Seward v. Receivers Op Seabd. Air Line Ry

• Decision Date: 22 May 1912
• Citation: 75 S.E. 34,159 N.C. 241
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SEWARD . v. RECEIVERS OP SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. et al.

75 S.E. 34

(159 N.C. 241)

SEWARD .

v.RECEIVERS OP SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 22, 1912.

1. Master and Servant (§ 32^*)— Blacklisting Statute—Construction.

Laws 1909, c. 858, which provides that a former employer may, upon request from any other person to whom a discharged employe has applied for employment, give in writing a truthful statement of the reason for such discharge, read in the light of the common law existing prior to its enactment under which the employer could in good faith report all matters which he believed to be true concerning his employe, will not be held by the words "a truthful statement of the reason for such discharge" to limit the employer's right to the exact reasons for the discharge, so that upon an application the entire record of an engineer was properly given to other railroads to whom he applied for employment.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 38; Dec. Dig. § 32.*]

2. Evidence (§ 244*)—Statement of Cause foe Discharge—Action.

Where it was within the scope of a railroad officer's employment to furnish a copy of the record of former employes to persons applying therefor, a statement in such report which was not of the character permitted to be given by Laws 1909, c. 858, was proper evidence against the company in an action for damages from the making of the improper report.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 916-936; Dec. Dig. § 244.*]

3. Master and Servant (§ 32*)—Blacklisting.

A statement included in a report of a record of a former employe to the effect that he was at the time suing the company reporting was outside of the information requested and improper as not bearing upon the character and competency of the employe, and would not be rendered proper by the fact that it was true.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 38; Dec. Dig. § 32.*]

4. Master and Servant (§ 32*)—Blacklisting—Action for—Evidence—Sufficiency.

In an action for damages for making an improper report upon the record of a discharged employe, evidence held sufficient to go to the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 38; Dec. Dig. § 32.*]

Brown, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Webb, Judge.

Action by R. H. Seward against the Receivers of the Seaboard Air Line Railway and the Seaboard Air Line Railway. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

This is an action to recover damages under chapter 858, Laws 1909, for preventing or attempting to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining employment with certain railroad companies as an engineer.

The plaintiff entered the employment of the defendant as engineer on the 31st of January, 1907, and was discharged on the 9th of January, 1909. After his discharge he applied to the Florida East Coast Railroad Company for employment, and this company, with the consent of the plaintiff, requested the defendant to give it a report of the record of the plaintiff, to which request the defendant replied on January 22, 1909, as follows: "As per your request of the 18th instant, I beg to give below the record of Engineman R. H. Seward: Entered service January 31, 1907. Charged with thirty days actual suspension for refusing to go out. Thirty days on account of accident. Thirty days actual suspension for damage on account of crown sheet to engine being damaged. Thirty days actual suspension for responsibility in connection with collision; and forty-five days record suspension for minor offenses, and dismissed January 9, 1909, for leaving station on time of another train, resulting in head-on collision." The plaintiff also applied to the Norfolk & Southern Railroad Company for employment, and, upon request from said company for the record of the plaintiff, the defendant replied, on July 9, 1909, as follows: "As per your request of July 7th, beg to give below report of Engineman R. H. Seward while in our service, and will state further that this man is now suing the S. A. L. for personal injury. Entered service January 31, 1907. Charged with thirty days actual suspension for refusing to go out. Thirty days on account of accident. Thirty days actual suspension for damages to crown sheet of engine. Thirty days actual suspension for responsibility in connection with collision; and forty-five days record suspension for minor offenses, and dismissed January 9, 1909, for leaving station on time of another train, resulting in head-on collision." The plaintiff also applied to the Durham & Charlotte Railroad Company for employment, and, upon request of said company for the record of the plaintiff, the defendant replied, on December 15, 1909, as follows: "Yours of December 11th. Kindly find below record of R. H. Seward. Entered service January 31, 1907. Charged with thirty days actual suspension for refusing to go out. Thirty days on account of accident. Thirty days actual suspension for damage to crown sheet of engine. Thirty days actual suspension for responsibility in connection with collision; and forty-five days record suspension for minor offenses, and dismissed January 9, 1909, for leaving station on time of another train, resulting in head-on collision."

The action for personal injury referred to in the letter of the defendant of July 9, 1909, was commenced after the discharge of the plaintiff by the defendant, and was settled in October, 1909, by the payment of $1,-350 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that he was refused employment by the several companies to which he had applied by reason of the re-ports made by the defendant, and that the statements contained in the reports were false. He admitted, however, on cross-examination, that he was notified of each charge contained in the report, and had a hearing thereon, and there was no evidence that the report did not contain a true statement of the action of the defendant upon the charge.

The part of chapter 858, Laws 1909, relevant to this case, is as follows: "If any person, agent, company or corporation, after having discharged any employe from his or its service, shall prevent or attempt to prevent, by word or writing of any kind, such discharged employe from obtaining employment with any other person, company, or corporation, such person, agent, or corporation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and such person, agent, company, or corporation shall be liable in penal damages to such discharged person, to be recovered by a civil action; but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any person or agent of any company or corporation from informing, in writing, upon request, any other person, company, or corporation to whom such discharged person or employe has applied for employment, a truthful statement of the reason of such discharge."

The plaintiff contended: (1) That the defendant had no right, under the statute, to give the record of the plaintiff, and could do no more than state the reasons for his discharge. (2) That if the defendant could give the record of the plaintiff, it did not state it truthfully, and was actuated by malice.

The defendant contended: (1) That it had the right, upon request, to give the entire record of the plaintiff, and that its communications were privileged, and not actionable, in the absence of malice. (2) That there was no evidence of malice.

At the conclusion of the evidence, his honor, upon motion of the defendant, entered judgment of nonsuit, and the plaintiff excepted and appealed.

Douglass, Lyon & Douglass and R. N. Simms, for appellant.

W. H. Pace and Armistead Jones & Son, for appellees.

ALLEN, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] The statute under which this action is brought by its express terms embraces "any person, agent, company or corporation, " and is applicable alike to all who employ labor. It must be read in the light of the common law as it existed prior to its enactment for the purpose of seeing wherein it was deficient, and of discovering the remedy intended to be supplied by the statute. Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 232, says: "When any question arises as to the meaning or the scope of a statutory enact ment, it is a good rule to compare it with the common law on the same subject, and to construe the statute with reference to that law. * * * No statute enters a field which was before entirely unoccupied. It either affirms, modifies, or repeals some portion of the previously existing law. In order, therefore, to form a correct estimate of its scope and effect, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the laws, both common and statutory, which heretofore were applicable to the same subject. Whether the statute affirms the rule of the common law on the same point, or whether it supplements it, supersedes it, or displaces it, the legislative enactment must be construed with reference to the common law; for in this way alone is it possible to reach a just appreciation of its purpose and effect. Again, the common law must be allowed to stand unaltered as far as is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the new law." And again on page 110: "The intention of the Legislature in enacting a particular statute is not to be ascertained by interpreting the statute by itself alone, and according to the mere literal meaning of its words. Every statute must be construed in connection with the whole system of which it forms a part and in the light of the common law and of previous statutes upon the same subject. And the Legislature is not to be lightly presumed to have intended to reverse the policy of its predecessors or to introduce a fundamental change in long-established principles of law."

When we look to the common law, we find that the employer had the right to employ whom he pleased, and to discharge with or without reason, and that the employe...