Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 26623.,26623.
• Citation: 409 F.2d 879
• Parties: SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and Atlantic Land and Improvement Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

409 F.2d 879 (1969)

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and Atlantic Land and Improvement Company, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 26623.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 2, 1969.

E. Snow Martin, Martin & Martin, J. H. Roberts, Jr., Lakeland, Fla., for appellants.

William T. Keen, Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr., Tampa, Fla., for appellee; Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, Fla., of counsel.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and GEWIN and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

General MacArthur remarked in his farewell address to Congress that, "Old soldiers never die, they just fade away." The appellants "champion the notion that old lawsuits never die; nor do they fade away."¹ They urge us to reverse the summary judgment of the district court so that they may relitigate a cause of action that has been thoroughly litigated in the Florida courts. Being of the opinion that the doctrine of res judicata bars such relitigation, we affirm.

Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf), the appellee, leased land for a pipeline and for a petroleum plant from the appellants, Atlantic Land and Improvement Company and Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company as successor to Atlantic Coast Line Railroad (these appellants are referred to collectively as Coast Line). The documentation for this agreement consisted of, inter alia, a license and two leases, and it contained clauses which provided that Coast Line would be indemnified for any losses resulting from fire on the leased premises. Subsequently two employees of Gulf were injured in a fire caused by Coast Line's negligence on the leased property. The employees received $100,000 in a compromise settlement of their negligence action.

On November 13, 1964, Gulf brought suit in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, against Coast Line and asked for a declaratory judgment that Gulf was not obligated to indemnify Coast Line for the $100,000 paid to the employees injured in the fire. The Circuit Court held that Coast Line had a right to indemnity, but the District Court of Appeal reversed and ordered judgment entered for Gulf. After numerous motions and another appeal by Coast Line, the Florida judgment in favor of Gulf became final.

Coast Line then filed this suit in the United States District Court. Gulf moved for a summary judgment, claiming that Coast Line's claim was barred by res judicata. Gulf's motion was granted, and judgment was entered against Coast Line.

In both the court below and the Florida courts Coast Line predicated its right to recovery upon the indemnity provisions of its agreement with Gulf. Coast Line, however, argues that it was suing under the license instrument in the Florida courts and under another document in the court below. It contends that by basing its claim upon different documents of the same agreement, it can split its cause of action for indemnity and have two trials on the same alleged breach of duty. This documentary duality cannot have the effect of creating two separate and independent choses in action where otherwise there would be only one. Thus, our concern is whether Coast Line had two separate causes of action for indemnity, not whether it can now produce different evidence in support of the claim already litigated in the Florida courts. Hinchee v. Fisher, Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 351, 353; Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1965, 179 So.2d 400. In Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 3 Cir. 1950, 186 F.2d 464, 470, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921, 71 S.Ct. 743, 95 L.Ed. 1355, we read:

"Reference to the basic theory of tort liability substantiates the position taken here. To put it in rather elementary tort language, the basis of the plaintiff\'s recovery is liability-creating conduct on the part of the defendant, the invasion of a legally protected interest of the plaintiff and the necessary causal connection between defendant\'s acts and plaintiff\'s injury. The plaintiff having alleged operative facts which state a cause of action because he tells of defendant\'s misconduct and his own harm has had his day in court. He does not get another day after the first lawsuit is concluded by giving a different reason than he gave in the first for recovery of damages for the same invasion of his rights. The problem of his rights against the defendant based upon the alleged wrongful acts is fully before the court whether all the reasons for recovery were stated to the court or not."

The principal test for comparing causes of action is whether or not the primary right and duty, and the delict or wrong are the same in each action. Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 8 Cir. 1964, 327 F.2d 30, 32. In Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 1926, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S. Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069, the Supreme Court instructs us:

"A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the violation of but one

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