's lack of cooperation with their custody agreement. At the close of the hearing, the trial judge spoke for several minutes about the considerations that the court deemed important to the custody determination, and stated that either party would be a fit and proper person to have custody of the children. After reviewing in detail the facts that tended to support each party's claim for primary physical custody of the children, the trial court stated that the parties would share joint legal custody of the children, with defendant having primary physical custody and plaintiff having visitation rights. The court ended the hearing by stating that “[t]his is a really hard decision” and that “I just hope and pray that I've done the right thing.” The trial court did not ask counsel for either party to draft an order reflecting the court's decision.
On 8 September 2015, the trial court entered an order for child custody. The court awarded primary physical custody of the children to plaintiff, with defendant to have “liberal visitation privileges,” and made findings that supported the court's decision. The trial court's findings also addressed the fact that its decision was different from what the court had orally stated during the hearing:
Defendant appealed to this Court from the trial court's order for child custody.
The standard of review in child custody cases may be summarized as follows:
The standard of review “when the trial court sits without a jury is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” “Whether [the trial court's] findings of fact support [its] conclusions of law is reviewable de novo .” “If the trial court's uncontested findings of fact support its conclusions of law, we must affirm the trial court's order.”
Burger v. Smith , ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 776 S.E.2d 886, 888–89 (2015) ( ).
In addition, “[i]t is a long-standing rule that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in cases involving child custody.” Pulliam v. Smith , 348 N.C. 616, 624, 501 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1998) (citation omitted). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason[.]”
White v. White , 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (citation omitted). The rationale for this rule has been explained as follows:
“[The trial court] has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and [its] decision ought not be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” “[The trial court] can detect tenors, tones, and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges.”
Surles v. Surles , 113 N.C.App. 32, 36–37, 437 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1993) ( ).
At the end of the hearing on this matter, the trial court announced its intention to award primary physical custody of the children to defendant. Upon further consideration, the trial court reached a contrary conclusion and determined that it would be in the best interest of the children if primary physical custody of the children was granted to plaintiff. Within a week of the hearing, the trial court informed the parties of this change and of its intention to award primary physical custody of the children to plaintiff. Approximately three months later, the trial court entered a written order placing the children in the primary physical custody of plaintiff. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked the authority to enter an order that did not correspond to its oral statements in court. Simply put, defendant asserts that, as a matter of law, the trial court may not change its mind between the end of a trial or hearing and entry of the order determining the issues raised in that proceeding. In the alternative, defendant contends that the trial court's power to enter an order that differs from its statements in court depends upon the existence of a substantial change of circumstances occurring between the date of the trial court's oral statements and the date that the court enters an order in a case. Defendant's arguments lacks merit.
In support of her position, defendant cites this Court's opinion in Edwards v. Taylor, 182 N.C.App. 722, 727, 643 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2007), in which this Court noted that a trial court has the authority to enter a written judgment that “conforms generally” with its oral pronouncement. Defendant...
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