State v. King, 34919

Decision Date24 April 1957
Docket NumberNo. 34919,34919
Citation166 Ohio St. 293,142 N.E.2d 222,2 O.O.2d 200
Parties, 2 O.O.2d 200 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. KING, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

The Akron Municipal Court does not have jurisdiction to try and finally dispose of a case in which an offense is charged to have been committed in a township outside the territorial limits of the court, where there is a qualified justice of the peace residing in such township and the offense is not one over which a justice of the peace in Summit County has county-wide jurisdiction.

Defendant and appellee herein, Catherine M. King, was arrested upon an affidavit issued out of the Akron Municipal Court and thereafter was tried and convicted by that court. The affidavit, which was signed by a deputy sheriff of Summit County, charges defendant with keeping a house of ill fame in Copley Township in violation of Section 13031, General Code and sets forth that defendant was a resident of Copley Township, Summit County, and that the offense with which she is charged occurred in that township.

Prior to the production of any testimony in the Municipal Court, defendant moved that court to dismiss the case upon the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction for the reason that the cause arose in Copley Township where there were two duly elected justices of the peace.

Defendant's motion was overruled but was renewed at the conclusion of the state's evidence, which was all the evidence, none being offered by defendant. The motion was overruled both times.

Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Common Pleas Court, which court reversed the judgment and discharged her upon the sole ground that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to finally dispose of the case, and that her challenge of the jurisdiction was timely and well taken.

On appeal by the state, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.

The cause is before this court upon the allowance of the state's motion to certify the record.

Alva J. Russell, Pros. Atty., Edward O. Erickson, Director of Law, and Rufus L. Thompson, Akron, for appellant.

Davis & Lipps, Akron, for appellee.

STEWART, Judge.

No question is made that the territorial limits of the Akron Municipal Court are confined to the city of Akron, and its only jurisdiction beyond such limits is granted by Section 1598, General Code (Section 1901.20, Revised Code), which reads as follows:

'The court [Municipal Court] shall have jurisdiction of the violation of any ordinance of any municipality within its territory and of any misdemeanor committed within the limits of its territory. In all such prosecutions and cases the court shall proceed to a final determination thereof. The court shall have jurisdiction to hear felony cases committed within its territory and to discharge, recognize, or commit the accused.

The court shall also have jurisdiction within the limits of the county or counties in which its territory is situated of those crimes and offenses which are now or may hereafter be within the county wide jurisdiction of justices of the peace.'

From a reading of the above statute, it is obvious that the Akron Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to try defendant for an offense committed outside the court's territory, to wit, Copley Township, unless the offense was within the county-wide jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Such jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal matters is defined in Section 13422-2, General Code (Section 2931.02, Revised Code). It confers such jurisdiction over 18 offenses outlined in the section, of which the offense with which we are concerned is not one. It also confers county-wide jurisdiction as follows:

'A justice of the peace shall be a conservator of the peace and have jurisdiction in criminal cases throughout the township in which he is elected and where he resides, and county wide jurisdiction in all criminal matters only upon affidavit or complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney or upon affidavit or complaint made by the sheriff, the party injured or any authorized representative of a state or federal department, in the event there is no other court of concurrent jurisdiction other than the Common Pleas Court, police court, or mayor's court, and on view or on sworn complaint, to...

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7 cases
  • Gerald v. Com. Gerald
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • 31 d4 Maio d4 2018
    ...in context of discussion of jurisdiction that "[t]he word concurrent means joint and equal in authority"); State v. King , 166 Ohio St. 293, 142 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1957) (stating in context of discussion of jurisdiction that "[c]oncurrent, as here used, means that which is joint and equal in ......
  • Seventh Urban, Inc. v. University Circle Property Development, Inc.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 1 d3 Julho d3 1981
    ...authority to hear and determine a cause. Concurrent * * * means that which is joint and equal in authority.' " State v. King (1957), 166 Ohio St. 293, at 296, 142 N.E.2d 222. In Ohio, the judicial power of authority flows, generally, from Section 1, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. 5 Th......
  • Gerald v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • 27 d2 Dezembro d2 2016
    ...In re Estate of Cassidy, 313 A.2d 435, 438 (Me. 1973) ("Concurrent jurisdiction means joint and equal jurisdiction."); State v. King, 142 N.E.2d 222, 225 (Ohio 1957) ("Jurisdiction, as here used, means the authority to hear and determine a cause. Concurrent, as here used, means that which i......
  • Elkem Metals Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Washington County Bd. of Revision
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 13 d3 Maio d3 1998
    ...is the authority to hear and determine a cause. See, also, Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton (1854), 3 Ohio St. 494; State v. King (1957), 166 Ohio St. 293, 2 O.O.2d 200, 142 N.E.2d 222. The jurisdiction for boards of revision is set forth in R.C. 5715.01 and 5715.11. R.C. 5715.01 provides, "There......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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