Sear v. Clayton County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment

• Decision Date: 24 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-1072,97-1072
• Parties: Rodger C. SEAR and Carla J. Sear, Appellees, v. CLAYTON COUNTY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, et al., Defendants, v. Steven Metzger, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 512

590 N.W.2d 512

Rodger C. SEAR and Carla J. Sear, Appellees, v. CLAYTON COUNTY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, et al., Defendants, v. Steven Metzger, Appellant.

No. 97-1072.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 24, 1999.

Dale L. Putnam of the Putnam Law Office, Decorah, for appellant.

Aaron K. Hawbaker and Robert C. Griffin of Randall, Griffin, Nelson & Hawbaker, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellees.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, TERNUS, and CADY, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

The intervenor appeals from the district court's grant of injunctive relief prohibiting the removal of a mobile home from the plaintiffs' property. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

This case presents a long and tangled procedural history, the recitation of which is not critical to our review of the propriety of the district court's grant of injunctive relief. The essential facts in this appeal can be briefly summarized as follows. During the course of these proceedings the plaintiffs, Rodger and Carla Sear, obtained a variance from the Clayton County Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board of Adjustment or Board) allowing them to place a mobile home upon their agricultural land. An adjoining landowner, the intervenor Steven Metzger, did not want the Sears to have a mobile home on their land and filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Board's actions in the district court. Metzger did not join the Sears as parties to the certiorari action. The district court found deficiencies in the Board's action and reversed its grant of a variance.

Metzger also commenced a mandamus action to compel the Clayton County Board of Supervisors to remove the mobile home. Again, the Sears were not made parties to the action. The district court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Board of Supervisors to remove the mobile home from the Sears' property.

The Sears filed a petition for a temporary and permanent injunction against the county, the zoning board of adjustment, the board of supervisors, the zoning department, and the zoning administrator. They sought to prevent the removal of the mobile home as directed by the writ of mandamus. The Sears maintained they had not been joined as parties in Metzger's various actions and had been denied due process by being deprived of an interest in real estate without notice or an opportunity to be heard. An order granting the Sears' request for a temporary injunction was entered.

Metzger intervened, claiming he had suffered and continued to suffer damages because of the temporary injunction. The district court denied his motion to dissolve the temporary injunction and his motion for a default judgment.

The parties entered a written stipulation of facts for the trial on the request for a permanent injunction. The district court granted the Sears' petition for a permanent injunction, finding they had been denied due process when they were not joined as parties to the certiorari and mandamus actions, they had no adequate remedy at law, and they would be irreparably damaged if the mobile home was removed. Metzger appeals and the county has filed a notice of nonparticipation in the appeal.

II. Mootness

At the outset, we must first address the Sears' contention that the issues on appeal are moot because the county has amended the ordinance in question. They request that this court either dismiss the appeal or remand to the Board of Adjustment for a determination of whether a special exception may be granted under the amended ordinance. A case is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved are academic or nonexistent. Iowa Bankers Ass'n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep't, 335 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1983). In assessing whether an appeal is moot, we determine whether an opinion would be of force or effect in the underlying controversy. See id.

The parties dispute whether the enactment of the new county ordinance moots Metzger's appeal. The district court injunction pertains to the enforcement of the former ordinance, and additional factual questions would have to be resolved to determine if the Sears could obtain a special use exception under the new ordinance. We find the appeal is not moot and proceed to address the remaining issues.

III. The Merits

A. Motion for Default

Metzger claims the district court should have granted his motion for default. We review the denial of the motion for default for the correction of errors at law. See Iowa R.App. P. 4. In his oral motion for a default judgment, Metzger asserted a default was proper because the Sears failed to respond to his petition for intervention. Former Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 76 ¹ governed the procedure for intervention and provided as follows:

Every intervenor shall file a petition, and a separate copy for each party against whom he asserts a right. The clerk shall transmit such copy to the attorney for the adversary party, who shall, without further notice, move or plead thereto within seven days from the date of filing unless the court fixes a shorter time and notice thereof is given.

Rule 76 clearly required a responsive pleading which the Sears did not file. The Sears contend we need not determine the effect of this omission because Metzger's appeal of this issue was untimely. They claim more than thirty days elapsed between the court's denial of the motion and Metzger's filing of a notice of appeal. An appeal must normally be taken within thirty days from the entry of the order, judgment, or decree. Iowa R.App. P. 5. However, rule 5(b)provides an order disposing of fewer than all of the issues in a suit may be appealed within the time for an appeal from the order, judgment, or decree finally disposing of the action as to the remaining issues.

"A final judgment is one which conclusively adjudicates all of the rights of the parties and places it beyond the power of the court to return the parties to their original positions." Ahls v. Sherwood/Division of Harsco Corp., 473 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1991). We conclude the denial of a motion for a default judgment is not a final order from which Metzger was required to seek an immediate appeal in order to preserve his right to appellate review. The court's order did not conclusively adjudicate the rights of the parties; it simply allowed the action to proceed. Therefore, Metzger's appeal on this issue is timely pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(b)

Having determined his appeal was timely, we now turn to whether the district court should have granted Metzger's motion for default. Metzger made his motion for default judgment orally, at the hearing on his motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. Metzger cited no authority and we are aware of none which holds the failure to file a response to a petition for intervention supports the entry of a default judgment. We affirm the trial court's denial of this motion.

B. Permanent Injunction

Metzger also appeals the district court's entry of a permanent injunction barring the Board of Supervisors from removing the mobile home from the Sears' property. He claims the district court erred in finding the Sears had been denied due process and in finding a permanent injunction was an appropriate remedy.

A request for an injunction invokes the district court's equitable jurisdiction. Iowa R. Civ. P. 320. Our review of a proceeding in equity is de novo. Matlock v. Weets, 531 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1995); Iowa R.App. P. 4. We give weight to the district court's findings of fact, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(7).

1. General Legal Principles

We have often noted that "[a]n injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted with caution and only when clearly required to avoid irreparable damage." Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Iowa 1991). The party seeking the injunction must establish: (1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial injury or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is granted; and (3) that there is no adequate legal remedy available. See Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 122. When considering the appropriateness of an injunction "the court should carefully weigh the relative hardship which would be suffered by the enjoined party upon awarding injunctive relief." Id.

2. Analysis

We undertake our analysis of the propriety of the district court's entry of the permanent injunction by utilizing the three-part test set forth in Matlock. We first examine whether the Sears proved an invasion or threatened invasion of a right. Id. The Sears claim that because they were not joined as parties in the certiorari and mandamus proceedings, they had no opportunity to present their case. They contend this fact, combined with the impending deprivation of a use of their property, constitutes a denial of due process.

The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions require that any deprivation of life, liberty or property must be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9; Quality Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. City of Spencer, 586 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1998). Once it is determined that a life, liberty or property interest is at stake, "[t]he question then focuses on the nature of the 'process' that is 'due.' " 2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance & Procedure § 17.1, at 579-80 (2d ed.1992).

We have previously recognized that a decision by a zoning board affecting the use of a person's property involves an interest in property for which some process is due. See Quality Refrigerated Servs., 586 N.W.2d at 205-06 (notice by publication was sufficient to give property owner notice of zoning changes affecting its property); accord Buchholz v. Board of Adjustment, 199 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Iowa 1972). We also conclude a certiorari or...