Scruggs, In re

• Decision Date: 16 February 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 5998
• Citation: 93 Cal.Rptr. 119,15 Cal.App.3d 290
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re Hood P. SCRUGGS on habeas corpus.

Page 119

93 Cal.Rptr. 119

15 Cal.App.3d 290

In re Hood P. SCRUGGS on habeas corpus.

Cr. 5998.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 16, 1971.

[15 Cal.App.3d 292] Robert F. O'Neal, Sacramento, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle Younger, Attys. Gen., by Edward Hinz, Jr. and Carol Hunter, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

BRAY ^*, Associate Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The controlling question is whether petitioner may now show that he pleaded guilty to a crime which he did not commit.

RECORD

Petitioner is confined in Folsom Prison on a judgment of conviction, after plea of guilty, of violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002. In his petition he alleges, (a) that he pleaded guilty without effective counsel and while suffering narcotic (heroin) withdrawal symptoms rendering him incompetent to understand the nature of the charge against him and to understandingly and intelligently plead guilty to it; (b) that his confinement is unlawful in that the statute he was convicted of violating did not prohibit his conduct and therefore he was convicted of a crime which he did not commit. ¹

October 6, 1966, petitioner was arrested and charged with violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code (possession of heroin). January 4, 1967, application was made pursuant to section 3100.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code for petitioner's temporary detention by the Sheriff's Department of Los Angeles County as a drug addict. ² Thereafter, proceedings were had pursuant to section 3100 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, resulting in a civil petition under that section being filed alleging that petitioner was in need of care, supervision and treatment for drug addiction. Petitioner was ordered detained in the Los Angeles County Jail Infirmary and the Public Defender was appointed to represent him. The hearing of the petitioner was had on January 26, 1967. During the hearing, petitioner unauthorizedly left the courtroom but was captured in the corridor outside the courtroom. On January 30, the court found petitioner to be a drug addict within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3100. It committed him to the Rehabilitation Center at Corona, where he was taken by the sheriff.

On March 2, 1967, an information was filed charging petitioner with escape in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002, a felony. It charged petitioner with the crime of escape from custody of a deputy sheriff, 'while charged with a crime, to wit, 3100, Welfare and Institutions Code.'

Petitioner was arraigned on this charge and the Public Defender appointed to represent him. On March 8, 1967, petitioner pleaded guilty to the offense charged--violation of section 3002 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and in due time was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law.

Petitioner committed no crime. Section 3002 provides in pertinent part, 'Every person Committed pursuant to this chapter or former Chapter 11 (commencing with section 6399) of Title 7 of the Penal Code who escapes or attempts to escape from lawful custody is guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not exceeding seven years. * * *' (Italics ours.)

A mere reading of the section establishes that in order to violate the section, the person who escapes must have been Committed pursuant to the statutes referred to in the section. It is conceded that while petitioner was before the court for determination of whether he should be committed, when he left the courtroom he had not been committed.

Moreover, the information states that petitioner escaped from custody 'while charged with a crime, to wit, 3100, Welfare and Institutions Code.' That section provides no crime. It simply provides that a person addicted to the use of narcotics or in danger of becoming so addicted may report to the district attorney, who, when there is probable cause, may petition the superior court for commitment to the Director of Corrections for confinement in the narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilitation facility.

The Attorney General concedes the above, but contends that because petitioner was represented by counsel when he pleaded guilty to a crime he did not commit, he may not now obtain relief. He relies upon In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449, which held in effect that prior to Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, where a defendant advises with counsel before pleading guilty, his plea cannot be considered involuntary. The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that for many years the California courts have recognized that when, through ignorance or omission, defense counsel causes or permits the loss or lack of a crucial defense, this is in effect a denial of counsel, infecting the conviction and is sometimes alone ground for reversal. (In re Williams (1969) 1 Cal.3d 168, 174--175, 81 Cal.Rptr. 784, 460 P.2d 980.) There, the defendant's counsel permitted the defendant to enter a bargain plea of guilty to a crime which he did not commit. On habeas corpus the Supreme Court held that he was thereby denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. (See also, People v. McDowell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 737, 746--750, 73 Cal.Rptr. 1, 447 P.2d 97, and People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464, 34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487.) In re Greenfield (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 536, 541, 89 Cal.Rptr. 847, held that where, through the ineffectiveness of co...