Scott v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 17 February 1919
• Docket Number: No. 32380.,32380.
• Citation: 170 N.W. 761,185 Iowa 464
• Parties: SCOTT v. WILSON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

185 Iowa 464

170 N.W. 761

SCOTT

v.WILSON.

No. 32380.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 17, 1919.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Thomas Guthrie, Judge.

Action at law for damages for the breach of an oral contract for services. The defendant's demurrer to the petition was sustained, and judgment against plaintiff for costs. The plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.C. C. Putnam, of Des Moines, for appellant.

J. L. Witmer and Dale & Harvison, all of Des Moines, for appellee.

PRESTON, J.

The petition alleges substantially that about August, 1894, the parties entered into an oral agreement by which plaintiff agreed to come to the home of defendant, remain with her during her lifetime, and keep her house, and perform the services of a domestic servant; that defendant was a school-teacher, and plaintiff was a colored girl, a seamstress, and proficient in housework, sewing, domestic affairs, and it was agreed that the plaintiff should, by economy, in faithfulness in managing the household expenditures, for food, household expenses, and sewing, aid the defendant in accumulating more property, and that defendant would give plaintiff a home for life, and in the event of defendant's death, she would see that plaintiff was well cared for for the remainder of her days, by always having a good home to live in; pursuant to the agreement plaintiff entered defendant's home, and continuously performed all of her duties for a period of 23 years, doing defendant's housework, cooking, and domestic work, making most of her clothes, and thus aided defendant in accumulating a farm in Cass county, Iowa, and two city properties in Des Moines; that during the 23 years plaintiff received no wages from defendant, and no money, except small gifts of money as birthday and Christmas presents, not to exceed $100; that under this agreement plaintiff put in the best years of her life, in the most faithful performance of her duties, and about April, 1917, when plaintiff had reached the age of 54 years, the defendant, after having endeavored for many months to induce plaintiff to leave voluntarily,canceled the agreement by ordering the plaintiff out of their home, and threatened to put plaintiff out if she would not get out; thereupon plaintiff left, and is now compelled, with practically no funds, to seek employment elsewhere; that the reasonable value of the services rendered by plaintiff during these years, in addition to board and lodging, was $4 per week. Plaintiff asks judgment for $4,720, with interest.

The demurrer was on the ground that the facts stated do not entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded, or to any relief, in this:

Plaintiff alleges an express contract providing for support of plaintiff during her lifetime; alleges performance thereof for a period of 23 years, at which time it is claimed defendant refused further performance. Plaintiff now sues for wages for the 23 years, during which time said contract was carried out according to its terms:

(1) Plaintiff, under the contract pleaded in her petition, must sue for damages for the alleged breach thereof, to wit, failure to carry out the contract for the unexpired term thereof, and is not entitled to sue for wages during the 23 years she admits said contract of support was strictly performed.

(2) The breach of the contract pleaded, if any, is failure to support plaintiff from April 26, 1917, to the end of her lifetime, and not failure to pay wages for the 23 years that said contract was strictly performed.

(3) If a contract was entered into as alleged by plaintiff for life support, 23 years of which support has been provided, it is not the province of plaintiff to ignore the terms of said contract, and make a new contract, under which she can claim wages for the years said support has been furnished.

(4) Said petition fails to state that said alleged discharge of plaintiff was without cause.

(5) Said petition is based upon a verbal contract “not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.” No recovery of wages thereunder can be had, for that said contract is not in writing, signed by the defendant.

(6) All claims of wages accrued more than five years prior to the beginning of this suit are barred by the statute of limitations.

(7) This action is prematurely brought, founded upon breach of the contract alleged in the substituted petition, in that the furnishing of a good home for plaintiff was not to be done until the death of the defendant, and that event has not yet occurred.

(8) A claim for a good home is too indefinite to constitute a valid enforceable contract, and leaves the court or jury to fix what the terms of the contract should have been, while such terms can only be fixed by the parties themselves.

The demurrer was sustained. Counsel for neither party has argued all the questions raised by the demurrer. We shall consider such as are argued.

[1] It is said by counsel for appellee that unfortunately, upon a ruling on a demurrer, facts well pleaded must be taken as true, however improbable and unreasonable the alleged facts may appear; but the counsel then proceeds to argue the unreasonableness and improbability of the plaintiff's claim. Ordinarily this would be a question for a jury. At any rate, we must, for the purposes of the demurrer and this appeal, consider all facts well pleaded as admitted. Two arguments have been filed on behalf of appellee. In the first, the following propositions only are advanced: (1) That the fundamental principle of damages is compensation to the injured party. The measure of damages is the value of the bargain to the complaining party, or the loss which a fulfillment of the contract would have prevented, or the breach of it has entailed; citing 8 A. & E. Encyc. of L. (2d Ed.) 633. (2) Plaintiff cannot recover on a petition showing an implied promise to pay for services when it appears that they were rendered under an express agreement, and a breach thereof which would entitle plaintiff to recover on a quantum meruit; citing In re Estate of Oldfield, 158 Iowa, 98, 138 N. W. 846;Duncan v. Gray, 108 Iowa, 599, 79 N. W. 362, and other cases. (3) Unless plaintiff's discharge was without cause, she would not be entitled to recover. No authorities cited. (4) Where a demurrer is based on a number of grounds, and is sustained generally, without specifying on which ground, reversal will not be had if the demurrer is good as to any one of the points raised; citing authorities.

[2][3] Disposing of these matters first, the first proposition will be disposed of later, in connection with appellant's proposition and authorities cited by her counsel. As to the second, we do not understand plaintiff to ask a recovery on a quantum meruit. It often happens that there is an express contract as to the employment, but no agreement as to the amount of compensation, in which case the law implies a promise to pay reasonable compensation. In re Oldfield's Estate, 158 Iowa, 98, 138 N. W. 846. This of course, is not quite the situation here. Appellant's proposition,...