Sergeant Bluff-Luton Ed. Ass'n v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School Dist.

• Decision Date: 29 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 62604,BLUFF-LUTON,62604
• Citation: 282 N.W.2d 144
• Parties: 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2247 SERGEANTEDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Lorraine Stodden and Lois Moore, Appellants, v. SERGEANTCOMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 144

282 N.W.2d 144

103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2247

SERGEANT BLUFF-LUTON EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Lorraine Stodden and Lois Moore, Appellants, v. SERGEANT BLUFF-LUTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 62604.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Aug. 29, 1979.

Charles E. Gribble, of Dreher, Wilson, Adams & Jensen, Des Moines, for appellants.

Gerald M. Kraai, of Shull, Marshall & Marks, Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK and LARSON, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

The Sergeant Bluff-Luton Education Association and teachers Lorraine Stodden and Lois Moore appeal from an equity decree of the district court refusing to enforce an arbitrator's ruling which had ordered the district to advance these individual teachers on the salary schedule incorporated in a collective bargaining contract. This action is brought pursuant to our Public Employment Relations Act, chapter 20, The Code 1977. We reverse the trial court and order the arbitrator's award enforced, but affirm as to the appellants' request for attorney's fees.

The teachers association is an "employee organization" certified under section 20.15 to represent teachers of the district in collective bargaining. The teachers filed a grievance alleging an erroneous interpretation or application of the agreement by the district in that the agreement prescribed salary levels for employees based upon all years of experience and educational achievement and teachers Moore and Stodden were not being paid accordingly. As the final step in the grievance process, the teachers invoked arbitration. The provision of the collective bargaining agreement dealing with arbitration states, in part:

The arbitrator shall not amend, modify, nullify, or add to the provisions of this agreement. The arbitrator's decision will be final and binding upon both parties unless he/she has exceeded the authority as listed above.

This provision is consistent with the statutory authorization for grievance procedures, section 20.18, which provides in part:

Negotiated procedures may provide for binding arbitration of public employee grievances and of disputes over the interpretation and application of existing agreements. An arbitrator's decision on a grievance may not change or amend the terms, conditions or applications of the collective bargaining agreement.

The arbitrator found in favor of the teachers, ordering their advancement on the salary schedule and ordering additional pay retroactive to April 29, 1977, the date on which the arbitrator found they first discovered they were "incorrectly placed" on the salary schedule. The district refused to abide by the arbitrator's decision; the association and teachers thereupon brought an action in equity to "enforce" the arbitrator's award, with interest, and to recover attorney's fees from the district. The district court refused to enforce the arbitrator's decision.

The posture of this case raises several issues. (1) Is there a cognizable action under our law to "enforce" an arbitrator's decision; (2) what is the scope of judicial review; (3) is the award here enforceable; and (4) are attorney's fees allowable in this action as part of the court costs?

I. Action to enforce the agreement. The petition in district court, filed in equity, states the action is brought "to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement And an arbitrator's award and is brought pursuant to section 20.17(6), Code of Iowa (1977)." (Emphasis added.) The reference to subparagraph (6) was apparently intended to be to subparagraph (5), which provides:

Terms of any collective bargaining agreement may be enforced by a civil action in the district court of the county in which the agreement was made upon the initiative of either party.

This statute provides for an action to enforce an "agreement;" it does not provide express authority to enforce an arbitrator's award. The absence of language in the statute to permit enforcing or vacating an arbitrator's award is significant because courts have traditionally regarded the arbitration process as an infringement upon their role as decision-makers. This court has, in fact, held agreements to submit to arbitration unenforceable. See e. g., Prader v. National Masonic Accident Association, 95 Iowa 149, 161, 63 N.W. 601, 605 (1895) ("(A) general provision by which the parties to an agreement in terms bind themselves to submit to arbitration all matters of dispute which may thereafter arise, and making the arbitration final, will not deprive the courts of their appropriate jurisdiction, nor be enforced by them."). See also Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317, 325 (Iowa 1977) and County of Jefferson v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Iowa 1979) (recognizes unfavorable common-law view of executory arbitration agreements). The United States Supreme Court, as late as 1957, indicated that some doubt existed whether federal substantive law would permit enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate, absent statutory authority. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456, n.7, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 980 (1957). In view of that background and the lack of specific language in Section 20.17(5) on the enforceability of arbitration awards, it could be argued that this section was not meant to authorize such an action. However, we conclude this section provides a basis for an action to enforce or vacate an arbitrator's award for two reasons.

First, this is consistent with the interpretation given by federal courts to a similar federal statute. "(J)udicial interpretations of identical or equivalent statutory language in other jurisdictions are entitled to unusual respect and deference and will usually be followed if sound, reasonable, and in harmony with justice and public policy." Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1978). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185, provides that:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States . . . .

This section was held to provide statutory authority in the federal courts to compel specific performance of collective bargaining agreements in Textile Workers Union. It has also been used to seek enforcement or vacation of arbitrators' awards. See, e. g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (suit by union to enforce award by arbitrator); Fabricut, Inc. v. Tulsa General Drivers Local 523, 597 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1979) (suit by employer under section 301 to set aside arbitrator's ruling; ruling held binding).

Second, this interpretation of section 20.17(5) more clearly effectuates the legislative policy favoring arbitration and gives effect to the procedure for which the parties have bargained. The General Assembly's favorable view of arbitration is evident from the P.E.R. Act. Not only does it authorize binding arbitration of grievances, it also provides for binding arbitration of negotiation impasses. See S 20.22(1).

II. Scope of review of arbitrator's award. In determining the proper extent of judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards under our new P.E.R. Act, it is again appropriate to consider the federal practice. The Labor Management Relations Act states the arbitration process is to be favored in resolving labor-management disputes. Section 203(d) of that act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), provides:

(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.

In recognition of that philosophy, the United States Supreme Court adopted a narrow scope of judicial involvement in the process in the Steelworkers trilogy. ¹ Citing the trilogy's Enterprise Wheel case, we have said that "(t)he function of the courts is strictly limited to a determination of the arbitrator's authority and the existence of an arbitrable dispute. Ordinarily courts may not inquire into the merits of the decision itself." Teamsters Local 394 v. Associated Grocers of Iowa Cooperative, Inc., 263 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Iowa 1978). The Teamsters case and the Steelworkers trilogy all involved private-sector contracts. However, we have alluded to the same concept in a prior P.E.R.A. case, West Des Moines Community School District v. West Des Moines Educational Support Personnel, 265 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 1978) (per curiam), where we said that "it is clear the arbitrator merely interpreted the (collective bargaining) contract in a way the school district would not and in a manner we might not. But this does not render the arbitrator's interpretation an alteration."

Despite the fact there is no equivalent of the forceful statement in the federal statute favoring arbitration, we conclude this was the intent of the P.E.R.A. provision for binding arbitration. There are several reasons to favor a broad scope of arbitrator authority and therefore a corresponding restriction of judicial involvement in the process. Arbitration is a faster process, draws on the expertise of persons in the field, ² and is less expensive. To allow a court to "second guess" an arbitrator by granting a broad scope of review would nullify those advantages. Most important, limited judicial review gives the parties what they have bargained for binding arbitration, not merely arbitration binding if a court agrees with the arbitrator's conclusion. See American Manufacturing, 363 U.S. at 567, 80 S.Ct. at 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1406. As stated in Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1429, a plenary review by a court of the merits of a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement would "make meaningless the provisions (of the...