Segal v. Wainwright, 44664

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Citation: 304 So.2d 446
• Docket Number: No. 44664,44664
• Parties: Steven Alan SEGAL, Petitioner, v. L. L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 11 December 1974

Page 446

304 So.2d 446 Steven Alan SEGAL, Petitioner,
v.
L. L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent. No. 44664. Supreme Court of Florida. Dec. 11, 1974.

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Steven Alan Segal, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

DEKLE, Justice.

By way of petition for writ of mandamus, petitioner seeks credit on a prison sentence for time served in jail while awaiting trial on unrelated charges. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla.Const.

Petitioner was charged by information with robbery on Jan. 30, 1967, and was arrested the following day. On October 10, 1967, he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery, and on Feb. 6, 1968, he was sentenced on that charge to a term of not less than 6 months nor more than 5 years. He was paroled on Nov. 10, 1970, but was arrested on Jan. 4, 1971, for receiving stolen property and for unauthorized use of credit cards; he was convicted of this charge on March 9, 1971, and sentenced to one year. On April 13, 1971, a warrant for this parole violation was issued; parole revocation hearing was held on Sept. 15, 1971, and on Nov. 9, 1971, the parole was revoked. On expiration of his 1-year sentence resulting from the conviction of March 9, 1971, petitioner was returned to the State's custody for completion of his initial robbery sentence of 1968. On March 1, 1972, he was placed on parole until Dec. 18, 1972, but he was arrested for robbery on April 7, 1972, and convicted on Sept. 6, 1972; he received a 9-year sentence. On Oct. 2, 1972, a warrant for parole violation was issued, resulting in parole revocation on Oct. 20, 1972.

It is respondent's contention that petitioner will not have completed service of the sentence (which was for a period of not more than 5 years) imposed on Feb. 6, 1968, until after completion of the subsequent 9-year sentence imposed on Sept. 6, 1972, despite the fact that petitioner has been actually 'free' on parole for only about 4 months since his arrest on Jan. 31, 1967, and despite the teachings of State v. Coleman, 149 Fla. 28, 5 So.2d 60 (Fla.1941); Adams v. Wainwright, 275 So.2d 235 (Fla.1973); Brumit v. Wainwright, 290 So.2d 39 (Fla.1973).

Inasmuch as we have not been presented with copies of underlying decuments such as the sentencing orders, it is impossible for us to determine whether petitioner was granted credit on his sentences, or any of them, for time served in jail while awaiting sentencing, as is authorized by F.S. § 921.161. ¹ For the same reason, we cannot tell whether the subsequent sentences imposed on March 9, 1971, and Sept. 6, 1972, were to run consecutively to the sentence of Feb. 6, 1968, and to each other (for a maximum total sentence on the three convictions of 15 years), or were to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on Feb. 6, 1968. F.S. § 921.16 would make these sentences consecutive unless otherwise ordered by the trial court, ² but we have not been provided with copies of the sentencing orders to enable us to determine

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whether the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on Feb. 6, 1968. Although the lack of such information renders a proper disposition of the case more difficult, we have sufficient information upon which to resolve the issue raised here.

The most striking feature of this case, as reflected above, is respondent's apparent disregard of our oft-repeated holdings that a prisoner is entitled to pay his debt to society in one...