Seventh Urban, Inc. v. University Circle Property Development, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-1569,80-1569
• Citation: 423 N.E.2d 1070,67 Ohio St.2d 19,21 O.O.3d 12
• Parties: , 21 O.O.3d 12 SEVENTH URBAN, INC., Appellee, v. UNIVERSITY CIRCLE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 19

67 Ohio St.2d 19

423 N.E.2d 1070, 21 O.O.3d 12

SEVENTH URBAN, INC., Appellee, v. UNIVERSITY CIRCLE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellant.

No. 80-1569.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 1, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

Courts of common pleas and municipal courts have concurrent original jurisdiction in forcible entry and detainer actions.

On May 19, 1978, plaintiff-appellee, Seventh Urban, Inc., filed a complaint in forcible entry and detainer in the Cleveland Municipal Court. The complaint alleged that defendant-appellant, University Circle Property Development, Inc., unlawfully and forcibly detained from appellee's possession certain premises located at 10600-10608 Euclid Avenue in the city of Cleveland, and sought restitution thereof.

On June 6, 1978, appellant filed an answer, "counterclaim and third-party defendant complaint." In its counterclaim and third-party complaint, appellant sought recovery of $1,000,000 in actual damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. Thereafter, pursuant to Civ.R. 13(J), appellant moved to certify the proceedings to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County on the basis that the counterclaim exceeded the "jurisdictional limits of the Cleveland Municipal Court." Despite appellee's opposition, the motion was granted and the proceedings so certified.

Appellee then filed a "Motion to Bifurcate" in the Court of Common Pleas and the same was granted. The action in forcible entry and detainer having been severed from the "balance of the case," a hearing was held on the morning of June 30, 1978, for the purpose of scheduling the forcible entry and detainer action for trial. Trial was set for July 5, 1978.

In the afternoon of June 30, 1978, appellant filed a motion for continuance, requesting a 90-day delay of the trial of the forcible entry and detainer action. This motion was overruled and the case was tried, as scheduled. At the close of all the evidence, the court withdrew the case from consideration by the jury and entered judgment for appellee. Additional facts, as required, will be set forth in this opinion. The only issue before this court relates to the trial court's resolution of the forcible entry and detainer action. ¹

Appellant gave timely notice of appeal. Among the numerous issues raised by appellant was whether the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer action. The Court of Appeals, finding such jurisdiction to be present, affirmed. The Court of Appeals finding further that its decision on the jurisdictional question was in conflict with decisions of the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County in Harbine v. Davis (1944), 41 Ohio Law Abs. 65, 57 N.E.2d 421; Lynam v. Schueler (1946), 79 Ohio App. 101, 68 N.E.2d 114; and Mann v. Sexton (1955), 99 Ohio App. 47, 130 N.E.2d 866, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination. ²

Schulman & Schulman, Jack Schulman and Howard A. Schulman, Cleveland, for appellee.

James R. Willis and William Wuliger, Cleveland, for appellant.

PAUL W. BROWN, Justice.

Including the certified question, appellant raises six propositions of law for our consideration. In essence, these assignments of error present three basic questions: (1) Did the court of common pleas have jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer action; (2) did the court err in directing a verdict for appellee; and (3) did the court err in denying appellant's motion for a continuance?

I.

The first issue presented is one which has not been previously addressed by this court. Succinctly stated, the question is whether courts of common pleas have subject-matter jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions? ³ The Court of Appeals answered this question in the affirmative, and we agree. ⁴

" 'Jurisdiction has been defined as: The power to hear and determine a cause; * * * the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide them; * * * the power of a court or a judge to entertain an action, petition, or other proceeding; * * * a power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate to take cognizance of and determine causes according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution.' " (Citation omitted.) Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Santoro (1915), 93 Ohio St. 53, at 56, 112 N.E. 190. " 'Jurisdiction * * * means the authority to hear and determine a cause. Concurrent * * * means that which is joint and equal in authority.' " State v. King (1957), 166 Ohio St. 293, at 296, 142 N.E.2d 222.

In Ohio, the judicial power of authority flows, generally, from Section 1, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. ⁵ The jurisdictional foundation for courts of common pleas, however, is set forth specifically in Section 4(B) of Article IV, as follows:

"The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law."

