Triangle Ranch, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California
| Citation | 135 Cal.App.2d 428,287 P.2d 537 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 13 September 1955 |
| Parties | TRIANGLE RANCH, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, a corporation, County of Los Angeles, Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County, and Regional Planning Commission of Los Angeles County, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 20966. |
B. W. Kemper, Los Angeles, for appellant.
L. A. Gibbons, Douglas C. Gregg, A. Andrew Hauk, Sheldon C. Houts, and Frank P. Doherty, Los Angeles, for respondent, Union Oil Co.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents, County Board of Supervisors, and Regional Planning Commission.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of dismissal entered following an order of the court sustaining defendants' demurrer to all three causes of action set forth in plaintiff's second amended complaint, without leave to amend the first cause of action and with leave to amend the second and third causes of action. Subsequent to said order, counsel for plaintiff wrote to defendants' attorneys in part as follows:
'In the above matter it has been decided not to further amend the complaint.
'Accordingly, we request that a judgment of dismissal be entered so that the matter may be reviewed by an appeal.'
Thereafter, counsel for defendants filed their affidavit setting forth among other averments the foregoing declination of plaintiff to amend its complaint and requesting a dismissal thereof. Judgment was accordingly entered.
From an examination of the record herein we are satisfied that the factual background surrounding this litigation, the allegations of plaintiff's second amended complaint and the issues thereby raised are fairly and correctly epitomized in the memorandum opinion of the trial judge which has been brought up on this appeal. We therefore adopt as part of this opinion said summary with additional allegations obtained by us from the second amended complaint.
'Plaintiff, having sold and conveyed a portion of its land to defendant Union Oil Company, 'excepting therefrom all petroleum, coal,' etc., by grant deed dated December 30, 1949, subsequently entered into a written contract with its grantee on January 25, 1950, whereby among other things it consented and approved of Union Oil Company's 'exercise of its rights and privileges under (a certain grant to the oil company) to drill for, produce, take, store, handle, process, remove and ship oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances' from the land conveyed and did thereby 'agree to join with, approve and endorse the action of First Party (Union Oil Co.) in any and all applications or petitions that First Party may file from time to time with the Regional Planning Commission of Los Angeles County or other governmental body for zoning exceptions and/or permission to conduct any such drilling and producing operations as First Party may deem necessary or convenient, upon said controlling drilling site.'
'Plaintiff alleges that during the negotiations for the property plaintiff knew of the exclusive residential character of plaintiff's property adjacent to the property sold to Union Oil Co., and that 'in order to preserve such exclusive residential character of said district', 'a contemporaneous oral agreement was made' between plaintiff and said defendant in Devember, 1949, 'collateral to the aforesaid sale of said land and execution and delivery of said grant deed' which according to its terms as alleged, substantially limited the use of the drilling site. It is very significant that this oral agreement of December, 1949, is alleged to be collateral to the deed executed that month but is not even mentioned in the deed, much less in the formal written agreement of January 25, 1950, relating to defendant's right to drill for oil.
It was also alleged by plaintiff that the area in which its property is located including the portion sold to defendant Union Oil Company was at the time of such sale of great value for exclusive residential and subdivision purposes, and was classified under the zoning ordinance as R-A-1 (residential-agricultural) by County Ordinance No. 5279, and in which zone oil wells were prohibited. However, section 526 of the ordinance provides that an exception may be granted permitting the drilling for an oil well if, (a) it appears probable that there is oil underneath the property under consideration or under adjacent property which oil cannot be otherwise extracted, and, (b) such exception will not be materially detrimental to the public welfare nor to the property of other persons located in the vicinity thereof.
Quoting further from the trial judge's memorandum opinion, 'Plaintiff contends in substance that the action of the Planning Commission and the Board were unwarranted, oppressive and unreasonable interference with its property rights, and an unconstitutional impairment of its property rights under its alleged collateral agreement with Union Oil Co.; that their action was not a legitimate exercise of the police power and was 'inimical to due process of law'; and that there was 'a total lack of evidence to sustain said two orders' and that they are illegal and void.
