Service Employees Intern. Union, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Public Instruction
| Decision Date | 29 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 51142-0,51142-0 |
| Citation | 705 P.2d 776,104 Wn.2d 344 |
| Parties | , 27 Ed. Law Rep. 586 SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 6, Appellant, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Hafer, Cassidy & Price, John Burns, Seattle, for appellant.
Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Patterson, Lacey, for respondent.
The Service Employees International Union Local 6 (SEIU) appeals from the trial court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment action. SEIU contends that the trial court erred by finding that a salary increase provision of a 1982 collective bargaining agreement between SEIU and South Central School District 406 (District) exceeded the statutorily established ceiling for school district employee salary increases. We conclude that the collective bargaining agreement complied with the applicable statutory provisions and we reverse.
In December 1980, SEIU and the District entered into a collective bargaining agreement which allowed for an average salary increase for classified employees of 13.28 percent for 1981-82. In March 1981, the State Legislature enacted RCW 28A.58.095, which prohibits school district boards of directors from granting salary increases "in excess of the amount and or percentage as may be provided for employees as set forth in the state operating appropriations act in effect at the time the compensation is payable." RCW 28A.58.095(1). The statute also provides:
Provisions of any contract in force on March 20, 1981 which conflict with requirements of this section shall continue in effect until contract expiration. After expiration, any new contract executed between the parties shall be consistent with this section.
For purposes of this appeal, RCW 28A.58.095 has three important ramifications: (1) it recognizes the validity of the December 1980, collective bargaining agreement between SEIU and the District; (2) it indicates that once the agreement expired there would be limitations on "the amount and or percentage" of future salary increases; and (3) it incorporates by reference a future piece of legislation, the State appropriations act, to establish the salary limitation.
In May 1981, two months after RCW 28A.58.095 went into effect, the 1981 State appropriations act was enacted. The act appropriated funds and authorized expenditures "for the operations of state agencies for the fiscal biennium beginning July 1, 1981, and ending June 30, 1983". Laws of 1981, ch. 340, p. 1612. In authorizing salary increases for classified school district employees, section 92 of the appropriations act provided in pertinent part: "Percentage increases provided under this section ... shall not exceed the percentages specified in LEAP Document 2." (Italics ours.) Laws of 1981, ch. 340, § 92, p. 1666. LEAP Document 2 was defined in section 88 of the appropriations act to mean a computer tabulation calculating the average salaries for basic education certificated and classified staff and specifying the allowable salary increase percentages. For the District, LEAP Document 2 provided:
Classified
----------
Avg. Salary % Entl. % Entl.
Thus, three sources must be analyzed to determine if a salary increase for school district employees in the 1981-83 biennium complied with the statutory limitation: (1) RCW 28A.58.095, (2) the State appropriations act, and (3) LEAP Document 2.
In 1982, the collective bargaining agreement between SEIU and the District, which provided for a 13.28 percent salary increase for 1981-82, expired. The union and the school district then entered into another collective bargaining agreement which provided classified employees with a 7.37 percent salary increase for 1982-83.
The Superintendent for Public Instruction found that the District's collective bargaining agreement covering the 1982-83 school year violated the salary increase provisions established by the Legislature. The Superintendent based his finding on WAC 392-140-020(2), a rule promulgated by the Superintendent pursuant to his authority under the 1981 appropriations act. The rule interprets the appropriations act as providing that the ceiling on permissible salary increases is to be determined by using the 1980-81 average salary, specified in LEAP Document 2, as a base salary to which the percentages to the right thereof are to be applied. Accordingly, the Superintendent determined that LEAP Document 2 allowed for the following average salary levels:
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83
------- ------- -------
$14,977 $15,471 $16,611
(base salary) (base salary X 3.3%) ($15,471 X 7.37%)
The Superintendent then calculated that SEIU's collective bargaining agreements allowed for the following average salaries:
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83
------- ------- -------
$14,977 $16,966 $18,216
(base salary) (base salary X 13.28%) ($16,966 X 7.37%)
Because the 1982-83 collective bargaining agreement provided employees with average salaries in excess of $16,611, the Superintendent concluded that SEIU and the District had violated the statutory salary limitation provisions.
After receiving the Superintendent's ruling, SEIU filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in superior court. The union contended that the Superintendent misconstrued the appropriations act by tying the allowable percentage salary increase to the average base salary.
Prior to trial, SEIU moved for summary judgment and the Superintendent, in turn, moved that the union action be dismissed pursuant to CR 12(b). The trial court denied the union's motion and, pursuant to CR 12(b), considered the Superintendent's motion as a motion for summary judgment which it granted. From these rulings, SEIU appeals.
The dispute over the validity of the 1982-83 collective bargaining agreement centers on a question of statutory construction. Specifically, we must decide if the percentage compensation increases contained in LEAP Document 2 are to be viewed independently for each school year or if the percentage compensation increases are to be tied to the average salary figure also listed in that document. Because the collective bargaining agreement covering the 1981-82 school year was entered into prior to the passage of the salary limitation law, both parties agree that the 13.28 percent increase is lawful. The 7.37 percent increase, called for in the collective bargaining agreement covering the 1982-83 school year, is also valid if each salary increase percentage listed in LEAP Document 2 is to be viewed independently. However, if the percentages listed in LEAP Document 2 are to be tied to the average base salary, then the 7.37 percent increase called for in the collective bargaining agreement violates the salary limitation law.
In construing a statute, the court's paramount duty is to ascertain and give expression to the intent of the Legislature. Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash.2d 441, 445, 536 P.2d 157 (1975). To determine the intent of the Legislature, the court "must look first to the language of the statute." Condit v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 101 Wash.2d 106, 110, 676 P.2d 466 (1984). "Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself." Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wash.2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163 (1982). In analyzing the wording, the court must read the statute as a whole; "intent is not to be determined by a single sentence". Human Rights Comm'n, at 121, 641 P.2d 163.
Here, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The 1981 appropriations act provides that salary increases "shall not exceed the percentages specified in LEAP Document 2." (Italics ours.) Laws of 1981, ch. 340, § 92(3), p. 1666. Thus, the language of section 92 of the 1981 appropriations act does not tie the percentage salary increase to the average 1980-81 salary listed in LEAP Document 2.
Additional support for this conclusion is found in an accompanying section of the appropriations act. In section 91 of the 1981 appropriations act, the Legislature calculated the total amount of state funds that a school district would receive for classified employee compensation. Unlike section 92, section 91 did tie the percentage increases to the average salary listed in LEAP Document 2:
(2) Total 1982-83 basic education classified compensation entitlement for a particular school district shall be the sum of the following:
(a) Maintenance of classified compensation for a particular school district shall be equal to the classified staff units ... multiplied by the 1980-81 average classified salary established in LEAP Document 2 for that district improved by the 1981-82 percentage salary increase ...
(Italics ours.) Laws of 1981, ch. 340, § 91, p. 1665.
"Where different language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed that a different meaning was intended." State v. Roth, 78 Wash.2d 711, 715, 479 P.2d 55 (1971). Thus, because the Legislature tied the average base salary to the percentage in the allocation section but did not do so in the classified salary increase section, this court will presume that the Legislature did not intend to tie the average salary to the percentage in determining the allowable staff salary increases. We, therefore, construe the appropriations act as limiting 1982-83 staff salary increases for the South Central School District to 7.37 percent. Staff salary...
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