Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 0998,0998 |
| Citation | 293 S.C. 191,359 S.E.2d 291 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Mary W. SCOTT, Respondent-Appellant, v. MID CAROLINA HOMES, INC., Appellant-Respondent. . Heard |
Marvin E. McMillan, Jr., of Weinberg, Brown & McDougall, Sumter, for appellant-respondent.
Douglas J. Robinson, Robert J. Sheheen and John W. Rabb, Jr., all of Savage, Royall, Kinard, Sheheen & Byars, Camden, for respondent-appellant.
Mary W. Scott commenced this action against Mid Carolina Homes, Inc. to recover damages for Mid Carolina's alleged refusal to honor a contract to sell a mobile home. Scott's complaint stated causes of action for fraud, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. 1 At the close of Scott's testimony, the circuit judge granted Mid Carolina's motion for directed verdict on the fraud claim, but submitted the other two causes of action to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in Scott's favor, awarding her $3,600.00 actual and $6,400.00 punitive damages for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act and $3,000.00 actual damages for violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The circuit judge affirmed the jury's verdict. He also awarded Scott costs and attorney's fees of $1,800.00 for her unfair trade claim, but denied her motion to treble her damages for the statutory violation. Mid Carolina appeals the jury verdicts, and Scott appeals the amount of attorney's fees and the refusal to treble damages. We affirm the award for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, but reverse the award of damages and attorney's fees under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
On March 23, 1985, Scott and her husband visited Mid Carolina's sales lot in Hartsville, South Carolina, looking for a mobile home to purchase for Mrs. Scott's mother. One of the salesmen, Neal Phillips, invited the Scotts to accompany him the following Saturday to Mid Carolina's lot in Sumter, South Carolina, to see a repossessed 1984 mobile home priced at about $5,600.00. When the Scotts returned to the Hartsville lot on Saturday, March 30, Phillips was not there, but Ashley Hardwick, another salesman, offered to show them the mobile home at the Sumter lot. The Scotts agreed and drove to Sumter. While examining the mobile home, they discussed its purchase with Hardwick. He told them the purchase price was $5,644.00, 2 to be paid in full before delivery. Mrs. Scott then decided to purchase the home for the stated price. She gave Hardwick a check for $2,913.71, agreeing to pay the balance before April 30. Hardwick, in turn, promised her the mobile home would be moved to the Hartsville lot by Friday, April 5. Before the Scotts left the lot, Hardwick filled out a form entitled "A Plain Language Purchase Agreement." This document, referred to by Mid Carolina as a "Form 500," contains a description of the mobile home, Mrs. Scott's name and address, and the amount of the purchase price, down payment, and balance due. In the lower left corner of the form is a space for the dealer's signature accompanied by the following statement: "Not Valid Unless Signed and Accepted by an Officer of the Company." This space was never signed. According to Mr. Scott's testimony, Hardwick told the Scotts that Phillips would have to sign the form so that he could obtain his commission as the original salesman. Mrs. Scott signed her name as buyer in the lower right corner.
During the following week, the Scotts received a telephone call from Phillips telling them to meet him the following Saturday, April 6. Accordingly, the Scotts drove to the lot on Saturday. There Phillips told them he was unable to sell them the mobile home because it had a bent frame. The Scotts offered to take the home anyway and sign a release for the frame, but Phillips said the South Carolina Manufactured Housing Board would not permit him to sell the home with a bent frame.
On April 12, 1985, another couple signed a Form 500 to purchase the same trailer from Mid Carolina for $9,220.00. This form was signed by an officer of Mid Carolina, and the purchase was consummated.
At this time, Mid Carolina still had Mrs. Scott's check, which it subsequently cashed on April 19. On April 25, Mrs. Scott's attorney sent Mid Carolina a letter stating that Mrs. Scott was prepared to comply with the terms of their "binding contract" and that failure to deliver the mobile home by April 30 would be a breach of that contract. Mrs. Scott's attorney sent a second letter on May 13 informing Mid Carolina that he considered the contract breached and that if Mrs. Scott's down payment were not returned within seven days, she would file an action for fraud or pursue a criminal warrant. Mid Carolina returned the down payment by a check dated May 15, 1985.
