Seguin v. Bexar Appraisal Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 04–11–00337–CV.,04–11–00337–CV.
• Parties: Bobby and Joyce SEGUIN, Appellants v. BEXAR APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appraisal Review Board, and Michael Amezquita, Individually, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

373 S.W.3d 699

Bobby and Joyce SEGUIN, Appellants

v.BEXAR APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appraisal Review Board, and Michael Amezquita, Individually, Appellees.

No. 04–11–00337–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

May 16, 2012.

Allan K. DuBois, Laura A. Cavaretta, Cavaretta, Katona & Francis, PLLC, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.

Charles S. Frigerio, Law Offices of Charles S. Frigerio, P.C., San Antonio, TX, Peter William Low, Law Office of Peter William Low, Sandra Griffin, Carol Barton, Christopher S. Jackson, Robert A. Mott, Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins & Mott, L.L.P., Austin, TX, for Appellee.

Sitting: KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, SANDEE BRYAN MARION, Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.

OPINION

Opinion by: KAREN ANGELINI, Justice.

Having discovered that Bobby Seguin was no longer a Texas resident, the Bexar Appraisal District removed the disabled veteran tax exemption from property owned by Bobby Seguin and his wife. The Seguins appeal the trial court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the Bexar Appraisal District, the Appraisal Review Board, and Chief Appraiser Michael Amezquita. The following issues are presented in this appeal:

(1) Does the tax exemption for disabled veterans under section 11.22 of the Texas Tax Code apply to non-resident disabled veterans?

(2) Does the Texas Constitution's provision regarding the disabled veteran tax exemption create a vested property right?

(3) Is section 11.22 unconstitutional because the Texas Legislature had no authority to limit the exemption to disabled veterans who are residents of Texas?

(4) Does section 11.22 violate Bobby Seguin's equal protection rights?

(5) Does section 11.22 violate Bobby Seguin's due process rights?

(6) Are the District and Amezquita equitably estopped from removing the disabled veteran exemption from the Seguins' property?

(7) Can the Seguins bring non-tax code claims?

(8) Should the trial court have granted summary judgment on claims against Amezquita in his individual capacity?

We affirm.

Background

Bobby Seguin is a 100% permanently disabled U.S. Army veteran, certified as such under the criteria used by the United States Veterans Administration. In 1983, Bobby and his wife Joyce purchased the home located at 6102 Topcroft in San Antonio, Texas. In 1984, Bobby applied for and obtained a disabled veteran exemption from taxation of a portion of the assessed value of the property as provided for by section 11.22 of the Texas Tax Code. In 1990, Bobby moved to Alabama and has been a resident there since. As his disability ratings increased, he applied for and obtained increased exemptions from the Bexar Appraisal District. Some of these increases were obtained after he moved to Alabama and were effectuated by correspondence to and from the District through the mail.

In 2009, under the direction and supervision of Chief Appraiser Amezquita, the District conducted a review of exemptions, looking for property accounts with exemptions where the owner's mailing address differed from the subject property's address. On February 24, 2009, the District sent the Seguins a letter requesting information and an explanation as to why they had a mailing address different from their parcel at 6102 Topcroft. On March 16, 2009, the Seguins responded in a letter, stating that they relocated to Alabama in 1990 and that their disabled niece lived at the 6102 Topcroft home. On March 18, 2009, the District sent the Seguins a letter notifying them of the removal of the disabled veteran exemption for the tax years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, because Bobby Seguin was no longer a resident of Texas. On April 2, 2009, the Seguins filed their notice of protest and requested a hearing before the Appraisal Review Board. On May 19, 2009, the Seguins' hearing before the Board was held by affidavit. On June 12, 2009, the Seguins received the Board's order, which denied their protest and affirmed the District's decision to remove the disabled veteran exemption for tax years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. On July 10, 2009, the Seguins filed their original petition for review against the District and the Board (collectively “the District”). On July 8, 2010, the Seguins filed their second amended petition, adding Chief Appraiser Michael M. Amezquita in his individual and official capacities “for unauthorized, unlawful, and/or ultra vires violations of law in unilaterally removing [the Seguins'] disabled veteran's exemption for five years, and reinstating [the] property on the tax rolls at full appraised value.”

