Seattle & M. Ry. Co. v. O'Meara

• Decision Date: 07 March 1892
• Citation: 4 Wash. 17,29 P. 835
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SEATTLE & M. RY. CO. v. O'MEARA ET AL.

29 P. 835

4 Wash. 17

SEATTLE & M. RY. CO. v. O'MEARA ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 7, 1892

Appeal from superior court, King county; J. A. STRATTON, Judge.

Petition of the Seattle & Montana Railway Company against Patrick O'Meara and others for condemnation of land. From the judgment for damages defendants appeal. Dismissed.

Strudwick & Peters, for appellants.

Burke, Shepard & Woods, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

Respondent moves to dismiss this appeal for the reason that it was not prosecuted within the time prescribed by law, it being over 30 days from the rendition of judgment. Section 2, c. 146, Laws 1891, being a general law, covering appeals to the supreme court, provides that, in civil actions and proceedings, appeals shall be prosecuted within six months after the rendition of the decision, order, or judgment complained of. While section 9 of [4 Wash. 18] an act in relation to regulating the mode of procedure to appropriate lands, real estate, or property, by corporations, for corporate purposes, and of ascertaining and securing compensation therefor, approved March 21, 1890, provides that either party may appeal from the judgment for damages entered in the superior court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment aforesaid. There can be no force in the suggestion that the use of the word "may" in a former act implies simply a permission to the appellant to appeal within 30 days; for, outside of the ordinary construction of the word, there was nothing in the general appeal law in force at the time of the passage of the act of 1890 to prevent the appeal from being taken within 30 days, or any shorter time so that there could have been no reason for such a provision. The provision must be construed to mean "must" appeal within 30 days, so that the only question involved is whether the general law regulating appeals repeals the former special law. We think there is nothing repugnant in the statutes, and that they can both stand. The general rule is as stated in Meade v. French, 29 P. 833, (decided by this court at this term,) that the general statute will not repeal a special one, and we think there is nothing to take this case out of the rule. One is a statute regulating appeals generally; the other is concerning appeals in a special case. In suits of this character, frequently, great public interests are involved, and the effects of the statute reach beyond the parties litigant,...