Scott v. Pulley
| Decision Date | 14 November 1985 |
| Citation | 705 S.W.2d 666 |
| Parties | Charles SCOTT and Delores Scott, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Aurelia Elizabeth PULLEY, Intervening Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHRISTIAN COUNSELING SERVICES, Respondent-Appellee. 705 S.W.2d 666 |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Renard A. Hirsch, Sr., Nashville, for petitioners-appellees.
Kim L. Kirk, Woods, Woods & Watson, Nashville, for intervening petitioner-appellant.
Lucien Dale, Nashville, for respondent-appellee.
This is an appeal by Aurelia Elizabeth Pulley from the Trial Court's dismissal of her "Motion for Permission to Intervene in Adoption Proceedings" and "Petition to Revoke Surrender of Child."
Miss Pulley is the natural mother of a child born out of wedlock on December 13, 1983. She surrendered the child to Christian Counseling Services (CCS) before the Honorable Muriel Robinson on January 13, 1984.
Miss Pulley, at the time she executed the surrender to CCS, was one month from her nineteenth birthday. She was a second year student at Tennessee Tech University, studying towards a major in mass communications.
Approximately one week before the child was born, Miss Pulley told her obstetrician that she wanted to give the baby up for adoption. Her obstetrician referred her to an agency, "Choice of Life." She informed "Choice of Life" that she wanted to place the baby for adoption and that, while she had no preference as to religion, she preferred that the adopting parents be "black." After consultation with three ladies at "Choice of Life" for a period of some three hours, she was referred to CCS.
Miss Pulley went to CCS on December 8, 1983, conferred with Rebecca Morsh who gave her a "Natural Parent Preliminary Questionaire." Miss Pulley took the questionaire home where she completed it and returned it to CCS. The questionaire contained, inter alia, the following: She answered: "Adoption."
The child was born at 2:00 A.M. on December 13th without any anesthesia or narcotic being administered to Miss Pulley. At 1:00 P.M. on December 13th, Rebecca Morsh came to Miss Pulley's hospital room and, in the presence of Miss Pulley's mother, asked Miss Pulley "to sign releasing the baby to the custody of Christian Counseling Services." Miss Pulley executed the document with her mother witnessing the release form. Miss Pulley also signed a second document at that time which allowed the CCS to make plans for the child.
Miss Pulley understood the document and stated that she was not under the influence of any drug and that it was at that time her intention to sign the document releasing the child.
The surrender was scheduled before Judge Robinson for January 8, 1984. Miss Pulley missed this date, and the surrender was rescheduled for January 13, 1984.
Ms. Morsh came to Miss Pulley's home on January 13th and took her to the Davidson County Courthouse for the surrender. Miss Pulley admits that neither Ms. Morsh nor anyone else did or said anything to "intimidate" or "coerce" her into signing the surrender document. No one insisted that Miss Pulley go through with the surrender. At no time prior to the surrender did Miss Pulley tell Ms. Morsh or anyone else that she had changed her mind about placing the child for adoption.
At the surrender, while Miss Pulley and Judge Robinson were alone in Chambers, she was informed by Judge Robinson that "if I changed my mind, I had thirty days" to revoke. She was asked by Judge Robinson if she was surrendering her child under duress, and she answered that she was not. In answer to Judge Robinson's question, Miss Pulley stated that she felt it was in the best interest of both herself and the child for the child to be surrendered for adoption.
On either February 12th or 13th, Miss Pulley had her mother call CCS to see if there was anything she could do about getting her child back. Miss Pulley testified that she really made up her mind that she wanted to keep the child after she had seen him some several days after the surrender was final.
Miss Pulley's mother talked with an attorney in Birmingham sometime in either February or March, 1984, regarding revocation of the surrender. This attorney advised Miss Pulley's mother that Miss Pulley should do something "in a hurry" about the surrender. Miss Pulley testified that she talked with three different attorneys about representing her before she hired her present counsel. One of these attorneys had a conflict, and two of them told her that they did not feel she could prevail.