'(1) On the first cause of action, for declaratory relief against all and each of the defendants herein, declaring (2) that the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the collateral agreement was competent and essential to a proper determination of plaintiff's rights, and that the Regional Planning Commission erred in failing to receive and consider said testimony; (b) that the decisions and orders of the Regional Planning Commission and of the Board of Supervisors were unreasonable, oppressive, and same constituted an unwarranted interference with the property rights of the plaintiff and was tantamount to the taking of plaintiff's property without due compensation; (c) that plaintiff was entitled to a hearing before the Board of Supervisors on its two appeals, and the denial thereof deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing within the concept of due process of law; (d) rhat there was a total lack of substantial evidence to support the aforesaid decisions and orders of the Regional Planning Commission and of the Board of Supervisors: (e) that plaintiff is entitled to a writ of mandate commanding and directing the Regional Planning Commission to grant plaintiff a full and complete hearing, and that this Court should by its judgment and decree order the vacation of the aforesaid orders of the Regional Planning Commission: (f) that plaintiff is entitled to a mandatory judgment directing and commanding the defendant Union Oil to remove all the buildings constructed thereon and to comply with the collateral agreement; (g) that plaintiff is entitled to a prohibitory injunction restraining and enjoining the defendant Union Oil from breaching said collateral agreement.
'(2) On the second cause of action, for a peremptory writ of mandate against the Regional Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors as hereinabove stated.
'(3) On the third cause of action, for a permanent mandatory and prohibitory injunction against the Union Oil Company as hereinabove stated.'
With reference to the foregoing oral agreement allegedly entered into with Union Oil Company contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of the grant deed, plaintiff alleged that the Union Oil Company expressly agreed:
'(a) To construct on the parcel conveyed to it not more than two tanks and one building.
'(b) That the wells on its land would not be visible to the public and to the prospective purchasers of the remainder of the tract retained by appellant;
'(c) To screen and cover its site and to make it parklike;
'(d) To carry on its operations on the land in a manner as not to destroy the residential character of appellant's land and not to interfere with the privacy and comfort of the present and prospective users of appellant's land;
'(e) To conduct its operations on said site in a manner as not to depreciate the residential market value of the property retained by the appellant.'
It is also alleged that said oral agreement was breached by Union Oil Company in that:
'(a) It constructed on its land more than two tanks and three additional buildings and one sound barricade;
'(b) Its oil wells, pipe lines and equipment were visible to the public; its site was not completely screened; it was not made parklike and did not have the appearance of a park;
'(c) It erected and placed on its site additional equipment consisting of weigh meters, pipe lines, sound screen, buildings, internal combustion engines; and its site was rendered incapable of being covered and screened from the public view;
'(d) It caused noises to be made that interfered with the privacy and comfort of the owners of the adjacent land;
'(e) It kept the site brightly illuminated at all hours of the night;
'(f) And the land retained by the appellant was thus converted into an industrial site and its value was greatly depreciated.'
Appellant's claim is that the foregoing two applications made by defendant Union Oil Company to the Regional Planning Commission of Los Angeles County for zone exceptions and variances were for the purpose of effectuating the conversion of the property into an industrial area in violation of the aforesaid...
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CHAPTER 12 JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT EXHIBITS: AN OVERVIEW
...by any party (even though that provision usually is not checked for inclusion). Article VIII.F. 3. In Triangle Ranch v. Union Oil Company, 287 P.2d 537 (Cal.App. 1955), it was held that an oil producer's oral agreement to carry on its operations in a manner so as not to destroy the resident......
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CHAPTER 12 JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT EXHIBITS: AN OVERVIEW
...by any party (even though that provision usually is not checked for inclusion). Article VIII.F. 3. In Triangle Ranch v. Union Oil Company, 287 P.2d 537 (Cal.App. 1955), it was held that an oil producer's oral agreement to carry on its operations in a manner so as not to destroy the resident......