Thus, it can appropriately be said that courts of common pleas are "the constitutional courts of general original jurisdiction in Ohio." 22 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, 46-47, Courts, Section 16; State ex rel. Heimann v. George (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 231, 344 N.E.2d 130. So stating, however, does not answer the question herein presented. "The constitution itself confers no jurisdiction whatever upon that court (Court of Common Pleas), either in civil or criminal cases. It is given a capacity to receive jurisdiction in all such cases, but it can exercise none, until 'fixed by law.' " (Emphasis added.) Stevens v. State (1854), 3 Ohio St. 453, at 455; State ex rel. Miller v. Keefe (1958), 168 Ohio St. 234, 152 N.E.2d 113.

It is clear, therefore, that the power to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas rests in the General Assembly and that such courts may exercise only such jurisdiction as is expressly granted to them by the legislature. Cincinnati v. Bossert Machine Co. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 76, 243 N.E.2d 105, certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 998, 89 S.Ct. 1592, 22 L.Ed.2d 776; Wolfrum v. Wolfrum (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 237, 208 N.E.2d 537; Jacobsen v. Jacobsen (1956), 164 Ohio St. 413, 131 N.E.2d 833; State ex rel. Black v. White (1936), 132 Ohio St. 58, 5 N.E.2d 163; Ellis v. Urner (1932), 125 Ohio St. 246, 181 N.E. 22; Hess v. Devou (1925), 112 Ohio St. 1, 146 N.E. 311; and Miller v. Eagle (1917), 96 Ohio St. 106, 117 N.E. 23. By this, we do not imply that a court of common pleas is powerless to issue those writs or take such action as is necessary to aid or to protect its statutorily granted jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Miller v. Keefe, supra.

The express legislative grant of jurisdiction to courts of common pleas is contained in R.C. 2305.01. ⁶ Appellant argues generally that this grant is not broad enough to encompass jurisdiction over actions in forcible entry and detainer. The specific basis for appellant's argument is that the provisions governing the procedures to be followed in the action of forcible entry and detainer are contained in R.C. Title 19, and that the location of such provisions in juxtaposition to the grant of jurisdiction to municipal courts manifests a legislative intent that municipal courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over such actions. Such argument is not well taken.

While it is true that the monetary and subject matter jurisdiction of municipal courts is defined in R.C. 1901.17 and 1901. 18, ⁷ respectively, an analysis of such sections fails to support appellant's argument. As can be easily ascertained, neither section provides that the jurisdiction of municipal courts in such matters is exclusive. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. The intent of the General Assembly to provide concurrent jurisdiction in such matters with courts of common pleas can be inferred, for example, from R.C. 1901.18, which states, in part: " * * * a municipal court has original jurisdiction within its territory: * * * (B) In any action or proceeding at law for the recovery of money or personal property of which the court of common pleas has jurisdiction." The jurisdiction of municipal courts over proceedings at law, within the monetary limitations set out in R.C. 1901.17, is measured not in absolute terms but in terms of the jurisdiction granted to courts of common pleas.

The General Assembly, had it chosen to do so, was clearly empowered to deny jurisdiction to courts of common pleas in forcible entry and detainer actions. See Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, supra; Miller v. Eagle, supra ; and State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis (1929), 119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298. It is equally clear that the General Assembly was cognizant of the difference between exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. ⁸ This being so, it may be reasonably presumed that had the General Assembly intended to vest exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions in municipal courts, it would have so provided.

An action in forcible entry and detainer is a civil action and the courts of common pleas have "original jurisdiction in all civil cases." R.C. 2305.01, at fn. 6, supra. ⁹ We hold, therefore, that courts of common pleas have original jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions, albeit such original jurisdiction is concurrent with that of municipal courts. ¹⁰

II.

The majority of appellant's propositions of law are directed toward the trial court's action in directing a verdict against it. The primary thrust of appellant's argument is that the alleged defaults occurred prior to the time appellee acquired title to the property, and that appellee therefore had no basis upon which to support an action in forcible entry and detainer. ¹¹ This, as well as appellant's other arguments, as set forth, infra, lacks merit.

The basic facts concerning title to the subject premises are not in dispute. In 1919, the property involved herein was owned by Nellie B. Cole. On May 27, 1919, Cole...