Thompson v. N.Y. Office of Court Admin.

• Decision Date: 19 December 2022
• Docket Number: Index No. 510995/22
• Citation: 181 N.Y.S.3d 858
• Parties: Hon. Harriet L. THOMPSON, Petitioner, v. The State of New York OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION ; Hon. Lawrence K. Marks, Chief Administrative Judge; and Hon. Deborah Kaplan, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, Respondents, and Hon. Carol R. Edmead, Acting Surrogate Judge, Nominal Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

181 N.Y.S.3d 858

Hon. Harriet L. THOMPSON, Petitioner,

v.The State of New York OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION ; Hon. Lawrence K. Marks, Chief Administrative Judge; and Hon. Deborah Kaplan, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, Respondents, and Hon. Carol R. Edmead, Acting Surrogate Judge, Nominal Respondent.

Index No. 510995/22

Supreme Court, Kings County, New York.

Decided on December 19, 2022

Counsel for petitioner: Matthew L. Berman, Valli Kane & Vagnini LLP, 600 Old Country Road, Suite 519 Garden City, New York 11530

Counsel for respondents: Anthony R. Perri, Acting Counsel, by Pedro Morales, Of Counsel, Office of Court Administration, New York State Unified Court System, 25 Beaver Street, Floor 11 New York, New York 10004

Karen B. Rothenberg, J.

Petitioner Hon. Harriet L. Thompson applies, pursuant to CPLR article 78, for a judgment declaring, among other things, that respondents, The State of New York Office of Court Administration (OCA), Hon. Lawrence K. Marks, (now former) Chief Administrative Judge (CAJ Marks), and Hon. Deborah Kaplan, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge (DCAJ Kaplan) (collectively referred to as the OCA Respondents) did not have legal authority to "suspend" petitioner and appoint nominal respondent, Hon. Carol Edmead, Acting Surrogate Judge, to assume her duties as surrogate.

Background

Petitioner primarily contends that CAJ Marks had no authority to suspend her from exercising her duties and responsibilities as surrogate. Petitioner was elected to a 14-year term as a Judge of the Surrogate's Court in the County of Kings in November 2018 and assumed office on January 1, 2019. On December 17, 2021, CAJ Marks issued an administrative order stating:

"Pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby direct that: (1) all judicial matters currently pending before the Honorable Harriet L Thompson, Judge of the Surrogate's Court, Kings County, shall be reassigned to such other judge or judges as the Honorable Deborah Kaplan, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for New York City Courts, shall direct; (2) no additional judicial matters shall be assigned to Judge Thompson until further order; and (3) Judge Thompson shall surrender all keys, access cards and other means of entry to UCS courts and facilities, as well as any UCS-provided computer or other equipment in her custody or control."

Following this order, DCAJ Kaplan issued an administrative order, dated December 20, 2021, designating nominal respondent, Hon. Carol Edmead, as an Acting Surrogate of Kings County.¹

In her verified petition, petitioner outlines an ongoing dispute she had with the Kings County Public Administrator (KCPA) that, among other things, led petitioner to issue an order suspending the KCPA from taking any action with respect to any of her pending or new cases in the inventory assigned to the KCPA and directing that the Deputy Kings County Public Administrator assume the handling of those matters. According to petitioner, this dispute with the KCPA led to meetings with the (now former) Chief Judge Janet DeFiore and (now former) CAJ Marks and a later meeting attended by CAJ Marks, (now former) Surrogate Margarita Lopez-Torres, the other Kings County Surrogate, and other OCA staff. This dispute resulted in a CPLR article 78 proceeding brought against petitioner by the KCPA (Matter of Buckheit v Thompson , Supreme Court, Kings County Index No. 517574/20; see Matter of Buckheit v. Thompson , 73 Misc. 3d 1201[A], 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 50889[U], 2021 WL 4270287 [Sup. Ct., Kings Count 2021] ). Petitioner asserts that her actions with regard to the KCPA fell within her statutory authority as surrogate, were justified under the circumstances, and provided no grounds for CAJ Marks suspending her by way of the administrative order dated December 17, 2021.

In opposing the petition, CAJ Marks submits an affidavit in which he asserts that he had authority to issue the order based upon the New York State Constitution, statutes and court rules, and avers that the order was justified by complaints made from others regarding petitioner's conduct as surrogate. CAJ Marks makes no assertion that petitioner's dispute with the KCPA played a direct role in the decision to suspend petitioner.² Rather, CAJ Marks asserts that on December 3, 2021, he received a report of an investigation conducted by the New York State Unified Court System Office of the Inspector General (Inspector General) in which the Inspector General documented statements made by petitioner in the presence of court staff that contained demeaning references to the sexual orientation of court administrators and the judiciary, to the competence and physical appearance of members of the judiciary, to the physical appearance of court employees, and to the character of judges, attorneys and court users based on their membership in a particular ethnic group. In view of the assertions contained in the report, CAJ Marks instructed the Inspector General to refer the matter to the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Such matter was referred to the Commission on December 17, 2021. CAJ Marks anticipates that the Commission's investigation of the complaint against petitioner could take up to two years.

