Seegers v. Parker

Decision Date19 October 1970
Docket NumberNo. 50870,50870
Citation241 So.2d 213,256 La. 1039
PartiesSidney A. SEEGERS et al. v. Mary Evelyn PARKER, Treasurer of the State of Louisiana, and William J. Dodd, Superintendent of Education for the State of Louisiana.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Victor A. Sachse, Robert P. Breazeale, Frank P. Simoneaux, Baton Rouge, for appellants.

A. Leon Hebert, Baton Rouge, Camille F. Gravel, Jr., Alexandria, Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D.C., Thomas A. Rayer, New Orleans, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C., Paul M. Hebert, Baton Rouge, for intervening defendants.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Bailey E. Chaney, Baton Rouge, for appellees.

DECREE

Considering the exigencies of this matter, because we believe that time and the expenditure of public funds require it, and being of the opinion that Acts 223 and 314 of 1970 are unconstitutional, we herewith hand down our decision and decree, the written reasons for which will follow in due course.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Acts 223 and 314 of 1970 are declared unconstitutional.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there be judgment herein in favor of the plaintiffs, Sidney A. Seegers, et al and against the defendants, Mary Evelyn Parker, Treasurer of the State of Louisiana and William J. Dodd, Superintendent of Education for the State of Louisiana, and the defendants are ordered and permanently restrained, from administering, acting under, or expending funds under Acts 223 and 314 of 1970.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pending the finality of this judgment, the said defendants are hereby restrained from expending any funds or doing any act to carry into effect the provisions of said acts.

HAMLIN, J., dissents with written reasons.

SUMMERS, J., dissents for the reasons assigned.

TATE, J., dissents with written reasons.

BARHAM, Justice.

By decree rendered in this case on October 19, 1970, we declared Acts 223 and 314 of 1970 unconstitutional, permanently restrained the state officers from acting in any way to implement these acts, and issued a restraining order, effective immediately, pending the finality of the judgment. Because this matter involves the unconstitutionality of statutes authorizing the expenditure of millions of dollars of public funds, we deemed it to be to the best interest of the state to give a decision at that time without waiting to reduce to writing the reasons which impelled us to that decision. We now hand down the written reasons for our decree.

Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the state, filed this suit attacking Acts 223 and 314 1 of 1970 which authorize the expenditure for this fiscal year of $10,000,000.00 in tax funds 'for the purchase by the State of Louisiana of secular educational services from teachers employed by nonpublic schools'. They sought an injunction restraining the defendants, the State Treasurer and Superintendent of Education, from implementing the legislation by expenditure of funds or other acts. The trial court issued a rule nisi, and the defendants answered, alleging the validity of the legislation. Others, including teachers in non-public schools and taxpayers, intervened. By stipulation documents were made a part of the record and other facts agreed upon. All parties applied to this court for certiorari, and because of the urgent public interest we exercised our plenary powers so that we could review the record and decide the issues.

Act 223 provides that the State Superintendent of Education shall 'Make contracts for the purchase of secular educational services directly with teachers of secular subjects'. It further provides in Section 3: '(c) 'Purchase of Secular Educational Services' means the purchase by the Department of Education, from a school teacher, of services in teaching secular subjects to children enrolled in approved nonpublic schools. Payments shall be made directly to the teacher and such payments shall not exceed the State scale paid to teachers in the public school system'. 'Secular Subject' is any course of study in the curricula of the public schools but not courses of study teaching religious beliefs or any form of worship of a sect or religion. 'Approved Nonpublic School' is defined as a non-profit elementary or secondary school in the state offering education in any grades from one through 12 which complies with the requirements of the compulsory school attendance law and which is supported predominantly 'from funds or property derived from nongovernmental sources'.

Funds to be disbursed for the purchase of secular teachers in non-public schools are to come from a special fund, and funds dedicated to public schools cannot be used to implement the act. If the appropriation to the 'Secular Educational Services Fund' is insufficient to pay the total teacher contracts, then they are to be paid in the proportion to which the total amount of each contract bears to the moneys available in the fund.

