State v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen

Decision Date20 June 1951
Citation37 Cal.2d 412,232 P.2d 857
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2250, 20 Lab.Cas. P 66,467 STATE v. BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al. S. F. 18003

Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., and Herbert E. Wenig, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.

James H. Phillips, Sacramento, for intervener and appellant.

Clifton Hildebrand, Oakland, for respondents.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

The State of California brought this action for declaratory relief to determine the validity of a contract entered into by respondent brotherhoods and the Board of State Harbor Commissioners respecting the rates of pay and working conditions of employees of the State Belt Railroad. This appeal was taken from a judgment in favor of respondents declaring the contract valid.

The Belt Railroad is owned and operated by the state, and its management and control is committed by statute to the Board of State Harbor Commissioners. Harb. & Nav. Code §§ 3150-3165. The railroad parallels the waterfront of San Francisco harbor, extending to some 45 wharves and directly serving approximately 175 industrial plants, and it has track or freight-car ferry connections with three interstate railways. The Belt line facilitates the freight traffic of the harbor by moving freight cars between the various steamship companies, industrial plants and railroad carriers with which it has connections, and it serves as a link in the through transportation of interstate freight shipped to or from points in San Francisco over the connecting carriers. It is settled that the Belt Railroad is engaged in interstate commerce. United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567; State of California v. Anglim, 9 Cir., 129 F.2d 455; Maurice v. State of California, 43 Cal.App.2d 270, 110 P.2d 706.

The railroad employs between 125 and 225 persons, the number depending upon the volume of business. The Constitution of California provides that these employees are members of the state civil service, and under the Civil Service Act the appointment, classification, promotion, salary ranges, hours and general working conditions of all members of the civil service are governed by provisions of that act and by regulations of the State Personnel Board. Calif.Const. art. XXIV, § 4; Govt.Code §§ 18500-19765. Compensation of employees within the ranges set by the State Personnel Board may be fixed by the Harbor Board, Harb. & Nav.Code, § 1705, subject to approval by the state Department of Finance. Gov.Code, § 18004.

On September 1, 1942, the Board of State Harbor Commissioners and respondent brotherhoods, representing the railroad employees, entered into the contract here involved. In general, the contract fixes matters relating to pay and working conditions which are normally governed by civil service statutes and regulations, and certain of its provisions conflict in substance with civil service laws on the subjects of promotions, lay-offs, leaves of absence, accumulation of sick leave and procedures for dismissal, demotion and suspension. The contract was the result of collective bargaining between respondent brotherhoods and the Harbor Board, and the parties concede that it has never been approved by the Department of Finance.

The state contends that the contract is invalid because the employees affected are members of the state civil service and that their pay and working conditions are to be governed exclusively by legislation or administrative rules and not by collective bargaining contract. A similar contention is made by the intervenor, a Belt Railroad employee, who claims that his benefits and privileges are less under the provisions of the contract than under the state Civil Service Act, and that he is entitled to protection of the laws governing state employment. It is respondents' position, however, that the state, as owner of the Belt Railroad, is subject to the federal Railway Labor Act which secures to employees of railroads engaged in interstate commerce the right to enter into collective bargaining agreements with their employer concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152. Accordingly, respondents argue, the contract is valid and supersedes all provisions of the state Constitution, the Civil Service Act, and rules and regulations of the State Personnel Board which are inconsistent therewith.

The Railway Labor Act requires all common carriers by railroad, their officers, agents, and employees 'to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether rising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce * * *.' 45 U.S.C.A. § 152. It provides that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and it sets up a procedure for the settlement of disputes by conference of representatives of employer and employees and, failing solution there, by reference to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the National Mediation Board, or arbitration. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 152-155, 157. Orders of the National Railroad Adjustment Board may be enforced by action in United States District Courts, and judgment may be entered on awards which are the result of arbitration. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 153 subd. 1(p), 159. The act fixes the procedure employers must follow in changing rates of pay, rules or working conditions, requiring thirty days' notice and conference with employee representatives; it further provides that no such changes shall be effective until final action by the National Mediation Board, if the board offers its services or either party requests them. 45 U.S.C.A. § 156. Punishment in the form of fines and imprisonment is prescribed for employers who fail to obey provisions of the act. 45 U.S.C.A. § 152. tenth.

The Railway Labor Act does not expressly apply to state-owned railroads, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151, and it is well settled that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to a sovereign, in the absence of express words to that effect, unless there are extraneous and affirmative reasons for believing that the sovereign was intended to be affected. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-273, 67 S.Ct. 677, 686, 706, 91 L.Ed. 884; United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 359, 69 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 93 L.Ed. 1406; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-351, 63 S.Ct. 307, 313, 87 L.Ed. 315; Balthasar v. Pacific Elec. R. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 305-306, 202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R. 452; cf. United States v. State of California, 297 U.S. 175, 186, 56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567. In United States v. State of California, supra, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567, which also involved the Belt Railroad, the Supreme Court found reasons for believing that Congress intended to include states within the operation of the federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. The court stated that the purpose of the statute there involved was to protect employees, the public and commerce from injury because of defective appliances on interstate carriers and that no convincing reason had been advanced why it should not apply to all carriers, whether private or state owned. The Belt Railroad has also been held subject to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. and the federal Carriers Taxing Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 261 et seq. Maurice v. State of California, 43 Cal.App.2d 270, 110 P.2d 706; State of California v. Anglim, 9 Cir., 129 F.2d 455. However, considerations which may justify the application of general safety and taxing measures to state-owned carriers are not controlling in determining the intended scope of a statute which purports to regulate and supervise employer-employee relationships. We must look to the subject matter of a particular statute and to the terms of the enactment in its total environment in order to determine legislative intent, and there are, we believe, affirmative reasons which indicate that Congress did not intend the Railway Labor Act to apply to state-owned carriers.

It is most significant that, while one of the major purposes of the Railway Labor Act is to secure the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employer with respect to rates of pay, rules and working conditions, the terms and conditions of government employment are traditionally fixed by legislation and administrative regulation, not by contract. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 95, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 1488, 89 L.Ed. 2072; Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 298, 168 P.2d 741; City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542-544. A concise statement of the characteristics distinguishing public from private employment in this regard appears in a letter from President Roosevelt to the National Federation of Federal Employees, dated August 16, 1937: 'All Government employees should realize that the process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government employe organizations. The employer is the whole people, who speck by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employes alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.' Quoted in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542-543; C. I. O. v. City of Dallas, Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d...

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