Scuri v. Board of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 28 July 1982
• Citation: 134 Cal.App.3d 400,185 Cal.Rptr. 18
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Dorothy SCURI, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF VENTURA, et al., Respondents. Civ. 63411.

Page 18

185 Cal.Rptr. 18

134 Cal.App.3d 400

Dorothy SCURI, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the COUNTY OF VENTURA, et al., Respondents.

Civ. 63411.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

July 28, 1982.

Hearing denied September 29, 1982.

Walter M. Leighton, Los Angeles, for petitioners and appellants.

Dorothy L. Schechter, County Counsel, and James L. McBride, Chief Asst. County Counsel, Ventura, for respondents.

KINGSLEY, Acting Presiding Justice.

This appeal is taken from a denial by the superior court of a petition for writ of mandate to set aside the decision of the Ventura County Board of Supervisors to annex certain unincorporated areas to two cities in the County of Ventura. We have concluded that the procedure involved did not violate the applicable statutes and that the statutes do not violate the Constitution.

At issue here is the annexation of four unincorporated areas, two to the City of Buenaventura and two to the City of Oxnard. These annexations were authorized under the provisions of Government Code section 35000 et seq., the Municipal Organization Act. ¹

That act generally provides for the incorporation of unincorporated areas and for the annexation of unincorporated areas to existing cities. The act contemplates that a governmental entity, the county or city, will request of the Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) authority to annex a particular piece of property. (§ 35100 et seq.) LAFCO will then conduct preliminary proceedings and, if it approves the proposed annexation, recommend the annexation to the city or county. (§§ 35150--35163.) The actual annexation proceedings are then conducted by the city or county. (§ 35200 et seq.) With respect to most annexation proceedings, an election is provided for. (§§ 35060--35071.) An exception to the election requirement is provided at section 35150, concerning the annexation of territory not exceeding 100 acres in area, substantially surrounded by the city to which annexation is proposed. Such an area is referred to as an island.

Four "island annexations" are challenged here. The first, referred to as Annexation No. 3, proposed to annex to the City of Oxnard an unincorporated area commonly referred to as College Park. (See exhibit 1 attached to this opinion.) Annexation No. 17 proposed to annex to the City of Oxnard unincorporated property commonly known as McMillan Manor Island. (See exhibit 2.) Annexations Nos. 52 and 53 proposed to annex to the City of Buenaventura two unincorporated areas both commonly referred to as Montalvo. (See exhibit 3.)

With respect to all four islands, appellants contend that their annexation is unlawful, in that the authorizing statute unconstitutionally deprives them of the right to vote on the annexation procedure, in violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

With respect to islands numbers 3, 52 and 53, it is further contended that they do not qualify as islands and thus may not be annexed in the absence of an election.

I

Appellants' constitutional argument is grounded in the distinction between residents of territory consisting of more than 100 acres and territory consisting of fewer than 100 acres. Residents of the larger areas have the right to protest and vote in annexation proceedings. (§ 35228.) By contrast, residents of territory consisting of fewer than 100 acres are not entitled to participate in any election on the subject. (§ 35150, subd. (f).) Contrary to appellants' contention that the strict scrutiny test applies here, because the denial of equal protection takes the form of a denial of voting rights, California courts have not so treated this issue. To begin with, it is well established that the state may create, expand, diminish, or totally abolish municipal corporations with or without the consent of its citizens, or even against their protest. (See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh (1907) 207 U.S. 161, 179, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151; Curtis v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 7 Cal.3d 942, 951, 501 P.2d 537.) Still, annexation procedures are state actions and thus subject to the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the California Constitution. (Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 951, 501 P.2d 537.) However, appellants are mistaken in their contention that the strict scrutiny test must be applied to determine whether the distinction violates the equal protection provisions.

In Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 513 P.2d 601, the California Supreme Court examined a similar distinction under this same act, where the annexation of uninhabited territory authorized no election, while residents of inhabited territory were entitled to vote. Uninhabited territory was defined in the act as an area where fewer than 12 registered voters resided. (Weber v. City Council, supra, at p. 958, 513 P.2d 601.) The Supreme Court distinguished other cases, including Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 7 Cal.3d 942, 501 P.2d 537 (relied on by appellants here) where classes of persons were excluded from participation in an election provided for by state law. In Weber, the issue was not the unconstitutional impairment of individual voting rights, but the right of the Legislature not to have provided for an annexation election under certain circumstances. (Weber v. City Council, supra, at pp. 960-961, 513 P.2d 601.) The Weber court concluded (at p. 961, 513 P.2d 601): "As the Legislature could constitutionally have provided that all annexations to cities be accomplished without a vote of the residents of the territory proposed to be annexed, and as the 1939 act provides for annexation without an election, the instant case involves no deprivation of or limitation on the fundamental right to vote calling for close scrutiny or justification on the basis of a compelling state interest."

The Weber court then evaluated the allegedly arbitrary line drawn between 12 and 13 registered voters on the traditional standard: whether the statute bore some rational relationship to a legitimate state end. The court found in the legislative statement of purpose more than sufficient justification for the distinction, concluding: "The Legislature may reasonably have concluded in such situations that the expense of annexation election procedures [citations] or the governmental interest in avoiding tiny pockets of unincorporated territory outweigh considerations in favor of obtaining a majority vote of the residents. [Citation.]" (Weber v. City Council, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 965, 513 P.2d 601.)

We see no distinction to be drawn between the Weber statute, discriminating on the basis of population size, and our statute, discriminating on the basis of territorial size. At issue here, too, is not the disenfranchisement of certain individuals in a particular election, but the decision of the Legislature not to provide for an election at all. That decision will be upheld if it bears any rational relationship to the legislative purpose.

The legislative purpose behind the Municipal Organization Act is illuminated by section 35000, wherein the Legislature explains what it intends to achieve and the problems sought to be solved by the act. Concerned with the orderly growth and development of communities within the state, the Legislature seeks logical formation and determination of city boundaries. Pertinent to the provisions of section 35150, challenged here, is the legislative finding "... that when areas become urbanized to the extent that they need the full range of community services, priorities must be established regarding the type and levels of such services that the residents of an urban community need and desire; that community service priorities be established by weighing the total community service needs against the total financial resources available for securing community services; ..." (§ 35000.)

The Legislature may well have concluded that, when confronted with a large number of potential island annexations (beginning in 1979 Ventura County conducted and approved 83 island annexations), substantial fiscal savings could be affected by not including an election procedure for territories of limited geographical size, already substantially surrounded by the annexing city. The failure to provide for elections in those small communities is sufficiently related to the legitimate legislative purpose of orderly, efficient, and economical formation and determination of city boundaries to satisfy equal protection requirements.

II

Appellants next contend that respondents acted in excess of their jurisdiction in the instant proceedings, in that the multiple annexations conducted here constitute a municipal reorganization, a procedure which demands an election. This contention is without merit.

Appellants cite no authority for this novel proposition, but rather select several definitions from the act which, read together and out of context, could support the argument that more than one annexation constitutes a municipal reorganization. However, that interpretation of the statute would render virtually meaningless many of the provisions in the act, including section 35150. To conclude that whenever more than one annexation to a city is proposed it becomes by definition a municipal reorganization would defeat the previously stated legislative purpose of efficient, orderly, and logical boundary formations. Principles and canons of statutory construction require that a statute be interpreted in harmony with the act of which it is a part. (See Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 723, 123 P.2d 505...