Seidler v. Municipal Court, B065085

• Decision Date: 27 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. B065085,B065085
• Citation: 12 Cal.App.4th 1229,16 Cal.Rptr.2d 90
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Stanley M. SEIDLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT for the BEVERLY HILLS JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 90

16 Cal.Rptr.2d 90

12 Cal.App.4th 1229

Stanley M. SEIDLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT for the BEVERLY HILLS JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B065085.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 27, 1993.

Lemaire & Faunce and Mark Ellis Singer, Seal Beach, for plaintiff and appellant.

Goldstein & Kennedy and Charles H. Goldstein, Gregory G. Kennedy, Los Angeles, and Caroline McIntyre, Chatsworth, for defendants and respondents.

SPENCER, Presiding Justice.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Stanley M. Seidler appeals from an order of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to plaintiff's first amended complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts as alleged in plaintiff's first amended complaint, which are deemed to be true (Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 746, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728) are as follows: In 1984, the Beverly Hills Municipal Court employed plaintiff as court administrator from a civil service list. While the municipal court was plaintiff's employer, he was paid through the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiff believed he enjoyed certain due process guarantees and protections, pursuant to statute, should he be removed from his position. In 1988, the statutes governing his employment were amended, recategorizing his employment as being at the pleasure of the judges of the municipal court. Plaintiff was not informed that any rights, guarantees or protections previously afforded him were being removed. He did not receive any comparable benefit in exchange for the relinquishment of said rights and protections.

On June 7, 1990, Judge Judith O. Stern, who was presiding over the court for that calendar year and thus acted as plaintiff's supervisor, provided plaintiff with a letter which informed him that he had not fulfilled his duties as court administrator. Accordingly, the judges of the court were terminating his employment effective July 31, 1990. At approximately 4:10 p.m. on June 19, 1990, plaintiff received a letter memorandum delivered by the Los Angeles County Marshall. This document demanded that he turn over his keys and vacate both his office and the courthouse by 5:00 p.m. on that date. He was escorted from the building by deputy marshals.

Before June 7, 1990, plaintiff had received no written notice he was performing his duties unsatisfactorily and could be subject to disciplinary action including dismissal. After June 7, he received no statement in writing of the reasons for his termination.

On June 8, 1990, plaintiff submitted an appeal to the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, protesting the denial of the due process afforded all permanent civil service employees and guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions and the County Charter. He requested a hearing prior to July 31, 1990. On June 27, 1990, the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission determined it did not have jurisdiction over the matter and removed it from its agenda. Plaintiff's employment was terminated on July 31, 1990.

CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to his first amended complaint, in that it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, i.e., whether it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); 5 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 894, p. 333.) The demurrer may be sustained only where the insufficiency of the complaint is revealed on its face. (Id., § 895, at p. 334.) A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint states a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 118, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; Kite v. Campbell (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 793, 804, 191 Cal.Rptr. 363, overruled on other grounds in Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 896, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909.) It may be sustained without leave to amend, however, where "the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists. Obviously no amendment would change the result." (5 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 945, p. 379.)

In sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court concluded plaintiff was not a permanent employee entitled to be discharged only for cause and to the due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard. As plaintiff sees it, that he is a permanent employee is not open to question at this point: he alleges this and, for purposes of demurrer, the allegation must be accepted as true. (Thompson v. County of Alameda, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 746, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728.) However, it is well established that public employment is held by statute rather than by contract, and no public employee has a right to continue that employment contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law. (Miller v. State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 813, 135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970.) Plaintiff alleges he was employed as the court administrator of the Beverly Hills Judicial District and, by virtue of that employment, was a permanent employee with certain fixed rights. If an examination of the pertinent statutes reveals as a matter of law that the court administrator of the Beverly Hills Judicial District is not a "permanent employee" with specific fixed rights, then plaintiff's allegation to the contrary cannot make it so. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the allegation can be ascertained only by statutory construction.

In construing statutes, the duty of the court "is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein...." (Code Civ.Proc., § 1858.) The court must interpret statutes so as to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 12, 177 Cal.Rptr. 325, 634 P.2d 352.) Toward that end, "[w]ords must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.]" (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836.) Where possible, significance should be given to every word and phrase; accordingly, "constructions which render some words surplusage ... are to be avoided." (Ibid.)

Government Code section 72002.1 is among the statutes on which plaintiff relies as establishing that he has the status of a permanent employee entitled to be discharged only for cause and after receiving notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard. Section 72002.1 provides in pertinent part: "In any chartered county in which a system of civil service is in effect, the civil service commission thereof shall administer any civil service provisions made applicable by this code to attaches of municipal courts. [p] Subject to the express provisions of this section and of any other state law, the provisions of the county charter relating to civil service and the rules of the civil service commission adopted pursuant thereto shall be applicable to the said attaches of the municipal courts in the same manner and to the same extent as applicable generally to officers and employees of such county...."

Whether Government Code section 72002.1 applies to the position plaintiff held, that of court administrator, depends on the meaning given the word "attaches." The word is not defined expressly in the code. However, the meaning given the word can be implied from its use in companion statutes. Article 4 of chapter 9 of title 8 of the Government Code specifies the officers and attaches which may be appointed in the municipal court districts of Los Angeles County. The statutes authorize the appointment by the judges of a court administrator "who shall be the clerk" and authorize the court administrator to appoint additional personnel. (Gov.Code, §§ 72750.4-72754.) In municipal court districts of a specified size, the judges may appoint a jury commissioner who shall "hold office at the pleasure of ... the judges." (Id., § 72757.)

The judges may appoint the marshal (Gov.Code, § 72643), who in turn may appoint specified subordinates (id., §§ 72645, 72646); the administrative personnel to be appointed by the marshal are described as "attaches" (id., § 72646). Government Code section 72150 permits the judges to authorize the clerk and marshal of the court to "appoint as many additional deputies as will enable them to promptly and faithfully discharge the duties of their respective offices." After describing the powers and duties of the clerk (id., § 71280) and marshal (id., § 71264), the code turns to those designated "other officers" in article 5 of chapter 8 of title 8 of the Government Code. These include commissioners (id., § 72190), jury commissioners (id., § 72191) and official court reporters (id., § 72194).

Based on all of the foregoing provisions, the logical conclusion is that the clerk (court administrator), marshal, commissioners, jury commissioner and court reporters are officers of the court, while subordinate employees which some of these officers are authorized to appoint are attaches. Since Government Code section 72002.1 applies only to "attaches of municipal courts," it does not apply to the position plaintiff held, which is that of an officer. Hence, this section provides no support for the conclusion plaintiff was a permanent employee with specified fixed rights.

Plaintiff also relies on Government Code section 72608, which in 1983 provided in pertinent part: "Officers and atttaches of municipal courts in Los Angeles County shall be entitled to...