Scott v. Androscoggin County Jail

• Decision Date: 29 November 2004
• Citation: 2004 ME 143,866 A.2d 88
• Parties: JON SCOTT v. ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY JAIL et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

2004 ME 143

866 A.2d 88

JON SCOTT v. ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY JAIL et al.

Docket: And-04-80.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted On Briefs: September 9, 2004.

Decided: November 29, 2004.

Jon Scott Van Buren, ME, for plaintiff.

Michael J. Schmidt, Esq., Wheeler & Arey, P.A. Waterville, ME, Attorney for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J. and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶1] Jon Scott appeals from entry of a summary judgment by the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Gorman, J.) in favor of defendants Androscoggin County and Androscoggin County Jail (the County). Scott had filed complaints pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4634 (2002 & Supp. 2003), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134 (1995 & Supp. 2004), asserting that the County had refused to accommodate his medication schedule while he was incarcerated. Scott contends that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard for recovery under the MHRA and ADA, and that genuine issues of material fact preclude entry of judgment as a matter of law.

[¶2] Although we clarify the correct legal standard for recovery under the ADA and the MHRA, we affirm the judgment because Scott failed to establish an actionable claim pursuant to those statutes.

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶3] Scott has been diagnosed as suffering from several mental illnesses for which he takes medications. He was incarcerated at the Androscoggin County Jail on four occasions in October 1999, February 2000, July 2000, and September 2000. During that time, his treating physician had prescribed that Scott take two of his medications, Xanax and Inderal, five times per day. Scott asserts that he had maintained this medication schedule for a substantial period of time before 2000.

[¶4] According to regular practice at the Androscoggin County Jail, medications are distributed three times per day. In anticipation of Scott entering the jail in October 1999, Scott's physician changed his medication schedule to three times per day. The physician believed that any discomfort Scott might feel as a result of changing the dosage to three times per day, with the same amount of medication, would be tolerable.

[¶5] While incarcerated in October, Scott experienced some discomfort from the change in schedule. When he returned to the jail in February 2000, he requested that the jail accommodate his five times per day schedule.

[¶6] As a result of Scott's request, a physician's assistant employed by the jail's contractual medical provider conducted an investigation regarding Scott's medication. The physician's assistant performed medical research, consulted with two physicians, including Scott's treating physician, and two pharmacists, and concluded that the normal frequency for taking Xanax and Inderal was three times per day, and that it was not medically necessary for Scott to receive the medication five times per day. The medical provider decided that Scott would receive all of the medicine that was prescribed, but three times per day instead of five.

[¶7] During the February 2000 incarceration, Scott threatened to sue if he did not receive his medications five times per day. The jail administrator acquiesced in Scott's demands, despite the medical provider's recommendation.

[¶8] During Scott's incarcerations in July and September 2000, the time periods at issue in this case, the jail administrator declined to accede to Scott's demands, and Scott was provided his medications according to the three times per day schedule. The jail administrator determined that he should defer to the medical provider on issues involving medical judgment, and he did not wish to set a precedent resulting in other prisoners' demanding medications on schedules of their choosing.

[¶9] In July 2000, after being given his medications three times per day, Scott began to complain of symptoms resulting from the change in schedule. Again, he demanded medications five times per day. In response, the medical provider contacted Scott's treating physician. Scott's physician agreed that the jail could administer Scott's medication three times per day, on the condition that Scott be monitored closely. The medical provider assured the physician that jail personnel would monitor Scott every fifteen minutes for adverse reactions potentially caused by the medication schedule.

[¶10] Scott repeatedly complained of nausea, dizziness, shortness of breath, chest pains, and loss of appetite. He slept a lot and sometimes missed or refused meals or the recreation period. In response to Scott's complaints, the medical provider examined Scott and determined that the three times per day schedule could be continued. In its statement of material facts, the County asserted, with appropriate record references, that several of the symptoms claimed by Scott did not occur and that some of Scott's claimed problems were inconsistent with regular physical observations of Scott by jail personnel. Scott did not adequately controvert these statements. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4).

[¶11] Before Scott returned to the jail in September 2000, his physician wrote a letter to the jail's medical provider stating that based on what Scott had reported to him, Scott should receive his medication five times per day. Based on jail logs that recorded physical observations of Scott that were inconsistent with the physical problems reported by Scott, the medical provider did not believe that Scott accurately reported his symptoms to his physician. The jail provided Scott his medications three times per day during the September incarceration.

[¶12] Scott filed a grievance with the jail administrator, alleging that the jail failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disability. The grievance was denied. Thereafter, Scott filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission. When conciliation efforts failed, Scott filed two complaints in the Superior Court, the first covering the July 2000 incarceration and the second covering the September 2000 incarceration. Scott's complaints were consolidated. He alleges that because he was not given his medication as prescribed, he suffered physical "withdrawal" symptoms such as nausea, headaches, and fatigue, and was prevented from participating in jail programs such as recreation, outdoor exercise, and meals. He sought damages, attorney fees, and costs.

[¶13] The County filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that disputed issues of fact exist as to whether Scott actually experienced symptoms due to the altered medication schedule. The court determined that the disputes of fact were immaterial, however, because Scott did not state facts to demonstrate that he had a genuine need for accommodation, or that the County was deliberately indifferent to Scott's medical condition. Accordingly, the court granted a summary judgment on Scott's ADA and MHRA claims. Scott then filed this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶14] The existence of a dispute of material fact and entry of summary judgment are questions of law that we review de novo. Botka v. S.C. Noyes & Co., 2003 ME 128, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 947, 952-53. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment has been entered to decide whether the parties' statements of material facts and the referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. To survive a defendant's motion for a summary judgment, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action. Doyle v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 9, 824 A.2d 48, 52. If the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence on an essential element of the cause of action, such that "'the defendant would . . . be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that state of the evidence at a trial, the defendant is entitled to a summary judgment.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12, ¶ 11, 765 A.2d 571, 575).

[¶15] Accordingly, we must decide whether the facts presented in the parties' statements of material facts and the supporting evidentiary materials, with disputes resolved in Scott's favor, establish an actionable claim under the ADA and the MHRA.

III. THE ADA AND THE MHRA

[¶16] Because the public entity provisions of the Maine Human Rights Act¹ generally track the language of the similar provisions in the ADA, `"it is appropriate to look to federal precedent for guidance in interpreting the MHRA.'" Doyle, 2003 ME 61, ¶ 14 n.7, 824 A.2d at 54 (quoting Winston v. Me. Technical Coll. Sys., 631 A.2d 70, 74-75 (Me. 1993)). See also Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 312 (1st Cir. 2003)

.

[¶17] Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination as follows:

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12132. Thus, to recover pursuant to the ADA or the MHRA, Scott must establish that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was excluded from participating in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminated against; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000).

[¶18] The ADA and the MHRA define the term "public entity" to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies, departments, and instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131(1); 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(8-C) (2002). A state correctional facility has been determined to be a public entity covered by Title II of the ADA. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr....