Security Mills of Asheville, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N. A.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 102,102
• Citation: 281 N.C. 525,189 S.E.2d 266
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SECURITY MILLS OF ASHEVILLE, INCORPORATED, Respondent, v. WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST COMPANY, N.A., Petitioner.

Page 266

189 S.E.2d 266

281 N.C. 525

SECURITY MILLS OF ASHEVILLE, INCORPORATED, Respondent, v. WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST COMPANY, N.A., Petitioner.

No. 102.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 16, 1972.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Hyde, by Emerson D. Wall, Asheville, for defendant.

Hendon & Carson, by George Ward Hendon, Asheville, for plaintiff.

LAKE, Justice.

The venue of suits against national banks is governed by 12 U.S.C. § 94, which provides:

'Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be Established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is Located having jurisdiction in similar cases.' (Emphasis added.)

It is now settled that this statute is mandatory, not permissive as was supposed by this Court in Curlee v. National Bank, 187 N.C. 119, 121 S.E. 194, and that, in the absence of a waiver by the bank, a suit against a national bank may be maintained only in a court designated in this statute. Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau 371 U.S. 555, 83 S.Ct. 520, 9 L.Ed.2d 523. Thus, Curlee v. National Bank, supra, which was decided prior to this determination by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Langdeau case, is no longer authoritative and is overruled, insofar as it relates to the proper venue of an action against a national bank which has not waived its immunity under the above quoted Act of Congress.

It is equally well settled that this statutory provision applies to transitory actions only, Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 26 L.Ed. 52, and that the national bank may waive its immunity from suit in other courts, which waiver may be express or implied. First National Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 10 S.Ct. 37, 33 L.Ed. 282. Such waiver may be implied from the conduct of the bank prior to the institution of the action. Lichtenfels v. North Carolina Nat. Bank, 260 N.C. 146, 132 S.E.2d 360; Annot., 1 A.L.R.3rd 904. The present action is, of course, transitory.

The questions presented by this appeal are, therefore: (1) Is the defendant bank 'located' in Buncombe County, where it maintains a branch and conducts a general banking business, within the meaning of the Act of Congress? (2) If not, has the defendant, by maintaining such branch in Buncombe County, waived its statutory immunity to suit in the court of the county otherwise having jurisdiction of the action, the suit arising out of business transacted at such branch bank?

Our attention has been directed to no decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which determines either of these questions. Decisions of the lower federal courts, construing this Act of Congress, are not binding upon us, notwithstanding our respect for the tribunals which rendered them, and their decisions with reference to the proper venue as between the several federal courts are not in point because of the language of the statute. We must, therefore, construe this Act of Congress ourselves and determine whether the defendant is 'located' in Buncombe County, within the meaning of the Act.

It is to be noted that an action or proceeding brought against a national bank in a federal court must be brought in the district in which such bank is 'established.' On the other hand, a suit against such bank in a state court must be brought in the county or city in which the bank is 'located.' Each of these words, 'established' and 'located,' has several connotations. Some of the connotations of 'established' overlap those of 'located,' but the words are not synonymous. It is not lightly to be supposed that Congress used both words in the same sentence carelessly or inadvertently. The presumption is that it used them deliberately, having in view their different connotations.

The definition of 'establish' in Webster, New International Dictionary, Second Edition, most applicable to the use of the word in this statute is: 'To originate and secure the permanent existence of; To found; to institute; to Create and regulate; said of a colony, a state, or Other institution.' (Emphasis added.) To the same effect, see: Webster, Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary; Century Dictionary (1889 Edition); Black's Law Dictionary. By the terms of the Act of Congress, therefore, an action or proceeding brought in a federal district or territorial court against a national bank must be brought in the district wherein the bank was founded, this being the district in which its charter states it has its principal office.

Obviously, a bank is 'located' where it is 'established,' but this does not preclude the possibility that it may also be located elsewhere. Webster, New International Dictionary, Second Edition, defines 'locate' to mean 'to set or establish in a particular spot or position; to station.' Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines 'locate' to mean 'to establish oneself or one's business: SETTLE.' The Century Dictionary (1889 Edition) defines 'locate' to mean 'to fix in a place; establish in a particular spot or position; place; settle: as to Locate one's self in a certain town or street.' (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary does not define 'located' but cites Raiola v. Los Angeles First National Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Misc. 630, 233 N.Y.S. 301, 304, as holding that a bank is 'located' in the place specified in its original certificate, which it obviously is, the question being whether it can be located elsewhere also. Black's Law Dictionary also cites Dairy Sealed v. Ten Eyck, 159 Misc. 716, 288 N.Y.S. 641, 649, as holding, 'Commissioner (of Agriculture and Markets) or any head of a bureau is 'located' not only in the principal office, but in the authorized branch office.' Thus, the word 'located' does not point exclusively to the birthplace of an institution as does the word 'established.' Congress having used the one word with reference to suits in federal courts and the other word with reference to suits in state courts must have intended to draw this distinction.

Another definition of 'locate' given by Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, is 'to search for and discover the position of; as to Locate an enemy; to Locate a fire.' This element of discovery, inherent in the word 'locate' but not in the word 'establish,' appears to have been in the mind of the Court in Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 212 Pa.Super. 185, 240 A.2d 90, cert. den., First Camden National Bank & Trust Co. v. Lapinsohn, 393 U.S. 952, 89 S.Ct. 376, 21 L.Ed.2d 363, when it said a national bank, by setting up a branch to conduct a general banking business, manifested an intent 'to be found' in that jurisdiction and so had waived its statutory immunity to suit there.

We do not overlook the fact, noted in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, supra, that the original National Banking Act of 1863 did not make mention of suits against such banks in state courts. Though the provision of the Act, relating to suits in state courts, came into it by later legislation, we must conclude that Congress intended a somewhat different rule to apply as between suits brought in federal courts and suits brought in state courts. Otherwise, it would hardly have switched from 'established' to 'located.'

Cases in which a national bank was sued in a court of a state where it was not 'established,' in which it maintained no branch and in which it carried on no...