Sandstrom v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1976
• Docket Number: 47450,Nos. 47201,s. 47201
• Citation: 336 So.2d 572
• Parties: Ray SANDSTROM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 572

336 So.2d 572

Ray SANDSTROM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

Nos. 47201, 47450.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 30, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 1976.

Ray Sandstrom, pro se.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and C. Marie Bernard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari reflected probable jurisdiction in this Court. We issued the writ and have heard argument of the parties. After hearing argument and upon further consideration of the matter, we have determined that the Court is without jurisdiction. Therefore, the writ of certiorari must be and is hereby discharged.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

ENGLAND, J., dissents with an opinion.

BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion, and concurs with ENGLAND, J.

ADKINS, J., dissents and concurs with ENGLAND, J.

ENGLAND, Justice (dissenting).

By petitions for writs of certiorari directed to the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal, we have been asked by Ray Sandstrom, a member of the Florida Bar, to review appellate decisions upholding his two convictions of criminal contempt entered in the trial courts of Dade and Broward County. His first conviction, in Broward County, was affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in an opinion reported at 309 So.2d 17. His later Dade County conviction was affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal, on the authority of the earlier case, in a decision reported at 311 So.2d 804. We tentatively granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict between these decisions and earlier Florida precedents. ¹ As will be developed more fully below, I believe that the conflict of decisions is direct, and that we have jurisdiction to review these two district court decisions.

The conduct of Sandstrom which was found to be contemptuous in each case was for all practical purposes identical. He appeared before a trial court judge, in his capacity as an attorney representing defendants in criminal causes, without a fabric necktie. His personal appearance and attire, which included a suit, clean and pressed shirt, and a hanging gold medallion, were otherwise neat, attractive, and proper. In each case the circuit judge ordered him to don a fabric necktie and recessed the court in order to give him time to comply. In each case Sandstrom refused to alter his attire, and when court reconvened he was cited for contempt and refused permission to represent his clients. ² The sole reason for the finding of contempt in each case was Sandstrom's refusal to wear a fabric necktie. ³ In Broward County Sandstrom was sentenced to three days in jail. In Dade County he was fined $500. ⁴

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Sandstrom's first conviction after finding that the only issue which could be raised on appeal was whether the Broward County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to order Sandstrom to wear a necktie. Inasmuch as the Third District affirmed the Dade County conviction without explanation and on the authority of the Fourth District's decision, it obviously adopted the same view of its review authority. ⁵ The determinations of these courts as to the form of appellate review in contempt cases creates the direct conflict with earlier decisions of this Court which requires our clarification.

A first step is to explore whether the district courts had jurisdiction to entertain direct appeals of the contempt citations, and if so whether the appropriate standard of review was applied in these cases. ⁶ No uniform procedure for reviewing contempt citations has been followed in Florida. In early cases it was held, due principally to statutory limitations on contempt powers, that review could only be had by writ of habeas corpus, and in those cases the only cognizable issue was whether the order of contempt was within the power of the court. ⁷ In 1931, this Court held in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tampa Southern R.R. that a civil contempt citation would be reviewed on appeal, although criminal contempt remained reviewable only by habeas corpus. ⁸ Later in Pennekamp v. Circuit Court, ⁹ the Court expanded the right of appeal to indirect criminal contempt where a fine was levied, as opposed to confinement in jail. Still later, in Clein v. State, ¹⁰ we reviewed by appeal an indirect criminal contempt punishable by detention. Habeas corpus, however, was permitted as an alternative means of relief. ¹¹

The Florida district courts of appeal were created in 1957. From their inception, a diversity of review procedures were permitted. In 1959 the Second District Court of Appeal held that appeal was proper in all contempt cases. ¹² Less than four years later the same court held that direct contempt was reviewable by writ of habeas corpus. ¹³ In 1962 the First District Cort of Appeal concluded that appeal was generally unavailable for contempt, but that on consideration of all of the facts in the case before it there were equitable grounds to consider an appeal and alleviate a harsh punishment for indirect criminal contempt. ¹⁴ In 1972, the Third District Court of Appeal reviewed by appeal an attorney's citation for direct criminal contempt. ¹⁵

Now, in the two cases before us, the Third and Fourth District Courts have accepted without comment appeals of Sandstrom's convictions of direct contempt. Because Sandstrom has been punished by the levy of a fine in one case and by detention in jail in the other, I feel compelled to clarify the earlier dichotomies and to determine the proper scope and manner of reviewing adjudications of direct contempt.

The availability and scope of appellate review of these identical contempt charges should not depend upon the degree of punishment or coercion which the trial judge elected to impose. To insure that the summary power of contempt is not abused, and to prevent possible inequities on review which could result from the application of different standards, I would hold that direct contempt cases are reviewable in the district courts whether they are brought by appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, this result seems to be required by the constitutional directive adopted in 1972 that 'no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought.' ¹⁶ It would follow that both district courts were correct in accepting the appeals below.

The more difficult issue in this case is the appropriate scope of review. Florida Appellate Rule 6.16 requires an appellate court to review

'all rulings and orders appearing in the appeal record insofar as it is necessary to do so in order to pass upon the grounds of appeal.'

Sandstrom argues that this rule required the district courts to pass on the propriety of the trial courts' first orders, requiring him to appear in court wearing a fabric necktie. The state argues that those orders are not subject to collateral attack on appeal of the direct contempt orders, and that Sandstrom should have appealed the first orders rather than defy them. I agree with the state as a general matter, but I also agree with Sandstrom's assertion that orders which can generate a contempt citation must always be tested for inherent invalidity.

The orders appealed to the district courts were those which declared that Sandstrom had disobeyed an earlier court order in the presence of the court, and summarily adjudicated him guilty of contempt. It has always been the law that knowing and voluntary disobedience of a valid court order is contemptuous. ¹⁷ Since the circuit judges had jurisdiction over Sandstrom and he willfully disobeyed their orders, the district courts properly found the contempt citations to be supported in the record. Sandstrom does not dispute their factual foundation. This would end the matter if the underlying court orders, in these cases prescribing Sandstrom's attire, were either unchallenged or unassailable. For example a general order preventing the possession of loaded firearms in a courtroom would generally be valid and present no question on review if disobeyed.

The district courts here, however, had also to determine whether the orders which Sandstrom disobeyed were valid orders of the trial courts, for if they were not he obviously could not be punished for disobeying them. ¹⁸ Neither order directing him to wear a necktie in court was published or rendered, in the approved sense, so as to be generally known and applicable to all attorneys in the respective circuits. ¹⁹ Nonetheless, both district courts concluded that trial courts have the power to regulate the attire of attorneys in judicial proceedings, and that the orders requiring Sandstrom to wear a fabric necktie were not void. On the latter point I disagree with the district courts.

Under the Constitution of this state the people of Florida have sought to guarantee to every individual the basic right to choose his or her own lifestyle without undue governmental interference.

'All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property . . ..' ²⁰

It falls to the courts to guard against improper attempts to exercise governmental authority, whether legislatively, by executive directive or judicially, in areas touched by these guarantees. The fundamental principles are well-established.

'When appealed to in a proper case, the judiciary can render no greater service toward the perpetuation of free government than to accord to an individual litigant before it, however, humble his station in society may be, the just protection of our fundamental law, when that protection is sought as a means to forestall aggressive combinations bent on employing the power of statutes to penalize the citizen for his rugged individuality in refusing to surrender his constitutional rights to what may be a contrary minded...