Seale v. Springfield

• Decision Date: 09 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95,95
• Citation: 680 N.E.2d 1286,113 Ohio App.3d 384
• Parties: SEALE, Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Appellee. CA 117.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 384

113 Ohio App.3d 384

680 N.E.2d 1286

SEALE, Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Appellee.

No. 95 CA 117.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Second District, Clark County.

Decided Aug. 9, 1996.

A. Robert Hutchins, Springfield, for Appellant.

Robin B. Debell, Springfield Law Director, Springfield, for Appellee.

WOLFF, Judge.

Michael Seale appeals from a judgment of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment to the city of Springfield, City Manager Matthew J. Kridler, and Fire Chief Donald J. Lee (collectively, "the city").

The pertinent facts and procedural history, as established by the record, are as follows. Seale was employed as a firefighter/paramedic for the city from March 1988 to July 1991. On July 12, 1991, Matthew Kridler sent Seale a letter which stated that Seale's employment with the city was terminated, effective immediately, and outlined the reasons for his firing. The letter stated that Seale was fired for not having completed sufficient hours of continuing education to meet the minimum requirements for recertification as a paramedic, for placing a false signature on a Springfield Fire Division Class Attendance Record indicating that he had attended a continuing education program at Miami Valley Hospital when he had not, and for executing an Ohio Department of Education recertification application for paramedics which contained false information.

On July 12, 1993, Seale filed a complaint against the city based on religious discrimination in employment pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112. Seale alleged that as a "non-Catholic" firefighter he had suffered disparate treatment by his Catholic supervisors and had been treated more severely than his Catholic co-workers for like infractions of department rules, and that such treatment eventually led to his discharge.

The city filed a motion for summary judgment on July 17, 1995. As evidentiary support for its motion, the city offered (1) excerpts from Seale's deposition, (2) an affidavit by Fire Chief Donald Lee, (3) the July 12, 1991 termination letter, (4) a letter to Seale dated September 16, 1991, from Bonnie Howell, the secretary of the civil service commission, informing Seale that the commission had decided to deny his appeal and uphold his dismissal, and (5) a copy of the August 8, 1990 written reprimand Seale had received from Lee for a fire engine accident in June 1990. Seale filed a response to the city's motion for summary judgment and offered excerpts from his deposition testimony and the July 12, 1991 termination letter as evidentiary support. Seale's complete deposition transcript was not made a part of the record in the trial court. In an October 5, 1995 entry, the trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment.

Seale asserts one assignment of error on appeal.

"The trial court erred in finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Seale contends that the trial court erred in granting the city's motion for summary judgment because the portions of Seale's deposition testimony referred to in the parties' summary judgment filings indicate that several genuine issues of material fact existed and, therefore, the city was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Our review of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the city is de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when the following have been demonstrated: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the moving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 117, 522 N.E.2d 489, 505; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., Inc. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 8 O.O.3d 73, 74, 375 N.E.2d 46, 47; Civ.R. 56(C).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Harless, supra, at 66, 8 O.O.3d at 74, 375 N.E.2d at 47; Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 526 N.E.2d 798, 801-802. Once the movant meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations of his pleadings to survive a motion for summary judgment, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for determination at trial. Savransky v. Cleveland (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 118, 119, 4 OBR 364, 365-366, 447 N.E.2d 98, 99; Civ.R. 56(E). Indeed, the nonmoving party must produce evidence on any issue upon which the movant meets its initial burden and for which the nonmoving party bears the burden of production at trial. Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, paragraph three of the syllabus, as limited in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293-295, and 299, 662 N.E.2d 264, 273-275, 278 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).

The substantive law applied in a case determines which facts are material and whether those facts create genuine issues for determination at trial. Here, the substantive law to be applied is that of employment discrimination. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1972), 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, the Supreme Court set forth a tripartite formula for allocating the burden of production and order of proof in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677-678. While this is not a Title VII discriminatory treatment case, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that federal case law interpreting Title VII is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112. Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196, 20 O.O.3d 200, 202, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131.

Under the McDonnell Douglas formula, the employment discrimination plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employee's discharge. McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 678; Plumbers & Steamfitters, supra, 197, 20 O.O.3d at 203, 421 N.E.2d at 132. If the defendant can state such a reason, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext for impermissible discrimination. McDonnell Douglas at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d at 679; Plumbers & Steamfitters, supra, 66 Ohio St.2d at 198, 20 O.O.3d at 203, 421 N.E.2d at 132.

A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case either directly by presenting evidence that the employer more likely than not was motivated by discriminatory animus, or indirectly by satisfying a multiprong test which raises the inference of discriminatory intent. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. (C.A.6, 1992), 964 F.2d 577, 582, fn. 4; Mauzy v. Kelly Serv., Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 586-587, 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1279. Accordingly, to avoid summary judgment, Seale was required to introduce evidence, or point to evidence already in the record, that if believed would have been sufficient to support a judgment in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 249-250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 212.

Here, Seale has not directly presented any evidence from which a jury could conclude that the city more likely than not discharged him because he was a non-Catholic. Seale testified that he was not questioned regarding his religious affiliation when he was interviewed and tested for the position of firefighter/paramedic, nor was he asked any time during his employment to indicate his religious affiliation on a document related to his employment. According to Seale, there were no restrictions placed on the terms or conditions of his employment based on his religion and none of the benefits of his employment, such as transfer rights, promotion rights, or leave benefits were different from those of other employees. Seale also testified that he had never heard Lee or anyone else refer to an individual's religious affiliation in connection with a disciplinary matter. Moreover, Seale estimated the breakdown between Catholic and non-Catholic firefighters was "about 50/50."

Because Seale did not directly present evidence which established his prima facie case, he was required to indirectly establish it by satisfying certain elements which give rise to an inference of discrimination. Thus, the next question is what proof Seale needed to indirectly establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination.

In McDonnell Douglas, supra, the court set forth the following elements a plaintiff needs to establish to prove a prima facie case of race discrimination in hiring under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:

"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677.

The court noted that the proof required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination would necessarily vary depending upon the factual situation presented. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677-678, fn. 13. The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted McDonnell Douglas's basic evidentiary framework to be a "flexible formula to ferret out impermissible discrimination in the hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting of employees." Plumbers & Steamfitters, supra, 66 Ohio St.2d at 197, 20 O.O.3d at 203, 421 N.E.2d at 131.

Accordingly, both Ohio courts and the...