Scott v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2005-CT-00915-SCT.,2005-CT-00915-SCT.
• Citation: 8 So.3d 855
• Parties: William G. SCOTT a/k/a William Scott v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

8 So.3d 855

William G. SCOTT a/k/a William Scott v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2005-CT-00915-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

December 4, 2008.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 2009.

J. Christopher Klotz, Joshua Aaron Turner, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by W. Glenn Watts, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

SMITH, Chief Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. William Scott was convicted of capital murder for the slaying of Paula Kay Dinkins during an armed robbery at Cash Depot, where Dinkins worked. Dinkins had been shot in the head. The jury found Scott guilty of capital murder and sentenced Scott to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Scott appealed on the following grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse herself after an ex parte conference with Scott's attorney; (2) whether the trial judge erred in denying Scott's motion to suppress his written confession; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial; (4) whether the State's closing argument constituted reversible error; and (5) whether Scott received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

¶ 2. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict and remanded the case for a new trial and a new evidentiary hearing and found as follows: The trial judge abused her discretion by failing to recuse herself after an ex parte hearing with Scott's counsel; the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Scott's confession into evidence; and the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial was not supported by sufficient evidence on either side and required a new evidentiary hearing to determine if Scott was prejudiced by the State's failure to provide a speedy trial.

¶ 3. Having remanded the case for a new trial and a new evidentiary hearing, the Court of Appeals held it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the closing argument resulted in reversible error. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that Scott's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would be better brought by motion for post-conviction relief and declined to reach the issue. Scott v. State, ___ So.3d ___ (Miss.Ct.App. Mar.18, 2008).

¶ 4. We disagree. We reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and hold that the trial court: (1) did not commit manifest error or abuse its discretion when the trial court judge did not recuse herself after an ex parte meeting with Scott's counsel while acting in her role as gatekeeper in a jury trial; (2) did not commit manifest error or abuse its discretion when it denied Scott's motion to suppress his written confession; (3) did not commit manifest error or abuse its discretion when it denied Scott's motion to dismiss for failure to provide him a speedy trial; (4) did not commit manifest error or abuse its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial based on allowing the State's closing argument; and (5) Scott did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

¶ 5. We reverse and vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment. We affirm and reinstate the jury verdict and the sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶ 6. On July 9, 2002, while working at the Cash Depot in Jackson, Dinkins was shot in the head during an armed robbery; she was found dead, kneeling in front of an empty safe that previously had contained $2,200. After an investigation which revealed Scott to be a possible suspect, an ex-girlfriend of Scott's told the Jackson Police Department Scott was in Marietta, Georgia. The JPD notified the Marietta police of an outstanding warrant, and the Marietta police took Scott into custody.

¶ 7. When the JPD arrived, Scott was given his Miranda warnings, and allegedly signed a waiver, which he later denied at trial.¹ Scott confessed to the armed robbery and murder in the presence of two officers, then signed and initialed the typed confession. At trial, Scott, who testified in his own defense, admitted he had signed a confession. Scott admitted he had signed some portions of the confession presented in court, but he alleged that he did not sign some of the confession. Both officers who took his confession testified at trial and were subject to cross-examination.

¶ 8. At the heart of this appeal is an ex parte conference (which was sealed under the court's order) in which Scott's counsel revealed a serious conflict brought about by his client's confession to the murder, insistence on taking the stand to offer perjured testimony, and insistence on attempting to find alibi witnesses who would likewise commit perjury. The record reveals that Scott's counsel tried to reason with Scott to prevent him from providing perjured testimony, to no avail. Scott attempted to have new counsel appointed on several occasions as well.

¶ 9. At that point, Scott's counsel attempted to withdraw from the case, which the trial court did not allow. Then, Scott's counsel, without initially revealing the content of the conflict, explained to the judge in an ex parte hearing that he found himself in an ethical dilemma that could cost him his license to practice law. The trial judge inquired further in order to make her ruling. At that time, Scott's counsel revealed to the trial judge that Scott had confessed to him that he had committed the crime and was intent on falsely testifying. Scott's attorney explained he had not been able to dissuade Scott from offering perjured testimony.

¶ 10. The trial judge held that Scott would be allowed to provide narrative testimony and would be subject to cross-examination, consistent with Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 and its comments. The comment to Rule 3.3 states, "an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the law as well, to avoid implication in the commission of perjury or other falsification of evidence." See Rule 1.2(d). Miss. Rule of Prof'l Conduct 3.3 cmt. (as amended 2000).

¶ 11. Scott was tried and convicted of the capital murder of Dinkins by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

¶ 12. The facts are set forth in detail in the Court of Appeals' opinion, and under the standards of review required in this case, it is unnecessary to revisit every detail. However, in order to reach the issues, we will reiterate pertinent facts.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the Trial Judge Erred in Failing to Recuse Herself after an Ex Parte Conference with Scott's Attorney.

¶ 13. The standard of review to which this Court is bound on the issue of recusal is manifest error. Davis v. Neshoba County Gen. Hosp., 611 So.2d 904, 905 (Miss.1992) (e.g., Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 677 (Miss.1990), Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss.1985)). Further, impartiality is presumed, and the presumption must be overcome by the appellant in order for this Court to find manifest error. Jones v. State, 740 So.2d 904, 912 (Miss.1999). The question is whether or not "a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Id. (citing Davis, 611 So.2d at 905, accord Miss. Const. art. VI, § 165 (1890)).

¶ 14. With regard to this case, Scott and the Court of Appeals misplace their focus on what Scott's counsel told the judge in the ex parte hearing. The confession that Scott's counsel revealed to the trial judge, after every other remedy had been exhausted, was entirely consistent with the corroborating evidence, including the written confession that had been obtained when Scott was arrested in Marietta, the proposed testimony of the two officers who had obtained an earlier written confession, and all of the other evidence collected in this case.

¶ 15. In support of its holding, the Court of Appeals cites cases involving bench trials. In addition, the Court of Appeals' majority has bolstered its ruling with authority that carries no precedent in this jurisdiction. (E.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.1978), Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C.1980)). Not a single case cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling involved a jury trial. As such, the facts herein are inapposite to those upon which the Court of Appeals seeks to rest its holding. This was not a bench trial; it was a jury trial. The trial judge applied the proper legal standard to admit the written confession and allowed the jury to weigh the evidence before it. The judge did not need to recuse herself and made no determination as to the truth or falsity of the confession, merely that it met the standard required for admission, that of being voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. Martin v. State, 854 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Miss.2003).

¶ 16. The Court of Appeals suggests that the trial judge was so persuaded by the attorney's revelation as to make the trial judge certain that Scott was guilty, which resulted in unfair prejudice at trial. If this contention was valid, the existence of a written confession would likewise be prone to persuade any trial judge that a defendant was guilty. This Court entrusts our judges with great discretion. Our trial judges are confronted daily with evidence that would tend to make defendants appear more culpable than not. We presume that our trial judges are aptly equipped to handle these issues and apply the law without fear of undue prejudice. See, e.g., Turner, 573 So.2d at 678 (Miss.1990). We have stated repeatedly that we will not overrule a trial judge's denial to recuse herself unless we find manifest error.

¶ 17. Our holding in Farmer v. State is illustrative. In Farmer, this Court held that a trial judge need not recuse himself because he had been the trial judge when a defendant previously had pleaded guilty. Farmer v. State, 770 So.2d 953, 956-57 (Miss.2000). "It is not unusual for a judge to sit on successive trials following mistrials or to hear on remand a case where he...