Scoggins v. Timmerman, WD

• Decision Date: 13 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 886 S.W.2d 135
• Parties: Becky SCOGGINS, Respondent, v. Thomas TIMMERMAN, Appellant. 48817.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 135

886 S.W.2d 135

Becky SCOGGINS, Respondent, v. Thomas TIMMERMAN, Appellant.

No. WD 48817.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Sept. 13, 1994.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Nov. 1, 1994.

Randall P. Baker, Seigfreid, Runge, Leonatti, Pohlmeyer & Seigfreid, Mexico, for appellant.

Becky Scoggins, pro se.

Before ULRICH, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and HANNA, JJ.

ULRICH, Judge.

Thomas Timmerman appeals from that portion of the trial court's order which denied his motion to modify his child support obligation. On appeal, Mr. Timmerman claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion because he made a prima facie showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make his present child support obligation unreasonable. Therefore, he concludes the trial court was required to determine his child support obligation in conformity with criteria set forth in Rule 88.01 and to make specific findings regarding any deviation from the Form 14 presumed amount.

The marriage of Thomas Frederick Timmerman and Becky Ann Timmerman (now Scoggins) was dissolved on January 11, 1984. Custody of their two minor children was awarded to Ms. Scoggins, and Mr. Timmerman was ordered to pay child support of $300 per month ($150 per month per child). In March of 1985, pursuant to Ms. Scoggins' motion to modify, this amount was increased to $225 per month per child.

Ms. Scoggins subsequently remarried. In July of 1989, Ms. Scoggins and the children moved to Northwood, Ohio, after her husband experienced a job transfer. Ms. Scoggins' third child was born in July 1991.

On May 29, 1992, Ms. Scoggins filed a motion to modify child support alleging "there has been a substantial and continuing change of circumstance in respect to child support in that the children have increased in age and the needs of the children have changed." She also alleged that Mr. Timmerman's "income has increased so that the child support amount would be increased by more than 20% in accordance with the child support guidelines." Mr. Timmerman essentially denied Ms. Scoggins' claims and counterclaimed seeking modification of his child support obligation. Mr. Timmerman alleged that his employment circumstances "have changed dramatically" because his current monthly gross income is approximately $600 per month. Mr. Timmerman prayed that the decree be modified and that "the child support for the minor children be reduced to the amount which would be in accordance with the child support guidelines now in effect." After a hearing, the trial court denied both parties' motions to modify and did not make any findings of fact. This appeal followed.

In his only point on appeal, Mr. Timmerman claims that the trial court was required to modify his child support obligation to reflect the amount contained in the guidelines, or it was required to enter an order that the amount so calculated is unjust or inappropriate. Ms. Scoggins did not file a brief.

Section 452.370, provides:

1. ... the provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable ... If the application of the guidelines and criteria set forth in supreme court rule 88.01 to the financial circumstances of the parties would result in a change of child support from the existing amount by twenty percent or more, then a prima facie showing has been made of a change of circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the present terms unreasonable.

2. When the party seeking modification has met the burden of proof set forth in subsection 1 of this section, then the child support shall be determined in conformity with criteria set forth in supreme court rule 88.01.

. . . . .

Rule 88.01 provides:

When determining the amount of child support to order, a court or administrative agency shall consider all relevant factors, including:

(a) the financial resources and needs of the child;

(b) the financial resources and needs of the parents;

(c) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved;

(d) the physical and emotional condition of the child; and

(e) the educational needs of the child. There is a rebuttable presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is the amount of child support to be awarded in any judicial ... proceeding for ... child support. It is sufficient in a particular case to rebut the presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is correct if the court ... enters in the case a written finding or a specific finding on the record that the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate.