On May 28, 1985, Mrs. Scott filed a complaint alleging Mid Carolina had breached a contract to sell her the mobile home. Mrs. Scott sought actual and punitive damages under three theories: fraud, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The circuit judge directed a verdict in Mid Carolina's favor on the fraud claim and submitted the other two causes of action to the jury. The jury awarded Mrs. Scott $3,600.00 actual damages and $6,400.00 punitive damages for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act and $3,000.00 actual damages for violation of the Act. The circuit judge upheld the jury's verdict, awarded Scott costs and attorney's fees for the statutory violation, and denied Scott's motion to treble the damages under the Act.
Mid Carolina urges reversal of the verdicts on the following grounds: (1) Mrs. Scott failed to prove the elements of breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, (2) the evidence supports Mid Carolina's defenses of accord and satisfaction and mistake, (3) the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act does not apply to Mid Carolina's conduct, and (4) the judge erred in refusing to give the jury Mid Carolina's requested charges on fraud and mistake.
A.
First, Mid Carolina argues Mrs. Scott failed to prove breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.
To recover for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, a plaintiff must prove three elements: breach of a contract, fraudulent intent relating to the breach, and a fraudulent act accompanying the breach. Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 336 S.E.2d 502 (Ct.App.1985). Mid Carolina contends Mrs. Scott failed to prove any of these elements.
Mid Carolina argues it could not have breached a contract because no contract existed. It maintains there was no agreement on its part to be bound by any contract of sale because no officer ever signed the Form 500. Thus, Mid Carolina contends, there was only an unaccepted offer by Mrs. Scott to purchase the mobile home for $5,644.00.
On appeal from a jury verdict, our review is limited to determining if there is any evidence to support the verdict. Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328 S.E.2d 108 (Ct.App.1985), cert. dismissed, 286 S.C. 127, 332 S.E.2d 102 (1985). The record contains some evidence showing that Mid Carolina consented, either expressly or impliedly, to sell the mobile home to Mrs. Scott under the terms alleged by her.
The jury could have concluded from the Scotts' testimony that Hardwick and Mrs. Scott entered an express oral contract before Mrs. Scott ever saw the Form 500. The evidence shows the parties had already agreed on the essential elements of the contract: the price, the method and schedule of payment, and the repairs to be performed prior to delivery. Further, at that time, Mrs. Scott had every reason to believe Hardwick had authority to enter a contract. The discussion took place at Mid Carolina's main lot; Hardwick went into the office to confirm the sales price; he informed Mrs. Scott of the required time for payment; and he made no mention of any need to obtain approval from an officer of the corporation.
Alternatively, if the Form 500 is construed merely as an offer to purchase the mobile home, the jury could have concluded Mid Carolina impliedly accepted the offer. Assent to an offer need not be expressed to constitute a contract, but may be inferred from acts and conduct. Florence City-County Airport Commission v. Air Terminal Parking Co., 283 S.C. 337, 322 S.E.2d 471 (Ct.App.1984). Mid Carolina accepted Mrs. Scott's check for one-half of the purchase price on March 30 and deposited it in its account almost three weeks later, after it had had ample time to reject the offer. Mid Carolina also retained Mrs. Scott's Form 500 in its files, despite testimony by its vice-president that all Form 500s are normally destroyed if Mid Carolina rejects the contract. According to both Mr. and Mrs. Scott, the reason Phillips gave for being unable to sell them the home was not that the form had been rejected or that there was no contract, but rather that the frame was bent. Because Mid Carolina's subsequent course of conduct was consistent with the existence of a contract, the jury could have concluded that Mid Carolina impliedly accepted Mrs. Scott's offer by its conduct.
Next, Mid Carolina contends Mrs. Scott failed to prove it either acted with fraudulent intent or committed any fraudulent act in connection with the breach of contract. Fraudulent intent is normally proved by circumstances surrounding the breach. Floyd v. Country Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., supra. In this case, fraudulent intent can be inferred from Phillips's statement to the Scotts that he was not permitted to sell them the mobile home because its frame was bent. Whether or not the frame was actually bent, it is clear that Phillips was not prohibited from selling the mobile home because of a bent frame. In fact, the home was sold to another couple for a substantially higher price, apparently without any repairs having...
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