Sebastian v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1995
• Citation: 634 N.Y.S.2d 114,221 A.D.2d 294
• Parties: Theresa SEBASTIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 114

634 N.Y.S.2d 114

221 A.D.2d 294

Theresa SEBASTIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Nov. 30, 1995.

T.F. Bello, for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Ravitch, for defendants-respondents.

Before KUPFERMAN, J.P., and ASCH, WILLIAMS and TOM, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered on May 13, 1994, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, is unanimously reversed, on the law, the motion denied and the complaint reinstated, without costs or disbursements.

Discrimination claimants, such as plaintiff, are not required to file notices of claim pursuant to the General Municipal Law. Both General Municipal Law § 50-i and Unconsolidated Law § 7401(2) (New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Act § 20[2]; L.1969, ch. 1016, § 1, as amended), which specifically deals with actions against the Health and Hospitals Corporation, define the torts for which a notice of claim is required only as personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to property claim and not torts generally.

Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709, 451 N.E.2d 456 cert. denied 464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 551, 78 L.Ed.2d 725, cited by the IAS court is not contrary. In Mills, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a discrimination complaint by the Fourth Department relying upon the fact that there was a notice requirement in County Law § 52(1) applying to "[a]ny claim ... against a county for damage, injury or death, or for invasion of personal or property rights, of every name and nature ...". Accordingly, the Appellate Division in Mills stated: "Plaintiff argues correctly that an action brought under section 296 of the Executive Law is not a tort claim which falls within the notice provisions of the General Municipal Law". Nevertheless, it dismissed the complaint because of the applicability of Section 52 of the County Law (Mills v. County of Monroe, 89 A.D.2d 776, 453 N.Y.S.2d 486, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 307, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709, 451 N.E.2d 456).

Since, as noted, supra, the only other law dealing with the issue herein, Unconsolidated Law § 7401, uses the same language as the General Municipal Law, plaintiff was under no requirement to comply with the notice requirements.