In any event, the petition to intervene was not filed until November 30, 1984, and the petition to revoke the surrender was not filed until December 20, 1984.
It was further Miss Pulley's testimony that one of the reasons she had decided to give the child up for adoption was that she did not feel that her family would be supportive of her. She testified, however, that she learned while she was still in the hospital following the birth of the child that the family was very supportive and would help her in caring for her child.
Miss Pulley stated that after she returned home she experienced mixed emotions, that she missed her child a great deal but was uncertain what to do. She was under the impression even before the surrender that it would not be possible to get the child back and, at the time of the surrender she was confused and experiencing great pressure and stress.
By her first issue, Miss Pulley insists that "[t]he surrender of [her] son for adoption came as a result of imposition of undue influence, the Trial Court therefore erred in denying [her] petition for revocation of surrender."
Undue influence has been defined as
that influence which controls the mental operations of the one influenced by overcoming his power of resistence and thus obliging him to adopt the will of another, thereby producing a disposition of property or the performance of some act by the influenced person which he otherwise would not have done.
In considering whether parental consents to adoption or to the surrender of their children to child placement or similar agencies were obtained through duress, courts have defined and construed the term "duress" according to its generally understood meaning, to signify that condition which exists where one is induced by the unlawful act of another to make a contract or to perform or forego an act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of his free will.
"Moral duress" consists in imposition, oppression, undue influence, or the taking of undue advantage of the business or financial stress or extreme necessities or weakness of another, and relief is granted in such cases on the basis that the party benefiting thereby has received money, property, or other advantages which in equity and good conscience he should not be permitted to retain, said the court in Huebert v. Marshall (1971) 132 Ill App 2d 793, 270 NE2d 464.
The imposition of undue influence is a ground for revocation of the surrender of a child. State v. A Licensed or Chartered Child-Placing Agency, 194 Tenn. 400, 250 S.W.2d 776 (1952).
At the hearing to revoke the surrender, the burden was on Miss Pulley to show that she was under duress and that the surrender was brought about by undue influence.
Miss Pulley relies on cases from other jurisdictions in support of her insistence that undue influence was applied forcing her to surrender her child.
In Methodist Mission Home v. NAB, 451 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Civ.App.1970), the mother entered a home for unwed mothers. The court found that the staff members had caused the natural mother to believe that her own parents' support for her decision to keep her child was an effort to put something over on the natural mother. She was told by the staff of the home that she had no right to keep her child. The court also found that the natural mother was dependent upon the staff of the home for assistance in finding employment and a place to live. The facts in Methodist Mission Home are inapposite to the facts here.
In Re D___, 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo.App.1966), is also inapposite to this case. There the court simply found that the conduct of the mother was inconsistent with the consent to adopt.
Here, Miss Pulley's actions prior to the surrender becoming final are consistent with her desire to place the child for adoption.
She testified that she had asked to see the child before the surrender and they told her she could not see it until the surrender had become final. Her counsel, therefore, concludes that she did the only thing she could in order to see the child--"she signed a surrender form."
We are not persuaded by this conclusion. The record shows that Miss Pulley is a person of above average intelligence. At the time of the surrender she was a college sophomore at Tennessee Tech University and she had made good grades both in high school and at Tennessee Tech University.
At the surrender hearing, she could have told Judge Robinson that she did not desire to surrender her child, that she wanted to keep the child. Instead, she told Judge Robinson that she felt that it was both in her best interest and the child's that the child be surrendered for adoption. She knew before she signed the surrender that her family would be supportive of her and would help her in rearing the child.
While the record shows that CCS agreed to pay the medical costs if the child was surrendered for adoption, there is no showing that Miss Pulley was indigent or that it was necessary that she rely on CCS for financial assistance.
We find nothing in this record to show that Miss Pulley was under duress or that there was any undue influence exerted upon her...
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