Seeboth v. Allenby

• Decision Date: 18 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12–17062.,12–17062.
• Citation: 789 F.3d 1099
• Parties: Timothy J. SEEBOTH, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Cliff ALLENBY, Director D.M.H.; Audrey King, Respondents–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

789 F.3d 1099

Timothy J. SEEBOTH, Petitioner–Appellant

v.Cliff ALLENBY, Director D.M.H.; Audrey King, Respondents–Appellees.

No. 12–17062.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 14, 2015.

Filed June 18, 2015.

Michael B. Bigelow (argued), Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Tami M. Krenzin (argued), Deputy Attorney General, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Brian G. Smiley, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondents–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:10–cv–02875–MCE–TJB.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI and SUSAN P. GRABER, Circuit Judges, and MICHAEL A. PONSOR,^* Senior District Judge.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

In this habeas case, Petitioner Timothy Seeboth claims that California's Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code §§ 6600 –6609.3, is unconstitutional on its face. Specifically, he asserts that the absence of a provision setting forth a time within which to hold a trial extending the term of his commitment denies him equal protection of the laws because, under California law, other civilly committed persons have a statutory right to a recommitment trial within a specified period. The state courts and the district court denied relief. Because the California state courts reasonably held that this aspect of the SVPA does not deprive Petitioner of equal protection of the laws, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The SVPA and Other California Civil Commitment Laws

California has enacted a set of civil commitment statutes that are triggered only after criminal charges have been filed. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, 587 (1999). The SVPA, which is one such statute, reflects the California legislature's “concern over a select group of criminal offenders who are extremely dangerous as the result of mental impairment

, and who are likely to continue committing acts of sexual violence even after they have been punished for such crimes.” Id. The state may file a petition to civilly commit a person as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) if that individual (1) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and (2) suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder that makes it likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior in the future.¹ Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 6600(a)(1). The SVPA then provides for a probable cause hearing and a jury trial, at which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual meets those criteria. Id. §§ 6602–6603; People v. McKee, 47 Cal.4th 1172, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 427, 223 P.3d 566, 574–75 (2010).

In its original form, the SVPA provided for commitment for two-year terms. Orozco v. Superior Court, 117 Cal.App.4th 170, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 573, 578 (2004). At the end of each term, and after a new trial, the individual could be recommitted. Id. at 578–79. In November 2006, California adopted Proposition 83, which “changed the commitment term for SVPs from renewable two-year periods to an indeterminate period.” Seeboth v. Mayberg, 659 F.3d 945, 947 (9th Cir.2011). Thus, for individuals committed or recommitted after 2006, there is no need for future recommitment proceedings. See Bourquez v. Superior Court, 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 142, 144 (2007) (holding that pending petitions for two-year extensions would be considered petitions for indefinite terms). Proposition 83 also changed the substantive requirements for civil commitment under the SVPA. Before 2006, the SVPA authorized civil commitment only if the person had been convicted of sexually violent offenses against two or more victims. Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 6600(a) (1996). After Proposition 83, only one victim was required. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 83 (West).

An individual also may be committed as a mentally disordered offender (“MDO”). To be committed as an MDO, a person must (1) stand convicted of a crime involving force, violence, or serious bodily injury; and (2) have a severe mental disorder that was a cause of, or an aggravating factor in, the commission of that crime. Cal.Penal Code § 2962 ; People v. Collins, 10 Cal.App.4th 690, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 768, 770 (1992).

Finally, California law authorizes the civil commitment of an individual who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGI”). In California, the question of sanity is determined separately, after a conviction. Cal.Penal Code § 1026(a) ; In re Moye, 22 Cal.3d 457, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1978). If the individual was insane at the time of the offense and has not regained sanity, the court may commit the person for up to the maximum term of the sentence that could have been imposed for the crime. Moye, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d at 1100. Civil commitment may extend beyond the period of that maximum sentence if (1) the person was convicted of a felony and (2) the person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. Cal.Penal Code § 1026(b)(1).

B. Facts and Procedural History in This Case

Over the course of more than 30 years, [Petitioner] was convicted nine times for crimes involving deviant sexual acts with children. Based on his convictions, [Petitioner] was first determined to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) in 1997 in a civil jury trial proceeding. He was held for consecutive two-year terms from 1997 until 2005.... While [Petitioner] was still in custody for the 2003–05 term, the California District Attorney filed a petition in May 2005 to extend [Petitioner]'s commitment from the end of that 2003–05 term.

Seeboth, 659 F.3d at 946 (citations and footnotes omitted). Petitioner's trial for the 2005 recommitment petition did not take place until September 2010. He currently is in custody because that proceeding resulted in an order committing him for an indefinite term. Id. at 947.

In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the SVPA is facially unconstitutional because it fails to establish a time period within which a recommitment trial must occur.² Petitioner claims that the lack of a timing provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there is a timing provision in the civil commitment laws that apply to MDOs and NGIs. See Cal.Penal Code § 1026.5(b)(4) (providing that an NGI has a right to a trial that commences “no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless that time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown”); id. § 2972(a) (same for MDOs).

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court (“Superior Court”) asserting, among other claims, that the absence of a timing provision in the SVPA violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. The Superior Court denied his equal protection claim on the merits, holding in part: “Petitioner has not shown that he is similarly situated to the other types of long-term civil commitments.” Petitioner next filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which denied the petition without an opinion. Finally, after filing further petitions in Superior Court and the Court of Appeal, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition, citing People v. Duvall (In re Duvall), 9 Cal.4th 464, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (1995), without a narrative explanation.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state courts' rejection of the equal protection claim “cannot be said to have been an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Petitioner timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the district court's denial of habeas relief. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1269 n. 7 (9th Cir.2005). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), we may not grant habeas relief

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, we may grant relief only if the state court's decision was “objectively unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

A. Identifying the State Court Decision Under Review

Our recent decision in Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201, 1203–04 (9th Cir.2015), causes us to question which state court decision is the “last reasoned decision” that we must review. Curiel suggests that a citation to Duvall alone might not constitute sufficient “reasoning” to make the California Supreme Court's order more than a summary denial. See id. at 1204–05. We have held that, when a state's highest court summarily denies a habeas petition, we “look through” that denial to the “last reasoned state-court decision,” Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial of rehearing, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1001, 187 L.Ed.2d 863 (2014), which in this case is the California Superior Court's order. But we need not resolve the question whether a citation to Duvall constitutes a reasoned decision because the California Supreme Court and Superior Court decisions share common reasoning that does not apply federal law unreasonably.

...