Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC
| Decision Date | 13 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 08-01789 (CGM),Adv. Pro. No. 12-01205 (CGM) |
| Citation | 641 B.R. 78 |
| Parties | SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Applicant, v. BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC, Defendant. In re: Bernard L. Madoff, Debtor. Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, Plaintiff, v. Multi-Strategy Fund Limited, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of New York |
BAKER HOSTETLER LLP, Attorneys for the Plaintiff, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10111, BY: MATTHEW FEIL (via Zoomgov), MATTHEW B. FRIEDMAN (via Zoomgov)
FRIEDMAN KAPLAN SEILER & ADELMAN LLP, Attorneys for Defendant, Multi-Strategy Fund Limited, 7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036, BY: ROBERT J. LACK (via Zoomgov)
SIPA LIQUIDATION (Substantively Consolidated)
Pending before the Court is Defendant's, Multi-Strategy Fund Limited ("Multi-Strategy"), motion to dismiss the complaint of Irving Picard, the trustee ("Trustee") for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS") seeking to recover one subsequent transfer allegedly consisting of BLMIS customer property. Multi-Strategy seeks dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim due to the safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and for failure to allege that it received BLMIS customer property. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.
This is an adversary proceeding commenced in this Court, in which the main underlying SIPA proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (CGM) (the "SIPA Proceeding"), is pending. The SIPA Proceeding was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court") as Securities Exchange Commission v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC et al. , No. 08-CV-10791, and has been referred to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and (e)(1), and 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4).
This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (F), (H) and (O). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these adversary proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(a), the District Court's Standing Order of Reference, dated July 10, 1984, and the Amended Standing Order of Reference, dated January 31, 2012. In addition, the District Court removed the SIPA liquidation to this Court pursuant to SIPA § 78eee(b)(4), (see Order, Civ. 08– 01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) ("Main Case"), at ¶ IX (ECF No. 1)), and this Court has jurisdiction under the latter provision. Personal jurisdiction has been contested by this Defendant and will be discussed infra .
The Court assumes familiarity with the background of the BLMIS Ponzi scheme and its SIPA proceeding.
This adversary proceeding was filed on March 22, 2012, by Trustee. The Trustee brings this proceeding to recover the subsequent transfer of BLMIS customer property that Multi-Strategy allegedly received from Fairfield Sentry Limited ("Fairfield Sentry"). (Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 97). Fairfield Sentry ("Fairfield Sentry") is known as a "feeder fund" of BLMIS because it invested "all or substantially all" of its assets in BLMIS. (Id. ¶ 3). In his amended complaint, filed on February 18, 2022 ("Complaint"1 ), the Trustee alleges that Multi-Strategy, a foreign investment fund organized under Caman law (Id. ¶ 58), received a transfer of $25,763,374 from Fairfield Sentry Limited ("Sentry") on March 15, 2005. (Id. ¶ 120).
According to the Complaint, Defendant is a company organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands (Id. ¶ 58) and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Caisse de dépôt et placement du Quebec ("Caisse"), and Defendant's address is alleged to be Caisse's headquarters in Montreal, Canada. (Id. ) It is alleged that CDP Capital was Defendant's investment manager and directed Defendant's investments in and redemptions from the BLMIS Feeder Funds. (Id. ¶ 4).
Following BLMIS's collapse, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Fairfield Sentry and related defendants to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers of customer property in the amount of approximately $3 billion. (Id. ¶ 114). In 2011, the Trustee settled with Fairfield Sentry. (Id. ¶ 115). As part of the settlement, Fairfield Sentry consented to a judgment in the amount of $3.054 billion (Id. ) but repaid only $70 million to the BLMIS customer property estate. The Trustee then commenced a number of adversary proceedings against subsequent transferees like Defendant to recover the approximately $3 billion in missing customer property.
In its motion to dismiss, Multi-Strategy argues that the safe harbor bars the Trustee's recovery of this transfer, the Trustee has failed to allege that it holds BLMIS customer property, and that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. The Trustee opposes the motion to dismiss.
Defendant objects to the Trustee's assertion of personal jurisdiction over it. In the Complaint, the Trustee argues that Defendant purposefully availed itself of the laws of the United States and New York. Compl. ¶¶ 87–113.
To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Trustee "must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists." SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG , 882 F.3d 333, 342 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha , 609 F.3d 30, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2010) ). A trial court has considerable procedural leeway when addressing a pretrial dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(2). Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A. , 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013). " ‘It may determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.’ " Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A. , 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller , 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981) ); see also Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS ), 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (same). At this preliminary stage, "the plaintiff's prima facie showing may be established solely by allegations." Dorchester Fin. , 722 F.3d at 84–85 (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A. , 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990) ); Picard v. Fairfield Greenwich Grp. (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd. ), 627 B.R. 546, 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021) (same).
In order to be subjected to personal jurisdiction in the United States, due process requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum in which defendant is sued " ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS) , 480 B.R. 501, 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ). The pleadings and affidavits are to be construed " ‘in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all doubts in their favor.’ " Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC , 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Porina v. Marward Shipping Co. , 521 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) ); Picard v. BNP Paribas S.A. (In re BLMIS) , 594 B.R. 167, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
The Supreme Court has set out three conditions for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State or have purposefully directed its conduct into the forum State. Second, the plaintiff's claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant's forum conduct. Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bank of Am. N.A. , 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
"[M]inimum contacts ... exist where the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there." Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp. , 883 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2018). "Although a defendant's contacts with the forum state may be intertwined with its transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties, a defendant's relationship with a third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bank of Am. N.A. , 916 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). "It is insufficient to rely on a defendant's random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or on the unilateral activity of a plaintiff with the forum to establish specific jurisdiction." Id.
A party "purposefully avail[s] itself of the benefits and protections of New York laws by knowing, intending and contemplating that the substantial majority of funds invested in Fairfield Sentry would be transferred to BLMIS in New York to be invested in the New York securities market." Picard v. Bureau of Labor Ins. (In re BLMIS ), 480 B.R. 501, 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
The Trustee has devoted over five pages of his twenty-seven-page Complaint to Defendant's contacts with New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 87–113). It is alleged that (Id. ¶ 88). And that Defendant "purchased shares in the BLMIS Feeder Funds intending to direct funds to New York-based BLMIS." (Id. ¶ 89). "Prior to subscribing to Fairfield Sentry, Defendant affirmed having ‘received and read’ a Fairfield Sentry private placement memorandum, dated July 1, 2003, which provided that ‘approximately...
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