State ex rel. Judson v. Spahr
| Decision Date | 02 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-194,86-194 |
| Citation | 33 Ohio St.3d 111,515 N.E.2d 911 |
| Parties | The STATE, ex rel. JUDSON, Appellant, v. SPAHR, Judge, Appellee, et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
This case involves an appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals for Licking County denying relator's complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent from proceeding with the trial of an action filed against relator by his wife for the alleged conversion of the proceeds from an automobile insurance policy settlement. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
On July 18, 1983, relator Austin Judson, his wife, Kristee Judson, and their two minor children, Joseph Judson and Austin J. Judson, were in an automobile accident when Warren Board, an uninsured motorist, failed to stop his car at a stop sign in Licking County and collided with the Judsons' car. The relator, Kristee Judson and Austin J. Judson were injured in the accident, Joseph Judson was killed.
Relator thereafter apparently arranged a $52,000 settlement with their insurance company, State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company ("State Auto"), with regard to the claims arising out of the accident. Kristee Judson has alleged that relator, with the aid of Robert McCarty (his attorney), and without her authority to do so, executed receipt release or discharge documents on her behalf and wrongfully converted the settlement funds to his own use and to Kristee Judson's detriment.
On November 18, 1983, relator filed a complaint against Kristee Judson in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas requesting a decree of divorce, division of property, custody of Austin J. Judson and other equitable relief.
On December 5, 1983, Kristee Judson and Sherry Ryan, the administratrix of the estate of Joseph Judson, filed a complaint against Warren Board, the individual county commissioners of Licking County, relator, Robert McCarty, and State Auto in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas requesting compensatory and punitive damages for the wrongful death of Joseph Judson and for Kristee Judson's injuries sustained in the July 18, 1983 accident. In the complaint, Kristee Judson asked for compensatory and punitive damages against relator and Robert McCarty for the wrongful conversion of the State Auto insurance settlement proceeds. In addition, she asked for a declaratory judgment of, inter alia, her rights and State Auto's obligations under the policy with regard to the accident.
On January 4, 1984, relator filed a motion to dismiss Kristee Judson's complaint against him on the ground that his divorce action had previously invoked the exclusive jurisdiction of the Muskingum County court over all matters involving rights to marital property, including Kristee Judson's claim to the proceeds of the State Auto insurance policy. In the alternative, relator requested that the claims against him be severed from the wrongful death action filed by Sherry Ryan and transferred to the Muskingum County court.
On February 24, 1984, the Licking County court denied relator's motion to dismiss and denied his motion to sever and transfer.
On July 9, 1985, the Licking County court scheduled the Judson-Ryan case for trial on January 6, 1986.
On November 5, 1985, relator filed an original action in the Court of Appeals for Licking County requesting (1) a writ of procedendo to require respondent Judge Spahr to rule on relator's motion to sever and transfer Kristee Judson's claim to the Muskingum County court and (2) a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent from exercising any further jurisdiction over that claim. 1
On December 19, 1985, the court of appeals denied relator's complaint, finding that he had failed to state sufficient facts which justified the requested relief.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Robert L. McCarty, Zanesville, for appellant.
Robert L. Becker, Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Burman, Robinson & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Dennis M. McCarthy and William C. Becker, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Kristee Judson.
In order for the extraordinary writ of prohibition to issue this court must find that the court or officer against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, that the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law, and that relator has no other adequate remedy at law, State ex rel. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. v. Guzzo (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 270, 6 OBR 335, 452 N.E.2d 1314; State ex rel. Northern Ohio Tel. Co. v. Winter (1970) 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 52 O.O.2d 29, 260 N.E.2d 827.
The first requirement is clearly satisfied in this case. The Licking County trial court denied relator's motion to dismiss or sever in February 1984. There have been continuing proceedings in that case and a trial was scheduled to commence in January 1986. It is evident that respondent is continuing to exercise his judicial power over the case.
With regard to the second requirement, relator argues that the Licking County court lacks any jurisdiction to adjudicate Kristee Judson's conversion claim because all matters dealing with their rights in marital property, including the State Auto insurance policy, are encompassed in relator's divorce complaint pending in the Muskingum County court. Since that complaint was filed prior to the commencement of Kristee Judson's case, relator in effect argues that the rule of concurrent and co-extensive jurisdiction applies requiring the conclusion that the Muskingum County court acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over the proceeds of the policy. Relator relies upon State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 4 O.O.3d 445, 364 N.E.2d 33, in support of his argument.
The syllabus of Phillips, supra, sets forth the general rule for the resolution of a conflict between two courts when both are asserting jurisdiction over the same cause:
It is a condition of the operation of the rule that the claims or causes of action be the same in both cases. If the second case is not for the same cause of action, nor between the same parties, the former suit will not prevent the latter. State ex rel....
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