Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of American Federation of Teachers v. Sharples

• Decision Date: 02 December 1930
• Docket Number: 21346.
• Citation: 293 P. 994,159 Wash. 424
• Parties: SEATTLE HIGH SCHOOL CHAPTER NO. 200 OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al. v. SHARPLES et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

293 P. 994

159 Wash. 424

SEATTLE HIGH SCHOOL CHAPTER NO. 200 OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al. v. SHARPLES et al.

No. 21346.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 2, 1930

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, Judge.

Action by Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the American Federation of Teachers, a voluntary association, and another against Casper W. Sharples and others, as Directors of Seattle School District No. 1. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Vanderveer, Bassett & Levinson and Vanderveer Beardslee & Bassett, all of Seattle, for appellants.

Peters Powell, Evans & McLaren, Pennock & Gates, and McMicken Ramsey, Rupp & Schweppe, all of Seattle, for respondents.

MITCHELL C.J.

This action was brought by the Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the American Federation of Teachers and L. A. Morrow, its president, to enjoin the defendants as directors of Seattle School District No. 1 from enforcing or attempting to enforce a resolution adopted by the board of directors with reference to the future employment of teachers.

The complaint alleges, in substance, that the defendants are directors of Seattle School District No. 1; that Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the American Federation of Teachers is a voluntary association of 250 persons, all of whom are residents and many of them taxpayers of the city; that all of them are holders of teachers' certificates and qualified and employed as teachers in the public and high schools of the city; and that the plaintiff L. A. Morrow is the president of the association and a resident and taxpayer of the city. It is further alleged that the defendants at a regular meeting of the board of directors of the district arbitrarily and unlawfully adopted the following resolution:

'That no person be employed hereafter, or continued in the employ of the District as a teacher while a member of the American Federation of Teachers, or any local thereof; and that before any election shall be considered binding, such teacher shall sign a declaration to the following effect:

'I hereby declare that I am not a member of the American Federation of Teachers, or any local thereof, and will not become a member during the term of this contract.'

It is further alleged that the defendants as directors of the school district are about to enter into contracts with teachers for the then ensuing year and intend to and will unless restrained arbitrarily and unlawfully deny employment to all teachers, however otherwise eligible or qualified, who decline to sign such declaration or who are members of the association; and that such threatened action on the part of the board of directors proceeds from the purpose and intent of denying to the teachers employed in the schools their natural, constitutional rights. The defendants in their answer deny certain allegations of the complaint but admit the existence of the school district and that the defendants are the directors of it. They further admit that Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the American Federation of Labor is a voluntary association of which a number of teachers employed in the high schools of the district are members; that the defendants acting as the board of directors of the school district by unanimous vote passed the resolution set out in the complaint; and that the board is about to employ teachers for the public schools of the city for the then ensuing year and intends to and unless restrained will require all teachers to be employed to conform to the requirements of the resolution.

For the purpose of presenting the real question in the case, it would seem that not much, if anything, more than the pleadings were necessary, but at the trial evidence was introduced on the part of the plaintiffs, among other things that the school board sitting as a committee of the whole met and adopted a written report reciting, among other things, that in the judgment of the board the aims and methods of the appellant federation of teachers conflicted with the best interests of the schools and that after much thought and conference with the educational department the board had decided not to employ teachers who are members of the American Federation of Teachers, and that 'we don't know who these members are and are therefore electing the high school teachers subject to their signing a contract which contains the following statement: 'I hereby declare that I am not a member of the American Federation of Teachers, or any local thereof, and will not become a member during the term of this contract.'' Immediately the board adopted the resolution complained of.

At the conclusion of the evidence on the part of the plaintiffs, the trial court upon motion of the defendants decided the case against the plaintiffs and entered judgment accordingly, from which judgment the appeal has been taken.

It is entirely clear that the resolution of the board in no way involved or related to any existing contract. There was no attempt to discharge any teacher or to cancel or impair his contract. It was intended to apply only in cases of future contracts. Counsel on both sides agree that the only question in the case is whether the rule promulgated and insisted upon by the board is in excess of the powers granted to the board by the legialature. In deciding the question it must be understood, of course, that as the school district is a municipal corporation created by the Legislature, it, acting through its board of directors, can exercise only such powers as the legislature has granted in express words, or those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to powers expressly granted, or those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipal corporation. State ex rel. Winsor v. City of Ballard, 10 Wash. 4, 38 P. 761.

Section 4776, Rem. Comp. Stat., provides that

'Every board of directors, unless otherwise specially provided by law, shall have power and it shall be its duty:

'First: To employ for not more than one year, and for sufficient cause to discharge teachers, and to fix, alter, allow and order paid their salaries and compensation * * *'

And later on the Legislature, in addition to the powers conferred in the above-mentioned section, said in section 4805-1, Rem. Comp. Stat., that the board of directors shall have power:

'Fourth. To adopt and enforce such rules and regulations as may be deemed essential to the well-being of the schools. * * *'

By the first of the above-quoted provisions of the statute power is given to employ and to discharge. The two are expressed in the same sentence and upon comparison the language employed is significant. As to the one, barring the time limit of one year for the contract which is not important here, the language used is 'to employ'; as to the other, the words are 'for sufficient cause to discharge.' For aught that is involved in this case, by the terms of the statute, the power to employ is to be exercised at the will and discretion of the board, while the power to discharge depends upon the existence of sufficient cause--the one unqualified, the other qualified. There is a manifest reason for the difference. The employment of teachers is a matter of treaty or voluntary contract. Both parties must consent and be mutually satisfied and agreed. On the part of each it is a matter of choice and discretion. However, though qualified, no teacher has the legal right to teach in the schools until the directors willingly enter into a contract for that purpose. Similarly the directors have no legal right to the services of any teacher until the teacher voluntarily enters into a contract for that purpose. Unless limited by statute in some way the board is entitled to the right of freedom of contract, as much so as the teachers are. On the other hand, the discharge of a teacher affects a legal right. It affects the right of a contract that may not be canceled or impaired at the will or discretion of the board of directors, but only for sufficient cause. The argument is made on behalf of the appellants that if the judgment in this case is correct, then it must follow that the school board has the power to banish certain enumerated classes of persons from its teaching force. We do not so understand; no teaching force or outstanding contract is involved. The principle announced by the judgment is that the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the board in the future employment of teachers. The exercise of the power to employ does not in any way affect a present teaching force or any part of it, but only the right of contract in creating or establishing a future teaching force. Still further, upon referring to the sections of the Code herein set out, appellants say: 'Neither of these two sections assumes to confer authority upon the school board to make rules or regulations for the government of the teachers in matters pertaining to their social or other intercourse with each other, or at all.' However, the question here is not one of regulating the conduct of the teachers, but the power of the board to say whom it will employ as teachers. Regulation of the conduct of teachers by whatever power comes only after the teachers have been employed. Appellants cite McGilvra v. Seattle School District No. 1, 113 Wash. 619, 194 P. 817, 819, 12 A. L. R. 913. That case held that the district had no authority to render free medical services to pupils by maintaining a clinic for the treatment of school children of parents unable to pay for professional services. It was so held because upon an examination of the statutes conferring powers upon the school districts it was said to be apparent that there is not in the statutes 'any ...