Sewell v. State, 63266
Decision Date | 20 April 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 3,No. 63266,63266,3 |
Citation | 696 S.W.2d 559 |
Parties | Randall Douglas SEWELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jesse L. Nickerson, III (on appeal only), Paris, for appellant.
Tom Wells, Dist. Atty. and Edward D. Ellis, Asst. Dist. Atty., Paris, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., and Alfred Walker, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ODOM and McCORMICK, JJ.
Appellant was convicted of murder. Punishment was assessed at eighty years.
Appellant, in a single ground of error, complains that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in declaring a mistrial on its own motion. At his first trial, appellant, prior to voir dire of the jury, filed a motion to shuffle the jury panel in accordance with Article 35.11, V.A.C.C.P. The trial judge denied the motion. Thereafter, appellant proceeded with the State to select a jury which was impaneled and sworn. After the jury had been impaneled and sworn, the trial judge determined that he had erred in refusing appellant's motion to shuffle and announced that he felt compelled to declare a mistrial. Prior to ordering a mistrial, the trial judge inquired if the appellant or the State desired a mistrial. Both the State and the appellant declined to ask for a mistrial and announced they desired to continue the trial with the jury they had selected. The trial court on its own motion declared a mistrial determining that there was a "manifest necessity" to do so. Appellant objected to the court's order of a mistrial. On retrial, appellant urged a special plea of double jeopardy in that the jury had already been impaneled and sworn in his first trial at the time that a mistrial was ordered. The plea of double jeopardy was denied by the trial judge.
Whether there can be a new trial after a mistrial has been declared without the defendant's request or consent depends on whether there is a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. Chvojka v. State, 582 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). However, only if jeopardy has attached is a court called upon to determine whether the declaration of a mistrial was required by "manifest necessity." Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). Thus, we must first determine if jeopardy attached. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches after the jury is impaneled and sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). The record shows that the jury had been impaneled and sworn when the judge declared a mistrial. Jeopardy had attached.
Next, we must determine if a "manifest necessity" existed.
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, at 464, 93 S.Ct. at 1070, 35 L.Ed.2d at 431.
In Somerville, the trial court declared a mistrial after it determined it was faced with a defective indictment. The trial court in the instant case faced a similar situation. In Texas, the right to shuffle a jury panel is provided for under Article 35.11, supra, and upon timely demand, it is an absolute right, denial of which constitutes reversible error. Davis v. State, 573 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Como v. State, 557 S.W.2d 93, 94 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Woerner v. State, 523 S.W.2d 717 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Alexander v. State, 523 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Since reversal automatically would have followed for failure to grant appellant's motion to shuffle the jury panel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a mistrial on its own motion. Under Illinois v. Somerville, supra, "manifest necessity" existed. See also, Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Appellant's ground of error is overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
On original submission appellant's conviction for murder was affirmed. We held the trial judge was justified in ordering a mistrial due to "manifest necessity" after he had erroneously overruled appellant's motion to shuffle the names of the jury panel and proceeded to select a jury, empanel and swear them. In his motion for rehearing appellant now agrees that "[i]f automatic reversal would have followed a conviction the trial court was empowered under the doctrine of 'manifest necessity' to order a mistrial upon its own motion and over Appellant's objection." However, he contends that his...
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