Seals v. Snow

• Decision Date: 12 March 1927
• Docket Number: 27,185
• Citation: 123 Kan. 88,254 P. 348
• Parties: CORA SEALS, Appellee, v. MARTIN SNOW, Revived in the Name of N. D. SNOW, Administrator, Appellant
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

254 P. 348

123 Kan. 88

CORA SEALS, Appellee, v. MARTIN SNOW, Revived in the Name of N. D. SNOW, Administrator, Appellant

No. 27,185

Supreme Court of Kansas

March 12, 1927

Decided January, 1927.

Appeal from Linn district court; EDWARD C. GATES, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. INSANE PERSONS--Liability for Torts. An insane person who shoots and kills another is civilly liable in damages to those injured by his tort.

2. DEATH -- Damages for Causing -- Defenses--Self-defense--Instructions. Instructions of the court given as to self-defense and the refusal of requested instructions as to the comparative physical and mental condition of the defendant and the person shot by him, and also as to the defendant having been induced to shoot the deceased by reason of threats or other acts of the person killed, examined and held to be without material error.

3. JURIES--Formation of Opinion--Character of Opinion. The first answer of a prospective juror that he had an opinion as to the controversy to be tried is not conclusive as to disqualification, and if on further inquiry he states that he has no fixed opinion and can decide the case on the evidence and the law regardless of what he had heard and read, the finding of the court that he is qualified is not regarded to be erroneous.

4. DEATH--Trial Generally. Other objections examined and held to be without merit.

John A Hall, of Pleasanton, for the appellant.

Harry W. Fisher, of Fort Scott, for the appellee.

OPINION

JOHNSTON, C. J.:

Cora Seals brought this action against Martin Snow to recover damages for shooting and killing her husband, Arthur Seals. She alleged that he left surviving him the plaintiff and four minor children, the heirs of the deceased, and that the action was brought for the benefit of the children and heirs.

In the answer of defendant he alleged that prior to the shooting of Arthur Seals he had suffered several strokes of paralysis which rendered him incapable of personal defense of himself; that Arthur Seals was a strong, able-bodied man about thirty years of age; that he knew of the feeble condition of the defendant, and that at the time of the tragedy Seals had threatened defendant and was in the act of attacking and terrorizing him, so that defendant believed that Seals was about to commit great bodily injury upon him.

It was further alleged that the aggression of Seals caused Martin Snow to become greatly excited, and caused him to believe he was in great fear and terror, and had purposely caused Snow to shoot at Seals with a shotgun which defendant had in his possession. The reply was a general denial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $ 10,000. With the verdict were the following special findings:

"1. Did Martin Snow at the time he shot Arthur Seals have reasonable cause to apprehend that Arthur Seals was about to do him some great personal injury? A. No.

"2. Did Martin Snow kill Arthur Seals in self-defense? A. No.

"3. Who was the aggressor at the time Arthur Seals was shot by Martin Snow? A. Martin Snow.

"4. Was Martin Snow insane when he shot Arthur Seals? A. Yes.

"5. If you answer the last question in the affirmative, was Martin Snow at the time he shot Arthur Seals able to distinguish right from wrong? A. No."

Several special questions requested by the defendant were not submitted to the jury. Among them were the questions:

"Q. Was Martin Snow physically able to defend himself against the attack of Arthur Seals at the time of the tragedy?

"Q. Did Arthur Seals know, or should he reasonably have known, at the time of the tragedy that Martin Snow was physically unable to defend himself?"

The facts pertaining to the killing of Arthur Seals were reviewed in the criminal case of State v. Snow, 121 Kan. 436, 247 P. 437. In this appeal a number of rulings are assigned for review.

Complaint is made of the overruling of objections to the prospective juror, I. J. Adams. On first inquiry he stated that he had an opinion as to the controversy which it would take evidence from one side or the other to change. In response to another question he stated that it was a fixed opinion. The court then questioned him, and in answer he stated that he did not have a positive opinion, but had one formed from what he had heard. The court then said to him there is a difference between an impression and an opinion, and he then stated the one he had would not be a fixed opinion. "If I sit on this jury I would expect to decide it from the law and the evidence produced." The court said, "Regardless of anything you read, heard or seen?" Answer. "Yes." And the court said, "You could do that, and lay all that aside?" A. "I could." The challenge was overruled, and the defendant exercised all of his peremptory challenges. The mere statement of the juror that he held an opinion as to the controversy is not conclusive of disqualification where as here a further inquiry developed that he was without prejudice in the case, was free to consider the evidence and decide the questions involved in the facts presented at the trial under the instructions of the court on the law. Whether he had a positive opinion or a mere impression was a question of fact for the trial court, and unless it is clear that the juror was disqualified the finding of the court cannot be set aside. Under the authorities, only a few of which we need to cite, the ruling of the court cannot be held to be erroneous. (State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 61 P. 805; State v. Smith, 74 Kan. 383, 85 P. 1020, 89 P. 21; State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489; State v. Van Wormer, 103 Kan. 309, 173 P. 1076, 180 P. 450.)

The defendant challenges the doctrine generally sustained by the courts that an insane person is liable to make compensation for his torts. It is conceded that the great weight of authority is that an insane person is civilly liable for his torts. This liability has been based on a number of grounds, one that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it. Another, that public policy-requires the enforcement of such liability in order that relatives of the insane person shall be led to restrain him and that tort-feasors shall not simulate or pretend insanity to defend their wrongful acts causing damage to others, and that if he was not liable there would be no redress for injuries, and we might have the anomaly of an insane person having abundant wealth depriving another of his rights without compensation. In 1 Cooley on Torts, 3d ed., 170, 171, the learned author says:

"A wrong is an invasion of right, to the damage of the party who suffers it. It consists in the injury done, and not commonly in the purpose or mental or physical capacity of the person or agent doing it. It may or may not have been done with bad motive. The question of motive is usually a question of aggravation only. Therefore, the law, in giving redress, has in view the case of the party injured, and the extent of his injury, and makes what he suffers the measure of compensation. . . . There is consequently no anomaly in compelling one who is not chargeable with wrong intent to make compensation for an injury committed by him, for, as is said in an early case, 'the reason is because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed.'"

At page 172 he says:

"Undoubtedly, there is some appearance of hardship, even of injustice, in compelling one to respond for that which, for want of the control of reason, he was unable to avoid; that it is imposing upon a person already visited with the inexpressible calamity of mental obscurity an obligation to observe the same care and precaution respecting the rights of others that the law demands of one in the full possession of his faculties. But the question of liability in these cases, as well as in others, is...