Scott v. State
| Citation | 7 A.3d 471 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 342, 2009.,342, 2009. |
| Parties | Jeffrey D. SCOTT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, Cr. I.D. No. 0407003957.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey D. Scott, Georgetown, Delaware; pro se Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for Appellee.
Jeffrey D. Scott ("Scott"), the defendant below, appeals from a Superior Court order denying his motion for post-conviction relief. Scott was convicted of second-degree (felony) murder as a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, one count of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony ("PDWDCF"), and one count of endangering the welfare of a child. Scott claims that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. We disagree and affirm.
On July 6, 2006, Scott and his girlfriend, Edna Crown,1 had an argument in their apartment concerning Edna's alleged affair with her nephew. Also present in the apartment were Edna's seventeen-year-old daughter, Doris, and Kelly Oster and Oster's two children, Ellen and Ester (ages five and three, respectively). During the argument, Scott pushed Edna down the apartment's front steps. After Edna returned to the apartment, Scott stabbed her eleven times with a kitchen knife. Edna died as a result of her injuries. Kelly and Ester Oster were also injured during the incident.2
When the police arrived at the crime scene, Scott admitted to the police that he had stabbed Edna. He later made a similar statement while receiving treatment at the hospital for injuries he sustained during the incident. During a subsequent police interview, Scott made additional incriminating statements, and while leaving the courthouse after a hearing, Scott also made further incriminating statements that were overheard by police officers.
Scott was charged with first-degree murder,3 two counts of assault in the second-degree,4 three counts of PDWDCF,5 and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child.6 At trial, his counsel presented a defense of extreme emotional distress, and introduced expert witness testimony in support thereof. A jury convicted Scott of second-degree murder,7one count of PDWDCF, and one count of endangering the welfare of a child, but found him not guilty of the other charges. Scott directly appealed his convictions to this Court, which affirmed them.8
Scott then moved the Superior Court for post-conviction relief, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, advancing eleven arguments as to why his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective.9 The Superior Court referred Scott's post-conviction motion to a Commissioner for proposed findings and recommendations. The Commissioner recommended, in his report, that Scott's post-conviction motion be denied as without merit and as procedurally barred. 10 The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner's report and recommendations and denied Scott's motion for post-conviction relief. 11 Scott then appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Scott raised a new ineffective assistance claim based on this Court's recent opinion in Cooke v. State.12 The State responded that because this claim was not raised in the trial court, the record was inadequate for appellate review. On May 4, 2010, this Court remanded Scott's appeal to the Superior Court for consideration of Scott's claim based on Cooke.13 On remand, the Superior Court held that Scott's Cooke-related claims were without merit and denied his motion.14 This appeal followed.
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel for abuse of discretion.15 Questions of law are reviewed de novo,16 while questions of fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard.17
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance caused the defendant actual prejudice.18 Counsel's performance enjoysa strong presumption of reasonableness.19 To succeed on the prejudice prong, the defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 20 That test requires that the defendant make specific and concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them.21
None of Scott's claims meets the required showing for either of the Strickland prongs.22 Scott makes conclusory assertions that his defense counsel acted unreasonably, but provides no support for those assertions, or explains why his counsel's performance was deficient. Nor does Scott explain how he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiencies. This Court has previously held that failure to articulate, with particularity, the nature of the claimed prejudice is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.23 Accordingly, the Superior Court properly denied Scott's motion for post-conviction relief.
On appeal, Scott raises twelve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 24 Each of these claims is addressed below.
Scott first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of Kelly and Ester Oster's medical records documenting their injuries and treatment, when neither witness testified at trial. Although the jury found Scott not guilty of the assault charges involving Kelly and Ester Oster, Scott argues that his counsel's failure to object prejudiced him, because the medical records "contradicted" his defense of extreme emotional distress. That contradiction, Scott contends, caused the jury to convict him of having a reckless disregard for human life, i.e., second-degree murder.25
Scott's claim fails for two reasons. First, the trial court properly admitted Kelly and Ester Oster's medical records into evidence as hearsay exceptions under Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence ("DRE") 803(4) and 803(6).26 Therefore, Scott's counsel would not have successfully prevented the admission of these documents, regardless of whether the Osters testified. Moreover, Scott was acquitted of the two assault charges involving Kellyand Ester Oster. His second-degree murder conviction rests on a totally separate basis-the injuries he inflicted on Edna Crown, resulting in her death. Because Scott cannot show actual prejudice, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Scott's claim.
Next, Scott claims that the police obtained a nighttime search warrant based on a false police affidavit, and that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the defective warrant. Specifically, Scott claims that the police knew that Kelly Oster did not reside at the searched apartment, even though the police affidavit stated otherwise.27
This claim cannot succeed either. Under Franks v. Delaware, suppression is an appropriate remedy only if the false statement was included in the affidavit knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. 28 Here, the Superior Court accepted the Commissioner's conclusion that the search warrant established probable cause regardless of whether Kelly Oster was a resident. Scott has not shown that the affidavit misstatement regarding Oster's residency was necessary to the finding of probable cause.
Equally important, Scott's counsel did, in fact, move to suppress the evidence based on a lack of exigent circumstances for a nighttime search warrant. The trial court denied counsel's motion, and this Court affirmed on direct appeal. 29 Because Scott cannot succeed on either the deficient performance or the actual prejudice component of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying that claim.
Scott next claims that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress his statements to the police when they handcuffed him. He urges that the statements would have been suppressed because he was neither told that he was under arrest nor advised of his Miranda rights.
This claim also lacks merit. Miranda warnings are required when a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation.30 Scott, however, made his statements voluntarily and spontaneously as he was being taken into custody by the police.31 Because there was no interrogation by the police, Miranda is inapplicable. Scott's counsel, therefore, did not perform deficiently by not moving to suppress Scott's spontaneous statements,and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Scott's third claim.
Scott's fourth claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to insist on a voir dire examination of a juror after the juror informed the court that she was taking pain medication. Scott argues that because most prescription pain relievers contain narcotics, the juror was impaired and preoccupied with her pain during the trial and, therefore, could not be fair and impartial.
This claim also fails. The juror was questioned about her medical issue, and told the trial judge that it would not interfere with performing her duty as a juror.32 The judge, defense counsel, and counsel for the State were sufficiently satisfied to allow the juror to continue to serve. Because Scott's contention that his counsel performed deficiently or that he was actually prejudiced lacks merit, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying...
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