Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Tampa Southern R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1931
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. TAMPA SOUTHERN R. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

134 So. 529

101 Fla. 468

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. TAMPA SOUTHERN R. CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

May 6, 1931

Suit by the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company against the Tampa Southern Railroad Company, in which an injunction was granted complainant pendente lite. From an order discharging complainant's rule to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt for violation of the injunction order and from the decree dismissing complainant's bill complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

See also, 97 Fla. 340, 121 So. 477. Appeal from Circuit Court, Sarasota County Paul C. albritton, judge.

COUNSEL

John B. Singeltary, of Bradenton, for appellant.

John H. Carter, of Marianna, and Kelly & Shaw, of Tampa, for appellee.

OPINION

DAVIS J.

In the court below a bill was filed on the chancery side of the circuit court of Sarasota county, Fla., seeking an injunction against the Tampa Southern Railroad Company from further occupying, or attempting to occupy, that portion of the right of way and tracks of the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company designated as Hog Creek spur, in the city of Sarasota, county of Sarasota, state of Florida, said right of way and tracks being more particularly described in the bill, and also seeking to restrain said Tampa Southern Railroad Company, its agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and each and all of them, from proceeding with the construction of its line of road over and across said lands described in the bill of complaint, or across the right of way or across the side tracks or spur tracks of the said Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, known as Hog Creek spur, until the further order of the court.

The court made an order under date of May 29, 1926, enjoining and restraining the said Tampa Southern Railroad Company, as sought in the bill, and a formal writ of injunction was issued by the clerk pursuant to the court's order, out of said circuit court, and in said cause, and was served upon the defendant, Tampa Southern Railroad Company, on the 29th day of May, 1926.

On the 4th day of September, 1926, a motion to dissolve said injunction was filed by Tampa Southern Railroad Company, and on the same day an affidavit in support of the motion to dissolve was also filed, and on the 11th day of September, 1926, a supplemental affidavit in support of motion to dissolve the injunction was filed by said defendant, Tampa Southern Railroad Company.

No hearing was ever had upon the motion to dissolve, and no further action or proceeding was had in said case, and the said injunctional order and decree of the court remained in full force and effect on the 5th and 6th days of May, 1928, when the defendant, Tampa Southern Railroad Company, so it is alleged, entered upon the premises, tore its way through Hog Creek spur, and laid its track across the same, and took up and removed certain spur tracks around, connected with, and being a part of, said Hog Creek spur.

On the 8th day of May, 1928, the complainant, Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, filed before the Honorable Paul C. Albritton, judge of the circuit court of Sarasota county, Fla., its petition for a rule on the defendant, Tampa Southern Railway Company, to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for its disregard of the injunctional order and decree of the court of May 29, 1926, and its disobedience thereto, and thereof, in extending its track upon and across the right of way and the spur track known as Hog Creek spur, referred to and particularly described in complainant's bill of complaint in said cause.

On the 8th day of May, 1928, an order to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of court for its violation of the injunctional order and decree was issued by the circuit court of Sarasota county, Fla., to the said Tampa Southern Railroad Company, as prayed by the complainant, Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, in its petition to the court for a rule on said defendant. Said order was on the same day served upon defendant, and on the 10th day of May, 1928, the defendant filed its answer to said rule, and on the 11th day of May, 1928, the court heard the testimony of the respective parties, complainant and defendant, and on the 12th day of June, 1928, the court made its order and decree that the rule to show cause be discharged, and in the same order and decree further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the bill in said cause be dismissed at the complainant's costs.

From this order and decree entered on June 13, 1928, the complainant in the court below entered its appeal.

At the outset it is suggested by the appellee here that the order of the circuit court discharging the contempt rule is not reviewable, because a contempt proceeding is primarily for the protection of the court and not of the parties to a cause; contempts of court being generally regarded as criminal in character. Thalheim v. Camp Bros. Phos. Co., 48 Fla. 190, 37 So. 523, 5 Ann. Cas. 784; Smith v. Whitfield, 38 Fla. 211, 20 So. 1012.

But not all contempts of court are criminal in character, and it was generally acknowledged long before the Constitution of the United States was adopted that a distinction existed between punishment of a contemnor for violating the dignity of the court, and a violation of the remedial part of a court's order necessary to secure the rights of an injured suitor. 4 Blackstone, Com. 285, 397, 398; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 6th Ed. (1787) 553.

Thus it was stated in the well-known case of Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498; 55 L.Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874:

'Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And 'it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both.' * * * It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. * * * There is another important difference. Proceedings for civil contempt are between the original parties, and are instituted and tried as a part of the main cause. But, on the other hand, proceedings at law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant, and are not a part of the original cause. * * * Inasmuch, therefore, as proceedings for civil contempt are a part of the original cause, the weight of authority is to the effect that they should be entitled therein. * * * We have already shown that in both classes of cases there must be allegation and proof that the defendant was guilty of contempt, and a prayer that he be punished. The classification, then, depends upon the question as to whether the punishment is punitive, in vindication of the court's authority, or whether it is remedial, by way of a coercive imprisonment, or a compensatory fine, payable to the complainant. Bearing these distinctions in mind, the prayer of the petition is significant and determinative.'

In another case it was said by the United States court ( Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U.S. 324, 24 S.Ct. 665, 667, 48 L.Ed. 997):

'Manifestly if one inside of a court room disturbs the order of proceedings, or is guilty of personal misconduct in the presence of the court, such action may properly be regarded as a contempt of court; yet it is not misconduct in which any individual suitor is specially interested. It is more like an ordinary crime which affects the public at large, and the criminal nature of the act is the dominant feature. On the other hand, if, in the progress of a suit, a party is ordered by the court to abstain from some action which is injurious to the rights of the adverse party, and he disobeys that order, he may also be guilty of contempt, but the personal injury to the party in whose favor the court has made the order gives a remedial character to the contempt proceeding. The punishment is to secure to the adverse party the right which the court has awarded to him. He is the one primarily interested, and if it should turn out, on...