Scott v. Dohse

Decision Date06 May 2011
Docket NumberNo. 24052.,24052.
Citation194 Ohio App.3d 364,956 N.E.2d 363,2011 -Ohio- 2190
PartiesSCOTT, Appellant,v.DOHSE et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Boucher & Boucher Co., L.P.A., Richard A. Boucher, Dayton, and Julia C. Kolber, for appellant.Craig T. Matthews & Associates, L.P.A., Craig T. Matthews, and J. Conrad Dillon, Dayton, for appellees.HALL, Judge.

[Ohio App.3d 367] {¶ 1} Jerrilyn Scott appeals from the trial court's journal entry dismissing her complaint against appellees Kent Dohse and Paul Stewart for unpaid rent and other money owed to her.

{¶ 2} Dohse and Stewart rented commercial space from Scott and operated an antique store. On December 4, 2008, Scott filed the present action in the small-claims division of the Dayton Municipal Court, seeking to recover $3,000 for back rent, payment for items sold on consignment, and a utility deposit. On January 2, 2009, Dohse and Stewart filed their own complaint against Scott in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, seeking a writ of replevin for the return of their inventory and damages of $28,000. The complaint also included claims for unlawful eviction, breach of contract, intentional interference with business relations, and defamation. Dohse and Stewart requested damages of $250,000 on each of these claims. In her answer to the complaint filed by Dohse and Stewart, Scott alleged that they “would not pay rent” and “would not pay [her] for [her] property.”

{¶ 3} On January 7, 2009, the Dayton Municipal Court transferred Scott's lawsuit from the small-claims division to the regular docket. On May 17, 2009, the common pleas court granted Dohse and Stewart summary judgment on their claims for wrongful termination of a lease and breach of contract. The common pleas court awarded Dohse and Stewart damages of $13,307.55, including punitive damages of $4,435.85. The common pleas court also awarded the two men attorney fees of $9,151.91.

{¶ 4} On November 12, 2009, Dohse and Stewart moved to dismiss Scott's municipal court lawsuit on the basis of res judicata. A magistrate initially denied the motion. The magistrate then reconsidered and granted the motion. Scott filed what the trial court treated as objections to the magistrate's decision. On April 19, 2010, the trial court overruled the objections and dismissed Scott's complaint. In support of its ruling, the trial court reasoned: “The court agrees with the magistrate's conclusion of law that plaintiff was required to present her claim as either a counterclaim or a defense in [the common pleas court case]. Plaintiff is now barred from litigating the same issues in the present case and it was properly dismissed.”

[Ohio App.3d 368] {¶ 5} On appeal, Scott primarily argues that the dismissal of her complaint violated Ohio's jurisdictional-priority rule. She asserts that two cases were pending in two different courts of concurrent jurisdiction involving the same parties and the same issues. Under these circumstances, she insists that the jurisdictional-priority rule granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Dayton Municipal Court because it acquired jurisdiction first. As a result, she reasons that the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed and, therefore, that the municipal court erred in dismissing her complaint. Scott also briefly touches on the concept of res judicata, asserting that she was not given an opportunity in the common pleas court action “to fully litigate her issues.” In response to Scott's arguments, Dohse and Stewart assert that the jurisdictional-priority rule did not apply and that res judicata barred her complaint for unpaid rent, payment for items sold on consignment, and a utility deposit. In reply, Scott argues at length that res judicata did not apply and that she was not required to raise her municipal court claims as counterclaims in the common pleas court action.

{¶ 6} Upon review, we reject Scott's first argument. The jurisdictional-priority rule generally provides that [a]s between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.’ State ex rel. Judson v. Spahr (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 515 N.E.2d 911, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 4 O.O.3d 445, 364 N.E.2d 33. For the rule to apply, the parties and the subject matter must be the same. Adams Robinson Ent. v. Envirologix Corp. (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 426, 429, 676 N.E.2d 560. Even if this requirement is met, the rule does not apply when “the conflict of jurisdiction is between a court of general jurisdiction and one whose limited powers are inadequate to afford full relief to the parties.” Judson at 113, 515 N.E.2d 911, citing State ex rel. McHenry v. Calhoun (1950), 87 Ohio App. 1, 93 N.E.2d 317; see also Duckworth v. Burger King Corp., 159 Ohio App.3d 540, 548, 2005-Ohio-294, 824 N.E.2d 592, ¶ 15.

{¶ 7} In the present case, Scott argues that (1) the Dayton Municipal Court and Montgomery County Common Pleas Court have concurrent jurisdiction, (2) she first invoked the municipal court's jurisdiction, and (3) her municipal court case and the appellees' common pleas court case involved the same parties and issues. Even assuming that this is true, Scott overlooks a dispositive fact—the Dayton Municipal Court's powers were limited, and it could not afford full relief to the parties.

{¶ 8} Scott filed her action in the small-claims division of the Dayton Municipal Court. The action remained pending there when Dohse and Stewart filed their [Ohio App.3d 369] lawsuit in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. The damages requested, and ultimately obtained, by Dohse and Stewart in the common pleas court significantly exceeded the small-claims division's monetary jurisdiction of $3,000.1 R.C. 1925.02(A)(1). The small-claims division also lacked jurisdiction over some of the claims filed by Dohse and Stewart. See R.C. 1925.02(A)(2)(a) (stating that a small-claims division lacks jurisdiction over actions for “libel, slander, replevin, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process”). This court has recognized the common-sense principle that no competing or conflicting jurisdiction exists when one of the two courts involved lacks jurisdiction. Adams Robinson, 111 Ohio App.3d at 430, 676 N.E.2d 560. Moreover, as noted above, the jurisdictional-priority rule has no applicability when “the conflict of jurisdiction is between a court of general jurisdiction and one whose limited powers are inadequate to afford full relief to the parties.” Judson, 33 Ohio St.3d at 113, 515 N.E.2d 911. Thus, the jurisdictional-priority rule did not give the small-claims division of the Dayton Municipal Court exclusive jurisdiction or preclude the lawsuit filed by Dohse and Stewart in the common pleas court.

{¶ 9} The remaining issue is whether the trial court erred in holding that (1) Scott was required to present her claims for $3,000 in back rent, payment for items sold on consignment, and a utility deposit as counterclaims or defenses in common pleas court and (2) Scott was “barred from litigating the same issues in the present case that were adjudicated in the common pleas court.

{¶ 10} Upon review, we conclude that both holdings are erroneous. The first holding implies that the claims Scott raised in her small-claims complaint were compulsory counterclaims in the common pleas court action. This is incorrect. Under Civ.R. 13(A), a compulsory counterclaim generally includes “any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” We do not dispute that Scott's claims arose out of the same general transaction or occurrence as the claims raised by Dohse and Stewart. In her lawsuit, Scott claimed that she had locked the appellees out of their business because they owed her money for rent and other things. In their lawsuit, Dohse and Stewart alleged that Scott had breached their lease agreement by engaging in self-help repossession and locking them out.

{¶ 11} Notably, however, Civ.R. 13(A) contains an exception. It provides that a claim...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Kinzel v. Ebner
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • August 21, 2020
    ...circumstances, the municipal court and common pleas court are not courts of concurrent jurisdiction. (Citations omitted.) Scott v. Dohse , 194 Ohio App.3d 364, 2011-Ohio-2190, 956 N.E.2d 363, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.) ; Adams Robinson Ent. v. Envirologix Corp. , 111 Ohio App.3d 426, 429-30, 676 N.E.2d......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT