Seeley v. LaRosa
| Decision Date | 02 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 17369,17369 |
| Citation | 179 W.Va. 476,370 S.E.2d 132 |
| Parties | Margaret L. SEELEY, et al. v. James LaROSA, et al., Buckhannon Coal Corp., etc., and Enoxy Coal Co., Inc. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
133 Syllabus by the Court
"One who seeks to assert title to a tract of land under the doctrine of adverse possession must prove each of the following elements for the requisite statutory period: (1) That he has held the tract adversely or hostilely; (2) That the possession has been actual; (3) That it has been open and notorious (sometimes stated in the cases as visible and notorious); (4) That possession has been exclusive; (5) That possession has been continuous; (6) That possession has been under claim of title or color of title." Syl. Pt. 3, Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., 160 W.Va. 84, 232 S.E.2d 524 (1977).
Joseph A. Noggy, Buckhannon, for Margaret L. Seeley, et al.
Frank E. Simmerman, Jr., Clarksburg, for James LaRosa, et al., Buckhannon Coal Corp. etc., and Enoxy Coal Co. Inc., defendant below appellees.
In 1962, James and Emilia LaRosa conveyed a large tract of land in Upshur County, West Virginia to Buckhannon Coal Corporation, a corporation in which Mr. LaRosa was a principal. On August 5, 1966, Mr. LaRosa conveyed to Mrs. Margaret Seeley for $1,200 a surface tract of 7.972 acres derived from the same parcel of land he had conveyed to Buckhannon Coal Company. The deed contained covenants of general warranty. Presumably Mr. LaRosa intended to convey the property in the name of Buckhannon Coal Corporation and surrender its interest in the surface tract of that acreage. 1 The 1967 county tax assessment book reveals that this tract was removed from the Buckhannon Coal Corporation's assessment at that time and assessed against the Seeleys. Since 1967, the Seeleys have paid taxes and have lived openly on the property.
Because Mr. LaRosa conveyed the land in question as an individual rather than as an officer of the Buckhannon Coal Corporation, a title dispute arose between the Seeleys on one side and Mr. LaRosa and Buckhannon Coal Corporation on the other. Despite repeated requests on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Seeley that the technical defect in their title be corrected, the defendants have refused to grant the Seeleys a clear title to the property. 2
On March 23, 1983, the Seeleys filed suit in the Circuit Court of Upshur County to quiet title to the property claiming that they had perfected their title to the property through adverse possession. In the alternative the petitioners asked the court to compensate them for the consideration that they paid to James and Emilia LaRosa for the purchase of the property ($1,200) and $35,000 for lost profits that the plaintiffs would have realized on the sale of the property had Mr. LaRosa conveyed to them clear title as he had warranted. At the circuit court's request, both parties submitted briefs on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs could not obtain ownership of the real estate through adverse possession and that plaintiffs' claim for breach of warranty and damages must fail under W.Va.Code, 55-2-1 [1923] 3 because ten years had passed before they asserted their claim. Thus, the plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations from bringing the action. The plaintiffs asserted that W.Va.Code, 55-2-1 [1923], relied upon by the defendants, rather, should be used to bar any counterclaim by the defendants. The plaintiffs further asserted that there were material facts and circumstances that should be presented to a jury to determine whether there was valid adverse possession. After reviewing the parties' arguments, the circuit court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On appeal to this Court the plaintiffs assert that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in granting the motion for summary judgment.
I
The doctrine of adverse possession is founded upon the legislative desire to settle land titles and is made manifest by the statute of limitations which bars the right to recover real property. Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., 160 W.Va. 84, 232 S.E.2d 524 (1977); Porter v. Staley, 99 W.Va. 91, 127 S.E. 911 (1925); Riffle v. Skinner, 67 W.Va. 75, 67 S.E. 1075 (1910). To acquire title by adverse possession, property must be held openly, notoriously, and under color of title for a period equal to the statute of limitations for recovery of real property, which at the present time is ten years. W.Va.Code, 55-2-1 [1923].
The doctrine of adverse possession is firmly established in our property law and accompanies W.Va.Code, 55-2-1 [1923]. Adverse possession enables one who has been in possession of a piece of real property for more than ten years to bring an action asserting that he is now the owner of that piece of property even when title rests in another. The elements of adverse possession were set out in syllabus point 3 of Somon v. Murphy Fabrication & Erection Co., supra:
"One who seeks to assert title to a tract of land under the doctrine of adverse possession must prove each of the following elements for the requisite statutory period: (1) That he has held the tract adversely or hostilely; (2) That the possession has been actual; (3) That it has been open and notorious (sometimes stated in the cases as visible and notorious); (4) That possession has been exclusive; (5) That possession has been continuous; (6) That possession has been under claim of title or color of title."
See also, Bitonti v. Kauffeld Co., 94 W.Va. 752, 120 S.E. 908 (1923); Wilson v. Braden, 56 W.Va. 372, 49 S.E. 409 (1904); Heavner v. Morgan, 41 W.Va. 428, 23 S.E. 874 (1895); Core v. Faupel, 24 W.Va. 238 (1884).
The circuit court ruled that the Seeleys' adverse possession claim failed as a matter of law on the first element of the doctrine as they could not show that their possession of the property was hostile to the right of the true owner.
In Somon, supra, 232 S.E.2d at 528 we explained how one meets the "hostile" element of adverse possession:
See also, Core v. Faupel, supra.
Appellees assert that the Seeleys clearly recognized the title of the true owners because their letters to the LaRosas sought to have the true owners convey proper title to the Seeleys. 4 Appellees assert that these letters were admissions by the plaintiffs that they were attempting to obtain ownership of the property by a new deed. Therefore, the Seeleys were acknowledging the true owners' title and failed to meet the "hostile" element. We dis...
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