Senzer v. N.Y.S. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct (In re Senzer)

• Decision Date: 23 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 31,31
• Citation: 35 N.Y.3d 216,150 N.E.3d 21,126 N.Y.S.3d 443
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the Hon. Paul H. SENZER, a Justice of the Northport Village Court, Suffolk County. Paul H. Senzer, Petitioner; v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

35 N.Y.3d 216

150 N.E.3d 21

126 N.Y.S.3d 443

In the MATTER OF the Hon. Paul H. SENZER, a Justice of the Northport Village Court, Suffolk County.Paul H. Senzer, Petitioner;

v.New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Respondent.

No. 31

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 23, 2020

Michael H. Blakey, Westhampton Beach, and Long Tuminello, LLP, Bay Shore (Michelle Aulivola and David H. Besso of counsel), for petitioner.

Robert H. Tembeckjian, Albany (Edward Lindner, Mark Le- vine and Brenda Correa of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Petitioner, a Justice of the Northport Village Court, Suffolk County, seeks review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that he committed certain acts of misconduct warranting his removal from office (see N.Y. Const, art VI, § 22 ; Judiciary Law § 44 ). Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the sanction of removal is appropriate and accept the Commission's determined sanction.

Petitioner has been a Justice of the Northport Village Court in Suffolk County, a part time position, since 1994. He is an attorney who, during the relevant time period, also maintained a private law practice. The Commission's formal written complaint alleged, among other things, that petitioner repeatedly used degrading and profane language in communications with his legal clients, whom he represented through his private law practice. The charge against him is based, in large part, on conduct that occurred during his representation of two clients in a Family Court matter against their daughter in which the clients were seeking visitation with their grandchild. Over the course of several months, petitioner sent a series of emails to his clients providing legal advice in which he repeatedly insulted other participants in the legal process, including a litigant, opposing counsel, and the presiding court attorney referee, using vulgar and sexist terms. Among other things, petitioner used an extremely crude gender-based slur to describe opposing counsel. Based on the foregoing conduct, the Commission charged petitioner with violating sections 100.1, 100.2(A) and 100.4(A)(1), (2) and (3) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (the Rules). These sections of the Rules require judges to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary, avoid the appearance of impropriety and conduct their extra-judicial activities in a manner that is not incompatible with, nor detracts from, the dignity of judicial office. After denying petitioner's motion for summary determination or dismissal of the complaint, the Commission designated a Referee to report findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Referee sustained the charge with respect to the language petitioner used in his email communications with his clients, following a hearing at which petitioner admitted writing the emails in question.

The Commission thereafter determined that petitioner repeatedly used "profane, vulgar and sexist terms" in emails to his clients that denigrated participants in the legal proceeding, concluding that the appropriate sanction was removal from office. Beyond acknowledging the clear impropriety of petitioner's language, the Commission reasoned that removal was appropriate because petitioner used the offensive terms while acting as an attorney and providing legal advice to his clients, inextricably connecting his misconduct to the judicial system. The Commission also noted that petitioner's use of a gender-based slur was particularly concerning because such words "denigrate a woman's worth and abilities and convey an appearance of gender bias." In this Court, petitioner does not dispute the Commission's factual findings and acknowledges that his written communications violated the Rules. He instead contends that his misconduct, occurring in "private" communications, does not warrant removal from office, and urges us to reject the Commission's sanction.

The purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is to impose sanctions where needed to protect the bench from unfit incumbents (see Matter of Esworthy, 77 N.Y.2d 280, 283, 567 N.Y.S.2d 390, 568 N.E.2d 1195 [1991] ). We recognize that "[r]emoval is an extreme sanction" that is appropriate "only in the event of truly egregious circumstances" ( Matter of O'Connor [New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct ], 32 N.Y.3d 121, 127, 87 N.Y.S.3d 140, 112 N.E.3d 317 [2018] [citation omitted] ), which we measure "with due regard to the fact that Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large" ( Matter of Tamsen, 100 N.Y.2d 19, 21, 759 N.Y.S.2d 435, 789 N.E.2d 613 [2003] [citation omitted] ). In determining the appropriate sanction, we must also consider the effect of the misconduct "upon public confidence in [the Judge's] character and judicial temperament" ( id. at 21–22, 759 N.Y.S.2d 435, 789 N.E.2d 613 [citation omitted] ). Thus, removal is warranted where a judge exhibits "a pattern of injudicious behavior ... which cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one holding judicial office" ( O'Connor, 32 N.Y.3d at 127–128, 87 N.Y.S.3d 140, 112 N.E.3d 317 [citation omitted] ). Whether a judge's behavior warrants removal is a fact-specific inquiry, as judicial disciplinary cases are necessarily sui generis (see id. at 128, 87 N.Y.S.3d 140, 112 N.E.3d 317 ).

Here, petitioner's statements were manifestly vulgar and offensive, and his repeated use of such language in written communications to insult and demean others involved in the legal process showed a pervasive disrespect for the system, conveyed a perception of disdain for the legal system, and indicated that he is unable to maintain the high standard of conduct we demand of judges. Petitioner repeatedly denigrated a litigant, opposing counsel, and the presiding court attorney referee while acting as an officer of the court representing...