The act states that approximately 15 per cent of our grade and elementary school pupils are in non-public schools, and the stipulation states that 69 per cent of the eligible non-public schools in Louisiana are religious-related while 31 per cent are nonreligious in character. The stipulation further reflects that 6756 teachers are eligible for funding, and that the percentage of teachers eligible in religious-related schools is 78 per cent and in non-religious schools 22 per cent.

To summarize, the act provides that the State of Louisiana shall pay qualified teachers of approved non-public schools, largely religious, an amount equal to, but not surpassing, that which teachers with similar qualifications in public schools would receive, but that such payments are to be made for the teaching of only secular subjects.

The thrust of plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of these acts is that the legislation violates Article 1, Section 4; Article 4, Section 8, and Article 12, Section 18, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. 2 They urge that if the court needs to look further, the legislation is in violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3

We have no need to resort to the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution for a determination of the issues before us since our Article 1, Section 4, embodies those provisions in full and expounds upon them in greater detail. Our decision is based exclusively on the application of our Louisiana constitutional provisions.

A bifurcated but inextricably interwoven proposition is presented to the court--aid to religious private schools and aid to nonreligious private schools; and the approach to each issue will be partly overlapping and determinative of the other. We would pose first the question of whether our state Constitution permits the appropriation of public funds to pay the salaries of teachers employed in and by Sectarian schools for the teaching of secular subjects, and permits the establishment of administrative machinery to monitor instructional materials, to formulate and supervise contracts of employment, to disburse funds, and to verify that the teachers' services purchased are free of sectarian religious content.

Our state Constitution contains three prohibitions relating to legislation of the type we are considering: (1) The prohibition against the enactment of any law 'respecting an establishment of religion', (2) the prohibition against the expenditure of any money from public sources, Directly or indirectly, 'in aid' of any religious group or 'in aid' of anyone engaged in the capacity of minister or teacher of such group, and (3) the prohibition against appropriating funds to 'any private or sectarian school'. We are of the opinion that the present acts violate all of these Louisiana constitutional prohibitions.

The prohibition of Article 1, Section 4, against the enactment of laws 'respecting an establishment of religion' forbids not only the full establishment of a religion or religions, but also prohibits legislative action either advancing or inhibiting religion. 4 The great similarity of the establishment clause of our Constitution and that of the United States Constitution allows us to use the United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal clause as an aid for interpreting our own.

Two United States Supreme Court cases are relevant to a determination of the constitutionality of these acts under our establishment clause. The first is Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), which reviewed the constitutionality of refunding bus fare to parents of children in non-public schools. The court stated that there was every reason to give to the clause prohibiting the establishment of religion the same broad interpretation previously employed by state courts in interpreting their state establishment clauses. The court in Everson held that the clause meant, at least, that: '* * * Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force non influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. * * *' (Emphasis here and elsewhere has...

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11 cases
  • Polk v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 20 Agosto 1993
    ...similar action to expedite the conclusion of important litigation see Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 (La.1975); Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So.2d 313 (1970); State ex rel. Le Blanc v. Democratic State Central Committee, 229 La. 556, 86 So.2d 192 With minor variations, the plaintif......
  • Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd.
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 2 Diciembre 1974
    ...apparent that the Louisiana Act is broader in scope and more embracing in its curative effects than the federal act. Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So.2d 213 (1970) and Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963) have held that the decisions of federal courts interpreting federal......
  • Bates v. Edwards
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • 3 Abril 1974
    ... ... Under the authority of Article 7, § 10, Louisiana Constitution of 1921 we granted writs and ordered the record up. See Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So.2d 213 (1970). Because an election is pending and because of the importance to the State as a whole, this memorandum ... ...
  • State v. Forbs
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • 23 Abril 2008
    ... ... Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So.2d 213 (1970); Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (La.1963). However, "[w]hile decisions of federal appellate ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Referenda, initiatives, and state constitutional no-aid clauses.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 76 No. 4, June - June 2013
    • 22 Junio 2013
    ...with modifications. Elbe, 372 N.W.2d at 117. That second program was found unconstitutional. Id. at 118. (167) See Seegers v. Parker, 241 So. 2d 213, 216 (La. 1970) (noting that the use of public funds to pay for secular instruction in religious schools violated the state's no-aid (168) Har......

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