Seigle v. Barry

• Decision Date: 17 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-2046,81-2046
• Parties: Mark S. SEIGLE, personally and as Director, Employee Relations, William T. McFatter, as Superintendent of Schools, and Benjamin F. Stephenson, as Associate Superintendent for Personnel, of the Broward County School Board, Appellants, v. Dr. D. Marshall BARRY and Lawrence E. Jessup, Jr., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 63

422 So.2d 63

Mark S. SEIGLE, personally and as Director, Employee Relations, William T. McFatter, as Superintendent of Schools, and Benjamin F. Stephenson, as Associate Superintendent for Personnel, of the Broward County School Board, Appellants, v. Dr. D. Marshall BARRY and Lawrence E. Jessup, Jr., Appellees.

No. 81-2046.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Nov. 17, 1982.

As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 14, 1982.

Edward J. Marko of Marko, Stephany & Lyons, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Joseph H. Kaplan of Kaplan, Sicking, Hessen, Sugarman, Rosenthal & De Castro, P.A., and Joseph C. Segor, Miami, for appellees.

HERSEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a non-final order in the nature of a mandatory injunction. We have jurisdiction under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(B), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. At the same time appellants seek review of an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint. That order is not properly appealable until after final judgment. Habelow v. Travelers Ins. Co., 389 So.2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Peavy v. Parrish, 385 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See Rule 9.130, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This action was commenced to enforce certain rights under Florida's Public Records Act, Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1981). Appellees, professional economists, are retained by the bargaining unit for several hundred employees of the Broward County School Board to prepare for and engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the School Board. Appellees sought access to certain public records maintained on a computer. The parties stipulated that, without admitting fault under Section 119.10, appellants would permit appellees access to the computer records including copies of computer tapes. None of the 800 programs maintained by appellants could provide the information in the format desired by appellees. To remedy that problem, appellees offered to design and pay for a program that would produce the desired printout or to reimburse appellants for obtaining such a program and running it for appellees. Appellants refused, resulting in this litigation. The issues were presented to the court at a priority hearing provided for by Section 119.11(1). The circuit court ordered appellant to run a new program designed at appellees' expense which would access the computer data banks resulting in a printout of the public records in appellees' desired format. Furthermore, the order determined that appellants were in violation of the statute, despite the stipulation of the parties that fault (violation of the statute, Section 119.10) would be heard and decided at a subsequent hearing.

We reverse that portion of the order finding a violation of the statute because the parties stipulated that this issue would be tried later. We also determine that finding is not supported by substantial competent evidence.

The remaining question is whether there is a right under the Public Records Act to obtain information in a particular format. This is a question of first impression in this as well as any other jurisdiction. That being so, we begin with a short explanation of the computer terminology and principles involved.

A computer is an electronic device consisting of a finite number of on-off switches having the capability of storing vast amounts of information fed into it in a random fashion and is referred to in computer jargon as hardware. A computer program, known as software, is a means of retrieving that information in a specified format and at high speed. When a program is run, the computer produces the information in printed form termed a computer print-out.

Turning to the Public Records Act, we note it is sometimes referred to as a "right to know" law. The Act provides access to any information that is a matter of public record with certain specific and very limited exceptions. The statute defines public records as follows:

[A]ll documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recording or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.

§ 119.011(1), Fla.Stat. (1979). There can be no doubt that information stored on a computer is as much a public record as a written page in a book or a tabulation in a file stored in a filing cabinet. Precedent is scant but supportive. See, e.g., Long v. U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.1979); Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116 (1973); Minnesota Medical Ass'n v. State, 274 N.W.2d 84 (Minn.1978). It is also apparent that all of the information in the computer, not merely that which a particular program accesses, should be available for examination and copying in keeping with the public policy underlying the right to know statutes.

We now confront the more insidious question of whether the public may require information contained in public records to be made available for inspection and copying in a particular format. In the context of pre-computer public records we perceive the answer to this question to be in the negative. If the health department maintains a chronological list of dog-bite incidents with rabies implications the putative plaintiff, bitten by a suspect dog, may not require the health department to reorder that list and furnish a record of incidents segregated by geographical areas. Nothing in the statute, case law or public policy imposes such a burden upon our public officials. Nor may the plaintiff prevail by offering to pay the cost, thus eliminating the objection that the taxpayers money is being spent for individual gain. It would be ludicrous to require public officials to provide such a service when it can be as easily obtained by paying an expert in the private sector to reclassify the information. A contrary rule would not only impose onerous and...