Sedlacek v. Hillis

• Decision Date: 20 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 70254-3.,70254-3.
• Citation: 145 Wn.2d 379,145 Wash.2d 379,36 P.3d 1014
• Parties: Diane SEDLACEK, individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Andrew J. Sedlacek, deceased, Respondent, v. Larry O. HILLIS and Veralene Hillis, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof, d/b/a Skyline Park Limited Partnership, Petitioners.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

36 P.3d 1014

145 Wn.2d 379

145 Wash.2d 379

Diane SEDLACEK, individually and as the Administratrix of the Estate of Andrew J. Sedlacek, deceased, Respondent, v. Larry O. HILLIS and Veralene Hillis, husband and wife, and the marital community composed thereof, d/b/a Skyline Park Limited Partnership, Petitioners.

No. 70254-3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 15, 2001.

Decided December 20, 2001.

Jeffrey Lowell Needle, Deanna Jill Hawkins Barnes, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Employment Lawyers Association.

Reed, McClure, William Robert Hickman, Seattle, for Petitioner.

Van Siclen, Stocks & Firkins, John Stocks, Robert Craig Van Siclen, Auburn, Terry Ann Zundel, Seattle, for Respondent.

BRIDGE, J.

The respondent, Diane Sedlacek, a nondisabled person, claims that she was wrongfully discharged from her position as a member of a husband-wife apartment management team because of her association with her disabled husband. The federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), prohibits employers with 15 or more employees from discriminating against able-bodied persons who are associated with or related to disabled persons. Washington law does not. We are asked to decide whether federal law provides a clear mandate of public policy on which a nondisabled employee, who is employed with a disabled employee, can base a state tort claim of wrongful discharge. We hold that it does not.

FACTS

Jack and Diane Sedlacek were employed as apartment managers for the Skyline Park Apartments from August 1988 until they were terminated in March 1996. The 192-unit apartment complex is owned by petitioners, Larry O. and Veralene Hillis, as general partners of Skyline Park Limited Partnership. The Sedlaceks were hired as a team and they served in that capacity until their termination. Although there was no written employment contract, the Sedlaceks were responsible for maintaining the apartment buildings and grounds, and for promptly renting vacant apartments so that the complex would be profitable for the owners.

Jack was diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia in December 1995. Diane notified the Hillises of Jack's illness before the end of that year. Jack remained hospitalized until January 31, 1996 when he was able to resume his maintenance duties with some new limitations resulting from his cancer.

Diane states that before the termination, the Hillises never mentioned any problem with the Sedlaceks' job performance. However, Diane concedes that after Jack's hospitalization, the Hillises began to complain about the number of days that Jack had missed from work and, for the first time, about the vacancy rate. To the contrary, the Hillises contend that over the last two years of the Sedlaceks' employment, they complained to the Sedlaceks on numerous occasions that the vacancy rate was unacceptably high and that the Sedlaceks responded that the downturn was probably cyclical. The Hillises accepted this explanation until the vacancy rate reached an all time high in February 1996.

In response to the high vacancy rate, Larry Hillis arranged to have property management consultant, Kimberly Greene, visit Skyline Park. Greene reported that, in her opinion, the outside areas of the apartment complex were not being adequately maintained and were in such a condition that potential tenants were likely to be discouraged from viewing apartments in the complex. Greene worked at the Skyline complex alongside the Sedlaceks for one month in order to improve the management and vacancy rates. Greene reports that the Sedlaceks resisted her new policies and she had many conversations with the Hillises surrounding the Sedlaceks' unwillingness to cooperate.

Around March 1996, the vacancy rate began to improve significantly and the Hillises eventually asked Greene to manage the complex permanently. She accepted on the condition that she could dismiss the Sedlaceks. The Hillises agreed and Greene informed the Sedlaceks of their termination on March 14, 1996. Greene states that she was aware of Jack's illness but would have insisted on the termination even if he were not ill.

Diane asserts that she and her family did the best they could to maintain the complex under the circumstances and they got little help from the Hillises. In addition, there were instances where the Sedlaceks asked for help in dealing with disposal of larger items, but the Hillises neglected to take any action. Diane claims that the Hillises fired them to avoid accommodating Jack's disability.

The Sedlaceks initiated this action alleging, among other things, that Jack had been wrongfully discharged in violation of a public policy against disability discrimination. After Jack's death in August 1996, Diane was named administratrix of her husband's estate and replaced her deceased husband as a party in this action. Diane then filed an amended complaint adding, among others, a claim that she was wrongfully discharged because of her association with and status of being married to a disabled person.

On February 27, 1998, the trial court granted the Hillises' motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims except those for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court reserved its ruling on these claims pending completion of discovery. After a subsequent motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the remaining claims and the complaint in full.

Diane appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims except those asserting wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.¹ The court determined that the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, constituted a clear mandate of public policy against disability discrimination.² Furthermore, disputed facts existed as to whether the Hillises' actions jeopardized this public policy and whether Jack's disability caused the Sedlaceks' discharge.³ The Court of Appeals also reasoned that because Jack and Diane were hired as a team, "[i]t can be no less a violation of public policy to wrongfully discharge a team based on the disability of one member of the team than it would be to wrongfully discharge a single employee based on his or her disability."⁴

The Hillises filed a petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision with regard to Diane's claim as an able-bodied associate and relative of Jack. This court granted the Hillises' petition for review of Diane's claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Because the petition for review and subsequent petitioners' briefs object only to the Court of Appeals holding that Diane's claim of wrongful discharge must survive summary judgment, no other claims are before this court.

ANALYSIS

I

An employment relationship that is not governed by a definite contract is generally terminable at will. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 223, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). However, we have recognized that the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a narrow exception to the employment at-will doctrine in Washington State. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d 1081.

In 1984, this court first adopted the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of clearly mandated public policy. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d 1081. In Thompson, the plaintiff sued for wrongful discharge arguing, in part, that he was fired because he implemented accurate accounting practices in compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 91 Stat. 1494, a federal statute intended to prohibit bribery of foreign officials. Id. at 223, 234, 685 P.2d 1081. Thompson asserted that the company dismissed him because he insisted on compliance with the federal requirements and the company intended for his dismissal to serve as a warning to all employees in his position. Id. at 234, 685 P.2d 1081.

The Thompson court joined a growing number of states by adopting the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of clear public policy. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d 1081. We reasoned that findings of public policy must be clearly grounded in legislation or prior jurisprudence in order to protect employers from frivolous lawsuits and to assure balance between the interests of the employer and the interests of the employee. Id. at 232-33, 685 P.2d 1081. We stated:

"In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy is violated, courts should inquire whether the employer's conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme. Prior judicial decisions may also establish the relevant public policy. However, courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject."

Id. at 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982)).

In Thompson's case, this court held that the FCPA was a clear expression of public policy in favor of careful accounting to prevent bribery of foreign officials. Id. at 234, 685 P.2d 1081. Consequently, if Thompson could prove that his dismissal was a result of his compliance with the federal law or that the discharge was intended to encourage other employees to violate that law, then his dismissal was contrary to the clear mandate of public policy. Id.

In 1996, this court further developed the tort of wrongful discharge in Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 913 P.2d 377 (1996). Plaintiff, Kevin M. Gardner, was discharged from Loomis because he violated a strict company policy by abandoning his armored car to help a person whose life was being threatened by an armed bank robber. Id. at 933-35, 913 P.2d 377. Before reaching the facts of the case, the Gardner court recognized that public policy tort actions were generally permitted in four situations:

(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a

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