Only Mr. Timmerman filed a Form 14. ¹ Mr. Timmerman's Form 14 attributed $1088 per month gross income to Ms. Scoggins and $1190 to himself for a combined monthly gross income of $2278. ² Mr. Timmerman's Form 14 showed that the presumed child support amount was $545, of which, Ms. Scoggins' share was $261.60 and his share was $283.40. Mr. Timmerman's current payment of $450 for child support exceeds by more than twenty percent the Form 14 presumed child support amount of $283.40. Because Mr. Timmerman's current support payment deviates by more than twenty percent from his child support requirement mandated by the guidelines, a prima facie case of a substantial and continuing change in circumstances has been established. Kieninger v. Kieninger, 836 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Mo.App.1992). Thus, Mr. Timmerman is entitled to a new award calculated according to Rule 88.01 and Form 14 unless the court determined, after considering all relevant factors, that the amount was unjust or inappropriate. Beeman v. Beeman, 816 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo.App.1991). The trial court neither awarded the Form 14 amount nor did it make a determination that the Form 14 amount was unjust or inappropriate after considering all relevant factors. Therefore, the case must be remanded to permit the trial court to correct this oversight. On remand, the trial court is directed to either enter the Form 14 amount or a written finding or a specific finding on the record that the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate and award the appropriate amount.

Because the trial court is compelled to make certain findings on remand, the issue of what findings the trial court is required to make when it does not award the Form 14 amount of child support is considered for clarification. Some cases emanating from this district hold that before awarding less child support than that prescribed pursuant to Form 14, a trial court is only required to find, after considering all relevant factors, that the Form 14 presumed amount is unjust or inappropriate. Davidson v. Davidson, 872 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Mo.App.1994); K.R.W. by A.C.S. v. D.B.W., 830 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo.App.1992); Beeman v. Beeman, 816 S.W.2d at 17; Campbell v. Campbell, 811 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo.App.1991). Other cases hold that the trial court is required to include "the actual numbers used in calculating the non-Form 14 child support, as well as the factors which make the Form 14 amount inappropriate." Harding v. Harding, 826 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Mo.App.1992); Clare v. Clare, 853 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.App.1993); Summerville v. Summerville, 869 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Mo.App.1993).

When interpreting Supreme Court Rules the same principles used in statutory construction are applicable. Adams v. Boring, 826 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo.App.1992). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from language used, to give effect to that intent, if possible, and to consider words used in their plain and ordinary meaning. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). However, when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, application of the rules of construction is unnecessary. Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. banc 1992). Additionally, the legislature is presumed to know the state of the law when enacting a statute. Adams v. Boring, 826 S.W.2d at 870. These principles are applied to the interpretation of Rule 88.01.

The relevant portion of Rule 88.01(e) provides: "It is sufficient in a particular case to rebut the presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is correct if the court ... enters in the case a written finding or a specific finding on the record that the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate." (emphasis added).

The unambiguous language of Rule 88.01 merely requires that the trial court find on the record the Form 14 amount is unjust or inappropriate, after considering all relevant factors if the court's child support award deviates from the amount calculated by application of Form 14. Campbell v. Campbell, 811 S.W.2d at 507; Kovacs v. Kovacs, 869 S.W.2d 789, 796 (Mo.App.1994) (Fenner, J., concurring); Cohen v. Cohen, 884 S.W.2d 35, 39 (E.D.Mo.App.1994); In re Marriage of Short, 847 S.W.2d 158, 166 (Mo.App.1993); Beeman v. Beeman, 816 S.W.2d at 17. Therefore, Rule 88.01 requires only that whenever a trial court deviates from the Form 14 amount, it must simply make a finding that the Form 14 amount, after considering all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate. ³ The preferred practice is for the trial court to make the finding in the precise language of 88.01(e) when it deviates from the Form 14 amount. In re Marriage of Short, 847 S.W.2d at 164. Any departure from this language invites issues on appeal. Id.

For at least four reasons the trial court is compelled by Rule 88.01 to merely find that the Form 14 amount is unjust and inappropriate. First, if the Supreme Court had intended to require ...