The Seguins and the District filed competing motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the Seguins' motion and granted the District's motion. Amezquita also filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that he is not a required party, is not a proper party in his individual capacity, and is entitled to official and qualified immunity. He also argued that the Seguins' constitutional claims are prohibited. In its order granting Amezquita's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that Amezquita was acting within the scope of his authority as the chief appraiser pursuant to section 11.43(i) of the Texas Tax Code and is therefore entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. Thus, the trial court granted Amezquita's motion and ordered that the Seguins take nothing in the claims against him in his individual capacity. In the same order, the trial court denied the Seguins' motion for summary judgment against Amezquita. The Seguins appeal, arguing that the trial court should have granted their motion for summary judgment and denied the District's and Amezquita's motions for summary judgment.

Disabled Veteran Tax Exemption

The Seguins argue that Bobby Seguin need not be a Texas resident in order to receive the disabled veteran tax exemption under section 11.22 of the Texas Tax Code. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo. Galbraith Eng'g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.2009). Our primary objective in construing statutes is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. In ascertaining legislative intent, if the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we apply them according to their plain and common meaning. Id. If the plain language of a statute does not convey the legislature's apparent intent, we may resort to additional construction aids, such as the objective of the law, the legislative history, the common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subject, and the consequences of a particular construction. Id. at 867–68;see alsoTex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.023(1), (3), (5) (West 2005) (allowing a court to consider the objective of the statute, legislative history, and the consequences of a proposed construction). Further, “we must always consider the statute as a whole rather than its isolated provisions.” Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex.2001). “We should not give one provision a meaning out of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions, although it may be susceptible to such a construction standing alone.” Id.

Additionally, in Texas, exemptions from taxation are not favored in the law and will not be favorably construed. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 804 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex.1991); Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Wilkinson, 317 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). “Statutory exemptions from taxation are subject to strict construction because they undermine equality and uniformity by placing a greater burden on some taxpaying businesses and individuals rather than placing the burden on all taxpayers equally.” N. Alamo Water, 804 S.W.2d at 899. Accordingly, the burden of proof of clearly showing that an individual falls within the statutory exemption is on the claimant. See id.

B. Disabled Veterans Exemption as Provided by Section 11.22 of the Texas Tax Code

Section 11.22 provides the following:

(a) A disabled veteran is entitled to an exemption from taxation of a portion of the assessed value of a property the veteran owns and designates as provided by Subsection (f) in accordance with the following schedule....

(b) A disabled veteran is entitled to an exemption from taxation of $12,000 of the assessed value of a property the veteran owns and designates as provided by Subsection (f) of this section if the veteran: (1) is 65 years of age or older and has a disability rating of at least 10 percent; (2) is totally blind in one or both eyes; or (3) has lost the use of one or more limbs.

(c) If a disabled veteran who is entitled to an exemption by Subsection (a) or (b) of this section dies, the veteran's surviving spouse is entitled to an exemption from taxation of a portion of the assessed value of a property the spouse owns and designates as provided by Subsection (f) of this section. The amount of the exemption is the amount of the veteran's exemption at time of death. The spouse is entitled to an exemption by this subsection only for as long as the spouse remains unmarried. If the spouse does not survive the veteran, each of the veteran's surviving children who is younger than 18 years of age and unmarried is entitled to an exemption from taxation of a portion of the assessed value of a property the child owns and designates as provided by Subsection (f) of this section. The amount of exemption for each eligible child is computed by dividing the amount of the veteran's exemption at time of death by the number of eligible children.

(d) If an individual dies while on active duty as a member of the armed services of the United States: (1) the individual's surviving spouse is entitled to an exemption from taxation of $5,000 of the assessed value of the property the spouse owns and designates as provided by Subsection (f) of this section; and (2) each of the individual's surviving children who is younger than 18...