Sessa v. State

• Decision Date: 09 July 1979
• Citation: 47 N.Y.2d 976,419 N.Y.S.2d 972
• Parties: , 393 N.E.2d 1044 Leonard SESSA et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 972

419 N.Y.S.2d 972

47 N.Y.2d 976, 393 N.E.2d 1044

Leonard SESSA et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 9, 1979.

Arthur D. Goldstein, New York City, for appellants.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Peter J. Dooley, Shirley Adelson Siegel and Jeremiah Jochnowitz, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Order affirmed, with costs, for the reasons stated in the opinion by Mr. Justice Robert G. Main at the Appellate Division (63 A.D.2d 334, 408 N.Y.S.2d 547, see, also, Ebbets v. State of New York, 47 N.Y.2d 973, 419 N.Y.S.2d 972, 393 N.E.2d 1044).

COOKE, C. J., and JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER and FUCHSBERG, JJ., concur.

MEYER, J., dissents in part and votes to modify in the following opinion.

MEYER, J. (dissenting).

I dissent and vote to reverse except as to Leonard Sessa, whose claim accrued more than six years prior to his application. The conclusion below, now affirmed by this court, that the saving provisions of the amendment made by chapter 280 of the Laws of 1976 do not apply to any claim which accrued more than Three years prior to the effective date of that amendment flies in the face of the fact that the saving provision allows a court to act at any time within Six years after accrual of the claim. So to interpret the amendment is to place undue emphasis on the rule requiring prospective application of statutes, recognized in Matter of Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 410-411, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 377 N.E.2d 453, to be no more than a rule of construction, and to ignore the background against which the saving provision was enacted.

Of course, the legislative intent could have been more clearly stated, but viewed in the setting of its enactment the amendment more than adumbrates its purpose to authorize a court to permit the late filing of any claim which on September 1, 1976, its effective date, was not six years old.

Prior to the amendment an appropriation claim was required to be filed within three years after accrual, but there was no provision authorizing the Court of Claims to allow late filing of such a claim. ¹ Private bills were, therefore, the only method to obtain compensation for a time-barred appropriation. Perceiving the unfairness and inequality of treatment resulting from the use of private bills, Governor Carey in 1975 vetoed a number of such bills, ² stating that he would submit to the next session of the Legislature "proposed legislation to enable this subject to be handled in the future in a logical, fair and orderly way, in place of the haphazard, careless and discriminating procedure which has been followed up to this time".

Chapter 280 of the Laws of 1976 was the resulting change in the Court of Claims Act. By it the Legislature for the first time gave the court discretion as to appropriation claims, by adding a new second sentence to subdivision 6 expressly referring to such claims and by providing that such a claim should be "deemed an action upon an implied contractual obligation", thus making the period within which discretion could be exercised Six years (CPLR 213, subd. 2). Since the very purpose of the amendment was to authorize the Court of Claims to allow revival of a time-barred...