Petitioner, in her own affidavit submitted in reply, asserts that, during the course of the above noted investigation by the Inspector General, she learned that the investigation was based on a complaint from a former member of the Law Department in Surrogate's Court and a letter from her former secretary. Petitioner, while not denying that these persons may have made the above noted accusations, and while conceding some specific statements petitioner made regarding her religion and religious faith, categorically denies the truth of the accusations. According to the petitioner, the Inspector General disregarded evidence petitioner provided during the course of the investigation that establishes that the allegations against her are spurious and unsupported.

Discussion

Although the OCA Respondents deny that the administrative orders effectuate a suspension of petitioner, in view of the fact that the orders reassigned petitioner's caseload, preclude her from being assigned new cases, bar her from accessing her work computers and equipment, and bar her from the non-public areas of the court premises, the orders did, in effect, suspend petitioner from her office of Surrogate, albeit with pay. At issue here is whether CAJ Marks and DCAJ Kaplan had the authority to issue the respective administrative orders pending a determination by the Commission.

The OCA Respondents primarily argue that their authority to issue the orders is implicit in the broad supervisory authority over the court system granted to the Chief Judge and delegated to the Chief Administrator by the Constitution, the Judiciary Law and Court Rules and the express grant of authority in these provisions with respect to judicial assignments. In this regard, NY Constitution article VI, § 28 (a) provides that the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is the chief judicial officer of the Unified Court System who appoints a Chief Administrator of the courts to serve at his or her pleasure. NY Constitution article VI, § 28 (b) provides that "[t]he chief administrator, on behalf of the chief judge, shall supervise the administration and operation of the unified court system. In the exercise of such responsibility, the chief administrator of the courts shall have such powers and duties as may be delegated to him or her by the chief judge and such additional powers and duties as may be provided by law." The Constitution also expressly grants the Chief Administrator the authority to temporarily assign supreme court justices to the surrogate's court in the City of New York and to temporarily assign a New York City Surrogate to certain other courts ( NY Const art VI, § 26 [a], [d], [i], [k]). Judiciary Law §§ 210, 211 and 212 essentially repeat and add detail regarding the powers and duties of the Chief Judge and Chief Administrator required by NY Constitution article VI, § 28. Section 212, among other things, provides that the Chief Administrator shall "[e]stablish the hours, terms and parts of court, assign judges and justices to them, and make necessary rules therefor" ( Judiciary Law § 212 [1] [c] ; see also Judiciary Law § 212 [2] [c] ), may hold hearings and conduct investigations ( Judiciary Law § 212 [1] [h] ), and can "[d]o all other things necessary and convenient to carry out his [or her] functions, powers and duties" ( Judiciary Law § 212 [1] [t] ). The Chief Judge's delegation of the function and duty to assign judges is likewise repeated in Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR) §§ 33.0, and 80.1 (b) (2).

In view of these constitutional and statutory provisions, courts recognize that the general administrative powers of the Chief Administrator are quite broad (see Corkum v. Bartlett , 46 N.Y.2d 424, 429-430, 414 N.Y.S.2d 98, 386 N.E.2d 1066 [1979] ; see also People v. Correa , 15 N.Y.3d 215, 224-226 [2010]; Matter of Scoralick v. Milonas , 207 A.D.2d 159, 160-161, 621 N.Y.S.2d 407 [3d Dept. 1995], lv dismissed 85 N.Y.2d 967, 629 N.Y.S.2d 725, 653 N.E.2d 621 [1995] and lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 707, 632 N.Y.S.2d 500, 656 N.E.2d 599 [1995] ; Matter of Bloom v. Crosson , 183 A.D.2d 341, 344-345, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328 [3d Dept. 1992], affd for the reasons stated below 82 N.Y.2d 768, 603 N.Y.S.2d 991, 624 N.E.2d 175 [1993] ). Courts also recognize the broad administrative authority of the Chief Administrator relating to the temporary assignment of judges to different courts and the assignment of cases to the judges in view of the overall needs of the courts (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. LeTennier , 189 A.D.3d 2022, 2025, 139 N.Y.S.3d 673 [3d Dept. 2020] ; Caffrey v. North Arrow Abstract & Settlement Servs., Inc. , 160 A.D.3d 121, 131-133, 73 N.Y.S.3d 70 [2d Dept. 2018] ; Schwartz v. Williams , 124 A.D.2d 798, 799, 508 N.Y.S.2d 521 [2d Dept. 1986]...