Scott v. Treasurer of Mo.
| Decision Date | 01 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. SD36597 Consolidated,No. SD36596,SD36596,SD36597 Consolidated |
| Parties | JANET K. SCOTT, Appellant, v. TREASURER OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI - CUSTODIAN OF THE 2nd INJURY FUND, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
AFFIRMED
Janet K. Scott ("Scott") filed two claims against the Second Injury Fund (the "Fund") for work-related injuries she sustained in 2009 and 2010. The Commission found both claims against the Fund were barred by the statute of limitations under section 287.430.1
Scott raises six points on appeal. In points 1 and 2, she argues her claims against the Fund were timely because her amended claims were filed within one year of settling her cases against her employer, and the amended claims made substantive changes to her original claims prior to settlement. In point 3, Scott argues other court filings made in her case designated the Fund as a party and consequently made her amended claims timely filed. In point 4, Scott argues recent court cases represented a procedural change in the law and should not be applied to her case. In point 5, Scott argues the application of recent caselaw to her case violates variousconstitutional provisions. Finally, in point 6, Scott raises arguments based on estoppel and on the Administrative Procedures Act.2 Finding no merit to any of Scott's points, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
While working at SRG Global ("Employer"), Scott injured her left shoulder after a fall in July 2009. Her next injury occurred in March 2010 when she injured her left ankle. Scott filed two separate claims for compensation against Employer on March 24, 2010.
Over six years later, on April 18, 2016, Scott filed amended claims for each injury now naming both Employer and the Fund. Each of her amended claims named the same body parts listed in her original claims. She now sought either permanent partial or permanent total disability benefits. The amended claims also listed pre-existing injuries and diseases in the part of the form describing Scott's Fund claim. In her amended claim for the 2010 ankle injury, Scott also marked out the statement "Employee needs medical treatment[]" which had been written on her original form.
The Fund's answer to each claim was filed on April 26, 2016 and asserted a statute of limitations defense under section 287.430. Scott settled both of her claims against Employer on April 27, 2016, approximately a week after filing the amended claims.
A hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") as to both of Scott's claims. On June 18, 2019 the ALJ entered awards finding Scott's claims against the Fund were not timely filed under section 287.430. The Commission entered a Final Award Denying Compensation in each case on February 21, 2020 affirming the ALJ's decisions and incorporating those decisions by reference. This appeal follows.3
Standard of Review
We review the Commission's Final Award to determine if it is "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Mo. Const. art. V, § 18. On appeal, this Court:
§ 287.495.1; Annayeva v. SAB of TSD of City of St. Louis, 597 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Mo. banc 2020). We review the findings of the Commission and not those of the ALJ. ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Phillips, 527 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). However, when the Commission's award attaches and incorporates the ALJ's award, as here, "we consider the findings and conclusions of the Commission as including the ALJ's award." Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, Dickemann v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
, 550 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. banc 2018), and we are "not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or its application of the law to the facts." Patterson v. Central Freight Lines, 452 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
Analysis
Our analysis of a statute of limitations defense involving a claim made against the Fund starts with section 287.430, which provides, in relevant part:
A claim against the second injury fund shall be filed within two years after the date of the injury or within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer pursuant to this chapter, whichever is later. In all other respects the limitations shall be governed by the law of civil actions . . . The statute of limitations contained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.
§ 287.430 (emphasis added); Guinn v. Treasurer of State, 577 S.W.3d 847, 851 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019). This statute provides two alternative deadlines for when a claim against the Fund can be filed: the first is "within two years after the date of injury" and the second is "within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer. . . whichever is later." § 287.430 (emphasis added). Here, Scott's claims for compensation listed injury dates of approximatelyJuly 15, 2009 and March 16, 2010. Scott's claims against the Fund were filed in 2016, so she did not meet the first possible deadline under section 287.430 by filing her claims against the Fund within two years after the dates of her injuries. We must therefore determine whether Scott filed her claims against the Fund within one year after she filed "a claim" against her employer or insurer. See id.
The parameters of what is considered "a claim" filed against an employer or insurer pursuant to section 287.430 have been explored in several cases. First, "a claim" is not limited to an employee's original claim and can include an employee's amended claim. See Elrod v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of Second Injury Fund
, 138 S.W.3d 714, 716-17 (Mo. banc 2004). A stipulation for compromise settlement can also be considered "a claim" under section 287.430 in cases where an employee has not previously filed a claim for compensation against his employer. See, e.g., Treasurer of State-Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Cook, 323 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010); Grubbs v. Treasurer of Mo. as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 298 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).
However, in Treasurer of the State of Mo.—Custodian of the 2nd Injury Fund v. Couch, the court distinguished the holdings of Grubbs, Cook, and Elrod, where an employee had filed claims in March 2010 and July 2011 against both her employer and the Fund for two different injuries, but then settled both cases with her employer and dismissed her cases against the Fund. Couch, 478 S.W.3d 417, 418-19 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). The employee then filed a new claim against the Fund for both injuries in December 2013. Id. at 419. The court held that the employee's claim against the Fund was not timely filed under section 287.430 because the claim had been filed more than two years after her date of injury and more than one year after her claims were filed against the employer. Id. at 422. "[W]here multiple claims were filed and subsequently dismissed, a settlement agreement may not be a second 'claim' that perpetually extends the statute of limitations expressed in 287.430." Id.
Finally, in Naeter v. Treasurer of Mo., the court affirmed the Commission's decision finding an employee's claim against the Fund was time-barred where the employee had filed two amended claims and later entered into a settlement agreement. 576 S.W.3d 233, 235-36, 240 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). The employee's original claim for bilateral hearing loss was filed in 2006, and then she filed a first amended claim on December 3, 2010 adding Tinnitus and Meniere's disease to her hearing loss claim. Id. at 235-36. A little over one year later, on December 16, 2011, she filed a second amended claim adding the Fund as a party. Id. at 236. In October 2012, she settled her case against her employer. Id.
In rejecting the employee's arguments that her claim against the Fund was timely when calculated from the time of her second amended claim, the court noted an employee's amendment to a claim "must address the same occurrence or term of employment and in some way add to the original claim by adding some cause, effect, or injury relating back to the original claim." Id. at 238 (emphasis added). The employee's second amended claim was not a valid claim under section 287.430 because it "did not supplement or amend the claim" against the employer, nor did it "add information related to [e]mployer or the injuries claimed on the original claim beyond those changes already made through the first amended claim." Id. The employee also argued her settlement agreement should be viewed as a claim for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations. Id. at 239. The court found a settlement agreement only constitutes "a claim" for purposes of the statute of limitations for claims against the Fund "when no claim was filed prior to a settlement stipulation under § 287.390."4 Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the Commission determined Scott's claims against the Fund were time-barred under section 287.430 after applying the principles established in Couch and Naeter. In each of Employee's six points, she presents arguments for why the Commission erred in finding Scott's claims against the Fund were not timely filed.
Point 1 - Attempts to Distinguish Couch and Naeter
In point 1, Scott argues the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding her claims against the Fund were not timely filed because Scott's claims were filed "within one year of the settlement of the case[,]" and "there were not multiple claims filed against the [Fund] and then dismissed as in Couch[.]"
Scott filed two separate claims...
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